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ABSTRACT
NIXON’S WAR ON TERRORISM
THE FBI, LEFTIST GUERRILLAS, AND THE ORIGINS OF WATERGATE
SEPTEMBER 2016
DANIEL S. CHARD, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christian G. Appy
In 1969, militant factions within both Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the
Black Panther Party (BPP) began to form the United States’ first clandestine
revolutionary urban guerrilla organizations: the Weather Underground and the Black
Liberation Army (BLA). These groups carried out bombings, police ambushes, and other
attacks throughout the country, prompting responses from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the administration of President Richard M. Nixon.
Several historians have analyzed U.S. leftist guerrillas’ motives, and much has
been written on FBI operations against the Black Power movement and New Left,
including the Bureau’s covert counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) designed
to “neutralize” these movements. Most of this scholarship has been one-sided, however,
framing FBI activities as “state repression” without analyzing how state actors
understood and responded to leftist violence. Drawing on declassified FBI documents
and materials in the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, “Nixon’s War on Terrorism”
revises this literature, explaining for the first time how domestic leftist guerrilla
violence reshaped the FBI and American politics during the Nixon administration.
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War with domestic leftist guerrillas transformed the FBI’s surveillance practices,
spawned the United States’ earliest institutions explicitly dedicated to combatting
“terrorism,” and triggered a bureaucratic struggle between the Nixon White House and
the FBI that played a critical role in fomenting the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s
August 1974 resignation. This dissertation examines how the FBI came to expand its
surveillance of the U.S. Left and revive mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and
break-ins—illegal spy techniques that Director J. Edgar Hoover had employed widely
against the Communist Party after World War II but banned during the mid-1960s. This
is a story of unintended consequences and conjuncture. Leftist guerrillas did not
achieve their goal of sparking a socialist revolution, and the FBI was unsuccessful in its
aim of preventing guerrilla violence. The Nixon administration was also unable to halt
guerrilla attacks. But together—through their conflicts with one another—leftist
guerrillas, FBI officials, and the Nixon administration triggered Watergate, the Church
Committee, antiterrorism politics, and a crisis of popular legitimacy from which neither
the Bureau nor the federal government have ever fully recovered.

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................... ix
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER
1.

VIOLENT DIALECTIC: NIXON, THE FBI, AND AMERICA’S GUERRILLA
INSURGENCY .............................................................................................................................. 40

2.

INTERNAL WARS: FACTIONALISM AND THE TURN TO
CLANDESTINITY .................................................................................................................... 100

3.

COUNTERING A NEW THREAT: THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND,
“TERRORISM,” AND THE HUSTON PLAN .................................................................... 129

4.

LOSING FACE: THE WAR AT HOME AND THE FBI’S PUBLIC IMAGE .............. 158

5.

MOUNTING CRISES: THE BLACK LIBERATION ARMY,
THE PENTAGON PAPERS, AND ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE .................................. 197

6.

DEEP THROAT’S SECRET WARS: BREAK-INS, ANTI-TERRORISM, AND
THE ROAD TO WATERGATE ............................................................................................. 242

EPILOGUE ................................................................................................................................................ 292
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 305

INTRODUCTION
RETHINKING AMERICA’S “SECOND CIVIL WAR”

During the years of Richard Nixon’s presidency, from 1969 and 1974, Black Power and
New Left radicals detonated hundreds of bombs inside the United States. Most of this
violence occurred during Nixon’s first two years in office. Between January 1969 and
April 1970, American leftists carried out more than four hundred politically motivated
bombings and arsons, with urban police stations and university Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) offices among the most frequent targets.1 A small number of
young radicals went further, taking their commitment to armed revolutionary struggle
This estimate comes from Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York: Random House, 1973), 632, and draws from
several sources outlined below. More research is needed to arrive at a precise number, though most
government reports put the numbers far higher. A July 1970 report by the Senate Investigations
Subcommittee, for example, documented 1,188 bombings, arsons, and attempted bombings during this
period. Another report drafted around the same time by the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of
the U.S. Treasury documented 40,934 bombings, attempts, and threats during this period, of which Sale
extrapolated approximately 2,800 were leftist bombings. In his memoir, Richard Nixon (presumably
drawing from the Treasury report) stated that there were over 40,000 bombings during this period. A
special January 1971 special issue of the leftist magazine Scanlan’s on “Guerrilla War in the U.S.A.”
documented over 1,000 examples of “guerrilla acts of sabotage and terrorism in the United States” in
1969 and 1970. All of these studies, however, included many examples of unclaimed bombings at schools,
businesses, homes, and other locations that were not necessarily politically motivated. Both radicals from
Scanlan’s and conservative proponents of “law-and-order,” including Nixon and politicians who chaired
the government investigating committees, had political motivations for overstating these numbers, the
former in order to celebrate a supposed incipient guerrilla revolution in the United States, and the latter
in order to emphasize the need for a stronger federal response to such activity. See Senate Committee on
Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearings on Riots, Civil, and
Criminal Disorders, Part 25, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., July 31, August 4, 5, and 6 1970; Richard Nixon, RN: The
Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 470; and Scanlan’s 1 no. 8
(January 1971), copy in author’s possession courtesy of Trevor Griffey. Journalist Bryan Burrough wrote
in his recent book that there were over 2,500 bombings “during an eighteen-month period in 1971 and
1972,” 1,900 of them in 1972. Burrough cited an interview with a retired FBI agent as his source for this
information, but provided no documentary evidence. The dates attributed to this figure are almost
certainly the result of the agent’s mistaken memory, since the peak of leftist bombing activity occurred
from 1969 to 1971 and dropped precipitously in 1972. See Bryan Burrough, Days of Rage: America’s
Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence (New York: Penguin Press,
2015), 5. For a more conservative quantitative study of political bombings from 1969 to 1975 that is
missing data from 1969 but shows 1972 and 1973 as a low point in the period’s bombings, when fewer
than 60 occurred over a two year period, see National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism (Washington, 1976), 509.
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beyond sporadic bomb attacks. Beginning in 1969, militant factions within both
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panther Party (BPP)—the
principle organizations of the predominantly white New Left and the Black Power
movement—began to form the United States’ first clandestine revolutionary urban
guerrilla organizations: the Weather Underground and the Black Liberation Army
(BLA).
America’s leftist guerrillas adopted clandestinity in hopes of evading state
surveillance while launching sustained campaigns of revolutionary urban guerrilla
warfare.2 They took inspiration from Latin American theorists Ernesto “Ché” Guevara
and Carlos Marighella, who believed that spectacular armed actions carried out by small
“focos” of highly disciplined guerrillas could spark popular revolutionary uprisings,
rendering unnecessary traditional leftist strategies of grassroots organizing and party
building. Modeling themselves after Uruguay’s Tupamaros and other Latin American
guerrilla organizations, members of the Weather Underground and BLA established a
revolutionary “underground” from which to launch guerrilla attacks on America’s
My thinking on clandestinity draws from Donna della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2; Gilda Zwerman, Patricia G. Steinhoff, and Donatella della Porta,
“Disappearing Social Movements: Clandestinity in the Cycle of New Left Protest in the U.S., Japan,
Germany, and Italy,” Mobilization: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (2000), 85-104; and Carlos Marighella,
“Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” in Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents, ed.
Jay Mallin (Coral Gables: University of Florida Press, 1982), 70-115. Della Porta defines clandestine
political violence as violence carried out “by small, underground groups (or even single individuals)
oriented to (more or less clearly stated) political aims.” However, neither della Porta, Zwerman, nor
Steinhoff offer a clear definition for clandestinity. I define clandestine urban guerrilla organizations as
groups whose members developed underground infrastructures of safe houses, fake IDs, and secret
communication networks for the purpose of evading state surveillance while conducting sustained
campaigns of politically-motivated urban guerilla warfare, in the form of bombings, police assassinations,
and other attacks. Timothy B. Wickham-Crowley characterizes guerrilla warfare as combat typically
undertaken by non-state insurgents who “avoid massed direct engagements with the enemy and instead
… concentrate on sapping the enemy’s strength and morale through ambushes, minor skirmishes, lighting
raids and withdrawals, cutting of communications and supply lines, and similar techniques.” Timothy B.
Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and
Regimes since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3.
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corporations, military, and police. They took on assumed names and forged false
identifications (IDs). They built an infrastructure of secret “safe houses” located
throughout the country. They trained themselves in the use of firearms and the
manufacture of explosives. And they were not alone. These organizations were part of a
larger trend within the international left—in Brazil, Italy, Japan, Northern Ireland,
South Africa, West Germany, and elsewhere during the late 1960s and early 1970s—in
which revolutionaries adopted urban guerrilla warfare as a strategy for overthrowing
the state and creating a socialist society.3
Instead of inspiring a socialist revolution, however, America’s homegrown leftist
guerrillas provoked backlash from the Nixon administration and U.S. police agencies.
Though responsible for only a fraction of the revolutionary violence carried out in the
United States during the Nixon years, the Weather Underground and BLA attracted a
disproportionate amount of police attention. These guerrilla organizations had a
particularly strong influence on the primary agency responsible for safeguarding
America’s “internal security”: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The Weather Underground, which emerged in 1969, two years prior to the BLA,
provoked the FBI with their clandestinity—their ability to elude capture while carrying
out bombings throughout the country and taking credit for them in widely publicized
communiqués. The Weather Underground also incited Nixon and his White House staff,
who personally and repeatedly implored FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to suppress
Lindsey Churchill, Becoming Tupamaros: Solidarity and Transnational Revolutionaries in Uruguay and
the United States (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014); Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home:
The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political
Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America; Zwerman, et al.,
“Disappearing Social Movements.”

3

3

America’s guerrilla insurgency. Initiated in 1970, the FBI’s Weather Underground
investigation (codenamed WEATHFUG) was the Bureau’s largest investigation since the
Charles Lindbergh kidnapping case of 1932-34. The FBI only captured a few of the
Weather Underground’s dozens of members, however, and was unable to prevent the
group’s bombings. The Weather Underground carried out over twenty bombings
throughout the United States before disbanding in 1976, hitting the Capitol, the
Pentagon, and the State Department among other targets.4
The BLA also attracted massive, nationwide FBI investigations, many of them
coordinated with those of local police agencies. Seeking to retaliate for police violence
against black communities and build an armed revolutionary movement inside the
United States, the BLA assassinated police officers, broke comrades out of jail, and
robbed banks to fund its underground activities. From 1971 to 1974, BLA guerrillas
killed at least eight police officers in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, and New Jersey,
and wounded more than a dozen. Seven of the group’s own members also perished in
shootouts with law enforcement. The BLA’s wave of assaults did not last as long as the
Weather Underground’s because the group engaged in riskier actions that exposed its
members to police capture, and because as African Americans, the BLA’s underground
The strongest scholarly study of the Weather Underground is Varon, Bringing the War Home, which
compares the organization with West Germany’s Red Army Faction. Dan Berger, Outlaws of America: The
Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity (Oakland: AK Press, 2006) offers further details on the
group’s history, much of it from oral histories, though it lacks peer review. Also see Ron Jacobs, The Way
the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (New York: Verso, 1997). For primary sources
produced by the Weather Underground, see Bernadine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, and Jeff Jones, eds., Sing a Battle
Song: The Revolutionary Poetry, Statements, and Communiqués of the Weather Underground, 1970-1974
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006). Several former Weather Underground members have published
memoirs: David Gilbert, Love and Struggle: My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond
(Oakland: PM Press, 2011); Mark Rudd, Underground: My Life with SDS ad the Weathermen (New York:
Harper Collins, 2009); Cathy Wilkerson, Flying Close to the Sun: My Life and Times as a Weatherman (New
York: Seven Stories Press, 2007); Bill Ayers, Fugitive Days: Memoirs of a Antiwar Activist, 2nd ed. (Boston:
Beacon Press, 2009); Susan Stern, With the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman
(New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975).
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guerrillas were vulnerable to racial profiling by law enforcement. By the time Nixon
resigned from office on August 9, 1974, police had sent most BLA members to prison or
the grave.5
A number of historians have explained revolutionary guerrillas’ motives, citing
the U.S. war in Vietnam, repressive police violence, and the post-World War II era’s
global wave of armed anticolonial rebellion as some of the prime factors driving
American radicals to take up arms.6 Scholars have also written a great deal on FBI
operations against the U.S. Left, including a number of works on FBI surveillance and
the Bureau’s secret counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) established in 1956
to undermine the Communist Party and expanded in 1967 and 1968 to “destroy,
disrupt, or otherwise neutralize,” America’s Black Power and antiwar movements.7

The BLA managed a brief resurgence between November 2, 1979, when the group broke its member
Assata Shakur from prison, until October 20, 1981, when a botched armored truck heist in Nyack, New
York led to the capture or death of its last members. Historians have yet to publish a full history of the
BLA. The best published scholarly source is Akinyele O. Umoja, “The Black Liberation Army and the
Radical Legacy of the Black Panther Party,” in Black Power in the Belly of the Beast, edited by Judson L.
Jeffries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 224-251. For a dissertation on the BLA, see Gaidi
Faraj, “Unearthing the Underground: A Study of Radical Activism in the Black Panther Party and Black
Liberation Army” (PhD dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 2007). For a brief overview of the
BLA’s history by one of its incarcerated former members, see Jalil Muntaqim, On the Black Liberation
Army (Montreal: Arm the Spirit/Solidarity, 2002). For a memoir by a former BLA member, see Jamal
Joseph, Panther Baby: A Life of Rebellion and Reinvention (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 2012).
6 Daniel Burton-Rose, Guerrilla USA: The George Jackson Brigade and the Anticapitalist Underground of the
1970s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Berger, Outlaws of America; Varon, Bringing the
War Home; Zwerman, et al., “Disappearing Social Movements.” For a sensational true crime account of the
Weather Underground, the BLA, and other U.S. leftist guerrilla groups during the 1970s and 80s, see
Burrough, Days of Rage.
7 Works covering late-1960s FBI operations against the U.S. left include David Cunningham, There’s
Something Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004); James Kirkpatrick Davis, Spying on America: The FBI’s Domestic
Counterintelligence Program (New York: Praeger, 1992); Kenneth O’Reilly, “Racial Matters”: The FBI’s File
on Black America, 1960-1972 (New York: Free Press, 1989); and Athan Theoharis, Spying on Americans:
Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). On
the April 1971 burglary of an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania that first exposed the FBI’s mass domestic
surveillance and counterintelligence operations, see Betty Medsger, The Burglary: The Discovery of J.
Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014). For a sociological study of FBI reforms and
institutional changes during the 1970s and 80s, see Tony Poveda, The FBI in Transition: Lawlessness and
Reform (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990). Scholarly works covering the sweep of FBI
5
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However, despite a mountain of literature on the FBI, the Nixon administration, and
1960s-era social movements, historians have yet to address fundamental questions:
How did members of the FBI and Nixon administration understand and respond to
Black Power and New Left violence? How did clandestine urban guerrilla violence affect
the FBI’s surveillance, counterintelligence, and investigative practices? How did the
FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas influence the Nixon White House and
history from 1908 to the early twenty-first century include Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Athan Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical
History (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); and Richard Gid Powers, Broken: The Troubled Past
and Uncertain Future of the FBI (New York: Free Press, 2004). Much of the FBI’s history has been written
as biographies of J. Edgar Hoover (1895-1972), who served as FBI Director from 1924 to 1972. See
Beverly Gage, G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the American Century (forthcoming, New York: Viking, 2017);
Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1993); Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991);
Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); and Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J.
Edgar Hoover (New York: Free Press, 1987). For unreliable accounts of FBI operations, see Ward
Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI’s Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party
and the American Indian Movement, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002), and The
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars against Dissent in the United States, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002). Churchill and Vander Wall based their work largely on previous
scholars’ research (much of which they misrepresented) and memoirs by leftist activists and police
informants. Among other works, the pair uncritically drew upon former Black Panther leader Huey P.
Newton’s questionable Ph.D dissertation “War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America,”
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz, 1980). Churchill and Vander Wall wrote The
COINTELPRO Papers in response to a review of Agents of Repression published in the Washington Post
preeminent FBI history Athan Theoharis, which argued that the authors did not provide evidence to back
their claims. See Athan Theoharis, “Building a File: The Case Against the FBI: AIM and the FBI,”
Washington Post, October 30, 1988. Though The COINTELPRO Papers includes excerpts of some FBI
documents, the authors misrepresent many of these sources, or interpret them out of historical context,
just as they did in their previous book. In 2007, Ward Churchill (who never earned a Ph.D.) was forced
from his faculty position in the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of Colorado Boulder after a
panel of experts determined that he had misrepresented evidence in several of his books on Native
American history (the panel did not review his books on the FBI). Because the University launched the
investigation in response to complaints from right wing activists about an essay he wrote after the 9/11
attacks arguing that some of the victims deserved their fate, some of Churchill’s supporters on the
militant left continue to believe that his dismissal was entirely politically motivated, rather than
motivated partially by politics and partially by his spurious scholarship. Churchill and Vander Wall
remain widely cited in scholarly literature on the New Left and Black Power movement. Independent
scholar Ernesto Vigil is currently finishing revisions of a forthcoming book critical of Ward Churchill and
his scholarship on the FBI and the American Indian Movement for University of Oklahoma Press. Ivan
Greenberg, The Dangers of Dissent: The FBI and Civil Liberties since 1965 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2010) draws from research in large collections of declassified documents previously unseen by scholars
that the author obtained through FOIA requests and lawsuits. The book lacks peer review, however, and
offers conspiratorial arguments without adequate corroboration or consideration of revolutionary
violence.
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American politics beyond the radical left?8 More broadly, how did conflict between
leftist militants and the state shape the punitive, “law-and-order” turn in American
politics that led to the rise of counterterrorism, militarized policing, and the racialized
system of mass incarceration that scholars have termed the “carceral state” and the
“New Jim Crow”?9
Most literature on the topic explains FBI operations against the Black Power
movement and New Left during the late 1960s and early 1970s in one-sided terms,
chronicling examples of Bureau misconduct in exposé-style narratives. Framing FBI
operations under the broad rubric of “political repression,” scholars have portrayed the
Bureau’s counterintelligence and domestic surveillance programs as products of
officials’ paranoia, anticommunist hatred, racism, or hunger for power without
considering how state actors understood and responded to revolutionary violence.10
Journalist Betty Medsger, for example, has argued that the FBI carried out its secret
operations merely to “silence people whose political opinions the director [Hoover]
opposed.”11 Similarly, sociologist David Cunningham asserted, without presenting
evidence, “the FBI has gone beyond the passive monitoring of dissidents [and instituted
An amazon.com search for books on “FBI History” yields over 2,000 results, yet there are no reliable
works on FBI operations targeting the U.S. Left during the critical period of the Nixon presidency (19691974). For a journalistic overview of FBI history that makes limited reference to Nixon-era revolutionary
violence, see Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012).
9 Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Khalil Gibran Muhammad, and Heather Ann Thompson, eds., “Historians and the
Carceral State,” special issue, Journal of American History 102, no. 1 (2015); Michelle Alexander, The New
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 2nd ed. (New York: The New Press, 2013);
Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
10 For an older, but influential work exhibiting such tendencies, see Robert Justin Goldstein, Political
Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present (Boston: G K. Hall & Co., 1978). Churchill and
Vander Wall’s book have also been influential in this regard. O’Reilly, “Racial Matters,” acknowledges that
concerns over political violence motivated FBI operations against the Black Panthers, but does not fully
analyze this. Clayborne Carson makes similar observations about SNCC in In Struggle: SNCC and the Black
Awakening of the 1960s, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
11 Medsger, The Burglary, 7.
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disruptive counterintelligence programs] whenever threats to the status quo have
intensified.”12 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, who remain highly cited despite
being discredited as reliable scholars, contended a core lesson to be learned from the
history of the FBI and the U.S. left is that “to the extent that you become effective at
advocating and organizing around your agenda, you will be targeted by the FBI for
systematic undermining and discrediting, harassment, and—ultimately—outright
elimination by counterintelligence operatives.”13
Though varying in scholarly merit, most literature on FBI operations against
American leftists during the late 1960s and early 1970s offer analyses mirroring those
of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities, popularly known as the “Church Committee” after its chair,
Senator Frank Church (D, ID). In January 1975, in the aftermath of the Watergate
Scandal and President Nixon’s resignation, the Senate charged the Church Committee
with the task of investigating American federal intelligence agencies’ involvement in
“illegal, improper, or unethical activities”14 Based on unprecedented Congressional
access to thousands of formerly classified intelligence documents, the Church
Committee’s nearly 1,400 pages of reports on the FBI revealed for the first time how the
Bureau used electronic surveillance, informants, mail-opening, break-ins, and covert
counterintelligence programs against American citizens in order to undermine
dissident social movements, manipulate the mass media, and influence government
Cunningham, There’s Something Happening Here, 8-9.
Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression, 384. See footnote 7 for further discussion on
Churchill’s scholarship.
14 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities
(hereafter, Church Committee), Final Report, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II,
94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, v.
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policy from 1936 through the early 1970s.15 The Church Committee reports offer what
remain the most detailed studies of FBI operations against dissident social movements
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and include extensive evidence on how
insurgent political violence influenced the FBI during this period. However, due to their
post-Watergate focus on uncovering FBI improprieties as a step towards reforming U.S.
intelligence agencies, and because of their thematic rather than chronological
framework, the Church Committee reports do not sufficiently analyze how domestic
revolutionary violence contributed to changes in FBI practices over time.16
Instead of explaining the changing motives and political conflicts underlying FBI
operations, the Church Committee reports offered broad-brush passive-voice claims
implying that FBI officials were driven primarily by political bias. The reports argued,
for example, that the postwar FBI was characterized by “a relentless expansion of
domestic intelligence activity beyond investigation of criminal conduct toward the
collection of political intelligence and the launching of secret offensive actions against
Americans,” and that “the unexpressed major premise of the [counterintelligence]
programs was that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary
to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order.”17 While these
statements are not entirely inaccurate, they do not explain the motives behind FBI
Church Committee, Book II, and Final Report, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.
16 In addition to its main final report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Book II), which
overviews FBI improprieties and offers policy recommendations, the Church Committee’s Supplementary
Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Book III) includes separate
reports on break-ins, informants, counterintelligence operations, mail opening, and other topics. For an
analysis of the Church Committee as a post-Watergate effort to restore the popular legitimacy of
America’s intelligence agencies, see Kathryn S. Olmstead, Challenging the Secret Government: The PostWatergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Also
see Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America’s Spy Agencies
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015).
17 Church Committee, Book II, 21, and Book III, 3.
15

9

operations, which cannot be understood solely as products of officials’ political biases.
The Church Committee’s focus on documenting FBI misdeeds without fully analyzing
the motives behind them obscured the fact that by 1969, homegrown revolutionary
violence had become a core, urgent concern for both the FBI and the Nixon
administration. Without analyzing leftist violence, however, we cannot properly
understand the FBI’s Nixon era operations against political dissidents, the origins of the
Watergate, or the rise of counterterrorism and mass incarceration.
This study is the most significant revision of scholarship on FBI operations
against the Black Power movement and New Left since the Church Committee reports.
Drawing upon materials in the Richard Nixon Library and numerous declassified FBI
files, “Nixon’s War on Terrorism” offers new perspectives on social movements,
policing, and political violence in the postwar United States, examining for the first time
how domestic leftist guerrillas and debates over a problem officials framed as
“terrorism” reshaped the FBI and American politics during the Nixon administration.
War with homegrown revolutionary guerrillas transformed the FBI’s
surveillance practices, spawned the United States’ earliest institutions explicitly
dedicated to combatting “terrorism,” and triggered a bureaucratic struggle between the
Nixon White House and the FBI that played a critical role in fomenting the Watergate
Scandal. This story centers on how the FBI came to expand its surveillance of America’s
Black Power and antiwar movements by increasing its use of paid informants inside
leftist groups and reviving mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and break-ins, illegal
spy techniques that Hoover had employed widely against the Communist Party USA
after World War II but banned during the mid-1960s. It is a story of unintended
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consequences and conjuncture. Leftist guerrillas did not achieve their goal of kickstarting a socialist revolution. And despite overhauling its surveillance operations, the
FBI was unsuccessful in its aim of preventing guerrilla violence. The Nixon
administration was also largely ineffective in halting guerrilla attacks, in spite of the
immense pressure it put upon the FBI to accomplish this task. But together—through
their conflicts with one another—leftist guerrillas, FBI officials, and the Nixon
administration triggered Watergate, the Church Committee, antiterrorism politics, and
a crisis of popular legitimacy from which neither the Bureau nor the federal
government have ever fully recovered.

W. Mark Felt, who oversaw FBI investigations of the Weather Underground and other
leftist guerrillas during the Nixon years later recalled, “In the late Sixties and early
Seventies, the country was at war—civil war—though very few knew it.”18 This world of
violent civil war would have been unthinkable at the outset of the 1960s. In President
John F. Kennedy’s America, the civil rights and student movements devoted themselves
to nonviolent direct action and participatory democracy. The group most responsible
for domestic bombings was the racist Ku Klux Klan. In early-1960s Birmingham,
Alabama, the Klan’s use of explosives to terrorize African Americans was so prolific that
the city gained the nickname “Bombingham.”19 Before long, however, the United States
government became the world’s leading bomber. After Kennedy’s November 22, 1963

W. Mark Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside (New York: Putnam, 1979), 11.
David Mark Chalmers, Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 15-20.
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assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson escalated his predecessor’s creeping
military intervention in Vietnam into a full-blown invasion, and oversaw the most
extensive aerial bombardment in human history. By the end of the war the U.S. had
dropped over eight million tons of explosives and napalm on Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, four times the amount of all U.S. aerial bombs employed during World War
II.20 In response, the student movement—radicalized by state violence and their
inability to stop it through normal political channels—rose to the forefront of the
antiwar movement and escalated its strategy from one of protest to physical resistance.
A militant subset eventually turned to armed revolution. The student antiwar
movements’ trajectory mirrored that of the African American freedom struggle, whose
participants increasingly questioned the efficacy of nonviolence after the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 left untouched the longstanding problem
of police brutality in Northern and West Coast cities. The massive wave of more than
250 urban riots during the Johnson years reflected this reality, as did the rise of the
Black Panther Party, which mushroomed during the brief period of 1967 to 1969 from
an obscure local group in Oakland, California into a nationwide organization whose
leaders called upon members to prepare for armed revolution against police and the
American government.21

Marilyn B. Young, “Bombing Civilians: An American Tradition,” History News Network, April 11, 2009,
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/67717.
21 Elizabeth Hinton, “‘A War within Our Own Boundaries’: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and the Rise of
the Carceral State,” Journal of American History 102, no. 1 (2015), 100-112; Amanda I. Seligman, “But
Burn—No”: The Rest of the Crowd in Three Civil Disorders in 1960s Chicago,” Journal of Urban History
vol. 37, no. 2 (2011), 230-255. Scholars disagree on what terminology to use for describing the civil
disorders of the 1960s. Emphasizing the political grievances underlying the events, some have insisted on
using the terms “uprising” or “rebellion” over “riot,” which many contemporary critics used to emphasize
the unlawful and destructive nature of the incidents. Others insist on more “neutral” terms such as
“disorder,” “disturbance,” and “upheaval.” For further overview of this debate and current scholarship on
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Several historians have invoked the notion of civil war to discuss the social
conflicts that shook American society during the 1960s and early 1970s and left in their
wake a legacy of heightened political partisanship and shattered faith in American
exceptionalism. As Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin put it, “In the course of the
1960s, many Americans came to regard groups of fellow countrymen [sic] as enemies
with whom they were engaged in a struggle for the nation’s very soul. Whites versus
blacks, liberals versus conservatives (as well as liberals versus radicals), young versus
old, men versus women, hawks versus doves, rich versus poor, taxpayers versus
welfare recipients, the religious versus the secular, the hip versus the straight, the gay
versus the straight—everywhere one looked, new battalions took to the field, in a spirit
that ranged from that of redemptive sacrifice to vengeful defiance.”22 Similarly, Rick
Perlstein argued, “between 1965 and 1972, America experienced no less than a second
civil war. Out of it the political world we know now was born.”23 But the conflict
Perlstein referred to as America’s “second civil war” was fought not only between
contesting social groups and political ideologies. This “war” also included a violent
informal military conflict between leftist guerrillas, who sought to topple U.S.
imperialism, and the FBI, which endeavored to defend America’s national security from
revolutionary violence. In contrast to the “high intensity” combat between formal
civil disturbances, see Seligman, “But Burn—No,” 247-248. I use these terms interchangeably, since the
riots were complex, and featured overlapping incidents of insurgent, criminal, and state violence.
22 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, 4th ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-4. For another synthetic overview of 1960s-era America that invokes
the theme of civil war, see Mark Hamilton, America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to Richard
Nixon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). For an explanation of how the U.S. “war at home”
during the war in Vietnam shattered faith in American exceptionalism, see Christian G. Appy, “The War at
Home,” Chapter 7 in American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity (New York: Viking,
2015). Also see Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1990).
23 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner,
2008), front jacket flap.
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military forces that characterized the American Civil War, however, the FBI’s covert war
with domestic guerrillas more resembled the “low intensity conflicts” the U.S. pursued
to crush revolutionary regimes and movements in Latin America and Southeast Asia
during the Reagan administration.24
To characterize the FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas as part of a second
American civil war is dramatic, but historically inaccurate. For one, the U.S. home front
of the 1960s and early 1970s was not exceptionally violent. Though published in 1969,
just before the rate of leftist bombings reached its peak, a report compiled for the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence determined that the
period from 1939 to 1968 was actually one of the least violent in U.S. history.25 There
were also antecedents for the FBI’s 1970s war with domestic leftist guerrillas. During
World War I and the years immediately after, the Bureau of Investigation, the Justice
Department, and Congress responded to a surge of anarchist bombings by broadly
targeting the U.S. labor and antiwar movements with political surveillance, arrests,
deportations, and legislative criminalization of speech, most significantly in what came
to be known as the “Palmer Raids” of 1919-1920.26

Ivan Malloy, Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press,
2001).
25 Sheldon G. Levy, “A 150-Year Study of Political Violence in the United States,” in Violence in America:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: New American
Library, 1969).
26 The most thorough study of the Palmer Raids (named after Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) is
Regin Schmidt, Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States (Copenhagen:
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000). For an analysis of how federal government surveillance partnerships
with private social activist organizations forged in response to antiwar and anarchist bombings from
1914 to 1919 laid a foundation for the Bureau of Investigation’s involvement in red scare of 1919-1920,
see Jennifer Fronc, New York Undercover: Private Surveillance in the Progressive Era (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2009), 177-188. Also see Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America
in its First Age of Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For discussion on how state and
vigilante repression shaped the anarchist movement, particularly its Italian women, see Jennifer
24
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The notion of a second civil war also overstates leftist guerrillas’ power. The
United States underwent tremendous change during the 1960s, as powerful social
movements toppled the South’s racist Jim Crow regime, overhauled traditional gender
norms, and reconfigured the Democratic and Republican parties. Unlike during the Civil
War, however, at no point during the 1960s or 1970s was the United States in a
“revolutionary situation,” which Rod Aya defines as when “two or more groups of
power holders vie for sovereignty of one territory formerly governed by one power.”27
American workers never carried out enough strikes during the 1960s to halt industrial
production. Though massive GI rebellion in 1971 played an important role in
compelling Nixon to pull U.S. military forces out of Southeast Asia, there was no mutiny
among America’s domestic police agencies.28 And although mass street protests and
leftist guerrilla bombings gave rise to an institutional conflict between the FBI and
Nixon administration, radicals never succeeded in preventing state officials from
carrying out their daily executive decisions or maintaining any significant level of
popular legitimacy.29 In other words, not only was this conflict “asymmetrical”—
America’s leftist guerrillas never stood a chance of overthrowing the state. Though their
violence was “revolutionary” in intention, it was never revolutionary in practice. By
embracing clandestine urban guerrilla warfare, the Weather Underground and BLA
vastly underestimated U.S. state power and overestimated their own. Their decision to

Guglielmo, Living the Revolution: Italian Women’s Resistance and Radicalism in New York City, 1880-1945
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 199-209.
27 Rod Aya, Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method
(Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1990), 71.
28 Appy, American Reckoning, 212-216.
29 I thank John Higginson for pushing me to think through these points, and for introducing me to Rod
Aya’s book. See John Higginson’s work on political violence, Collective Violence and the Agrarian Origins of
South African Apartheid, 1900-1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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forgo the difficult task of organizing leftist social movements was a grave strategic
error.
Although the notion of a second Civil War is inappropriate, war is a useful
framework for rethinking FBI operations against the Black Power movement and New
Left during the Nixon administration. Understanding the FBI and leftist guerrillas as
combatants in an informal war—in which both state forces and leftist guerrillas
inflicted and suffered violence—can help us move beyond inaccurate narratives that
explain Bureau operations as part of a centralized government conspiracy to quash
dissent, or argue that America’s leftist guerrilla violence had little impact on the state.
In recent years, historians have published a great deal of literature on groups
associated with America’s late 1960s and 1970s militant left, particularly the Black
Panther Party.30 This scholarship has been driven by a new generation of social
movement historians seeking to amend earlier participant-observer accounts that
dismissed such groups as reckless or blamed them for the left’s decline.31 While this
new work has greatly enriched our understanding of the era’s social movements, it has
Recent monographs on the Black Panther Party include Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., Black
Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2013); Donna Jean Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther
Party in Oakland, California (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Jane Rhodes, Framing
the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon (New York: New Press, 2007); Paul
Alkebulan, Survival Pending Revolution: The History of the Black Panther Party (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 2007); and Curtis Austin, Up Against the Wall: Violence and the Making and Unmaking of
the Black Panther Party (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006). For an analytical overview of
Black Panther historiography up to 2009, see Joe Street, “The Historiography of the Black Panther Party,”
Journal of American Studies vol. 44 no. 2 (2010), 351-375. See footnotes 4-6 for overviews of literature on
the Weather Underground and other American leftist guerrilla groups. Also see Dan Berger, Captive
Nation: Prison Organizing in the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014);
and ed., The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010).
31 See, for example, Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About
the Sixties (New York: Free Press, 1996); Hugh Pearson, Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the
Price of Black Power in America (Cambridge: Perseus, 1995); Eric Cummins, The Rise and Fall of
California’s Prisoners’ Rights Movement (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Todd Gitlin, The
Sixties: Days of Hope and Rage, 2nd ed. (New York: Bantham Books, 1993).
30
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not included significant new primary source research on the FBI. Indeed, this literature
has tended to reproduce one-sided interpretations of FBI operations while neglecting to
examine how militant leftists’ violent rhetoric and actions influenced U.S. police
agencies, policies, and political culture. Moreover, the literature has tended to blur key
distinctions in police activity: between FBI activities and those of other police and
intelligence agencies; between counterintelligence and surveillance; between officiallysanctioned and informal FBI actions; and between paid informants and undercover
agents.32 As a result, FBI operations against the Black Panthers and SDS, which were
central to the larger conflicts that rocked American society during the Nixon years,
remain widely misunderstood.
One-sided interpretations of FBI operations are especially pronounced in the
recent historiography of the Black Panther Party. Early journalistic and participantobserver accounts of the BPP chronicled stories of Panther violence against police,
neighbors, and their own members and allies, asserting that the organization in many
ways resembled a gang.33 Over the past ten years, scholarly studies of the organization
have downplayed Panthers’ fratricidal and criminal violence, instead exploring how
experiences of state violence in the form racial inequality, police brutality, and
incarceration shaped the organization’s changing political ideology, programs, and

Bloom and Martin acknowledged, “It is not clear whether the wave of raids of Panther offices that
followed [Nixon’s election] was the independent response of local police to the victory of Nixon’s Law and
Order campaign in the polls or whether the FBI systematically encouraged the change in policy
nationwide.” Nonetheless, the authors lumped the actions of various police and other state agencies
together as part of a singular “state repression” without analyzing conflict within and among state
agencies or the role of Panther violence and violent rhetoric in influencing state actors’ decisions.
33 David Hilliard, This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther
Party (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 314; and Collier and Horowitz, Destructive Generation, 141-165. Also
see Street, “The Historiography of the Black Panther Party,” 359, 360-362, 372, 374.
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strategies.34 In regards to the FBI, however, most recent books on Black Panther history
offer only slightly modified versions of Huey P. Newton’s conspiratorial thesis from his
1980 Ph.D. dissertation “War Against the Panthers”—that the FBI and other “agencies
and officers of the federal government” endeavored to destroy the BPP because of the
organization’s “political ideology and potential for organizing a sizeable group of the
country’s population that has been historically denied equal opportunity.”35 By and
large, historians of the Black Panthers have not engaged with the strongest post-Church
Committee study of FBI operations against the Party, Kenneth O’Reilly’s 1989 book,
“Racial Matters,” which argues that violent Panther rhetoric “invited” much of the “FBI
repression” of the Party.36
The scholarly monographs on Black Panther history published since 2006 base
their interpretations of FBI operations against the Party primarily upon three key
declassified FBI documents originally excerpted in the Church Committee reports,
highlighted in Newton’s dissertation, and reprinted in Ward Churchill and Jim Vander
Wall’s unreliable 1990 book The COINTELPRO Papers.37 These FBI documents are as
follows: a August 25, 1967 memo authorizing the Bureau’s counterintelligence program
against so-called “Black Nationalist-Hate Groups” (COINTELPRO-BHNG) with its aim to
“expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize” the black freedom
movement and its leaders; a March 4, 1968 memo expanding COINTELPRO-BNHG
operations to forty-one field offices in order to prevent the rise of a black “messiah”
See footnote 30.
Newton, “War Against the Panthers.”
36 O’Reilly, “Racial Matters,” 295. Bloom and Martin, Rhodes, and Austin cited O’Reilly but did not engage
with his argument. Murch and Alkebulan did not cite O’Reilly.
37 For commentary on the dubious scholarly merits of Newton’s dissertation and the works of Churchill
and Vander Wall, see footnote 7 and Street, “The Historiography of the Black Panther Party,” 355, 357358.
34
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capable of unifying the “militant black nationalist movement”; and a September 1968
memo naming the Black Panthers as the new primary target of COINTELPRO-BNHG.38
These books also cite COINTELPRO memos on operations designed to exacerbate
violent tensions between the Panthers and groups such as the cultural nationalist US
organization, as well as documents in which Hoover calls for counterintelligence
programs to undermine the Panthers’ free breakfast programs for children.39 In
addition, the Black Panther histories cite Hoover’s July 1969 statement (often misdated
as having been said in September or November 1968) that the Black Panthers posed the
“greatest threat to the internal security of the country,” and the Church Committee’s
finding that 233 of the FBI’s 295 COINTELPRO-BNHG operations (79 percent) targeted
the Black Panther Party.40 Furthermore, the Black Panther monographs chronicle
federal and state indictments of individual Panthers, Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
surveillance of the Party, and local police raids on BPP offices.41
Citing this information, Black Panther historians have argued that the FBI and
other agencies targeted the Black Panther Party with a “virulent” and “systematic”
campaign of “state repression” motivated by officials’ desires to combat the supposed

Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 201-203, 211; Murch, Living for the City, 160-161, 184;
Alkebulan, Survival Pending Revolution, 84; Rhodes, Framing the Black Panthers, 184-185; Austin, Up
Against the Wall, 191-193; Churchill and Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers, 92-93, 108-111, 124-125;
Church Committee, Book III, 20-22, 187-188.
39 Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 211, 218; Murch, Living for the City, 184; Alkebulan, Survival
Pending Revolution, 84-85; Austin, Up Against the Wall, 230-240; Churchill and Vander Wall, The
COINTELPRO Papers, 130-133; Church Committee, Book III, 189-195.
40 Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 210 (for a discussion of sources on Hoover’s statement see
444 fn45); Murch, Living for the City, 184; Alkebulan, Survival Pending Revolution, 84; Austin, Up Against
the Wall, xxvi-xxvii; Rhodes, Framing the Black Panthers, 293; Churchill and Vander Wall, The
COINTELPRO Papers, 123.
41 Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 199-215.
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threat that the Party posed to America’s political order.42 In his book on the BPP and
violence, for example, Curtis Austin contended that “it was not Panther violence but the
violence of the state that ultimately determined the tactics of the party” and that the
BPP “immediately incurred the decidedly violent and deadly wrath of all levels of
government after they took full responsibility for their own survival and advancement
and after they openly challenged the white monopoly on violence in black
communities.”43 Similarly, in Black Against Empire, described by reviewers as the
“definitive” “comprehensive history” of the Black Panther Party, Joshua Bloom and
Waldo E. Martin Jr. argued that the FBI targeted the Party with counterintelligence
programs because of the group’s “influence, growing national scope, and the political
challenge it … posed to the status quo.”44 The authors also reiterated the assertion that
“no aspect of the Black Panther program was of greater concern to the FBI than the Free
Breakfast for Children Program.”45 Bloom and Martin provided no evidence that the
BPP ever seriously threatened America’s political order, however, and attributed the
organization’s decline to state repression and decreased support from more moderate
allies in the Black freedom and antiwar movements without considering how violent
Panther rhetoric and actions contributed to such developments.46 Donna Jean Murch
incorporated more Panther agency into her assessment of how FBI operations
contributed to the Party’s downfall, asserting that the “seeds” of the BPP’s destruction
“were sewn not only by state repression but also by the leadership’s reliance on an
Ibid, 200; Murch, Living for the City, 148. Also see Alkebulan, Survival Pending Revolution, 83-86; Austin,
Up Against the Wall, 191-193, 246-247;
43 Austin, Up Against the Wall, xxii.
44 Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 203.
45 Ibid, 211.
46 Ibid, 393-394.
42
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armed wing,” “the failure to establish democratic procedures within the organization,”
and leaders’ “pronouncements endorsing urban guerrilla warfare.”47 Murch did not
fully develop this argument or conduct substantial new research in FBI sources,
however, and her overall account of FBI operations mirrors those of other Panther
historians.48
A full reevaluation of FBI surveillance and counterintelligence operations against
the Black Panther Party is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, by freshly
examining declassified FBI sources and shifting the framework from one of government
conspiracy to one of mutually constitutive war, this dissertation illustrates how conflict
between the FBI and the militant left gave rise to the Weather Underground and Black
Liberation Army as well as further conflict between leftist guerrillas and the state. In
doing so, it contributes to recent scholarship on the historical origins of today’s crisis of
mass incarceration, which has rightly explained the rise of law-and-order politics
during the 1960s and 1970s as a state backlash (or “frontlash”) against the Black
freedom movement, but without sufficiently analyzing how leftist violence informed
state actors’ policy decisions.49 Nixon’s War on Terrorism underscores the importance of

Murch, Living for the City, 189.
Murch’s account of FBI and police operations against the Panthers drew primarily from unpublished
dissertations and the works of Newton, Churchill and Vander Wall, and Austin. Rhodes also added a twist
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49 Elizabeth Hinton’s recent work is an important exception, analyzing how urban riots informed
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social movement’s strategies in affecting the outcome of their struggles, explaining for
the first time how militant leftists’ choices to pursue urban guerrilla warfare shaped the
FBI and the larger conflicts that gave rise to the punitive turn in American politics.
A domestic war framework also challenges the popular post-9/11 belief that
those who engage in violence labeled as “terrorism” are somehow motivated by
psychosis or irrational “extremist” ideologies rather than by understandable political
grievances. Politically, this view tends to legitimize state violence and surveillance
carried out in the name of “counterterrorism.”50 Historians have written a great deal on
the circumstances that radicalized Black Power and New Left activists, and notions of a
psychologically abnormal “terrorist mindset” as the source of non-state political
violence have been thoroughly interrogated in critical scholarly literature as
deterministic and politically biased.51 Nonetheless, a separate body of work on the
history of “terrorism” tends to reinforce this view by applying today’s dominant statecentric definition of “terrorism”—a tactic of political violence carried out by non-state
actors with the aim to spreading fear beyond the immediate target—to a vast array of
examples across time and space without sufficiently contextualizing them in relation to
state violence and political conflict.52 Moreover, terrorist experts, often with ties to

Development of American Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21 (2007),
230-265.
50 Sam Rafael, “In the Service of Power: Terrorism Studies and U.S. Intervention in the Global South”;
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state security forces, continue to frame the Weather Underground, BLA, and other
1970s U.S. leftist guerrilla groups as “terrorists.”53
My approach takes a great deal of inspiration from scholars in the subfield of
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), who have called upon Terrorism Studies scholars to
analyze “terrorist” violence within broader historical and political contexts. Mikkel
Thorup, for instance, has argued that instead of uncritically adopting state definitions
for the term “terrorism,” “one has to write the history of terrorism as a dialectics or
‘dialogue’ between the state and its violent challengers.”54 Sociologist Lisa Stampnitzky
has demonstrated that the history of the term “terrorism” is itself critical to
understanding conflicts between insurgents and the state.55 Though late nineteenth and
early twentieth century state officials sometimes referred to anarchist bombings as
“terrorism,” for example, they more typically framed such violence as “anarchism,” a
term that then carried heavier overtones of illegitimacy and existential threat to
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Western civilization.56 During the 1930s and after World War II, “Communism” would
become America’s new bogeyman. Not until the 1970s did “terrorism” become, as
Stampnitzky put it, “the dominant framework for understanding illegitimate political
violence,” as Americans came to associate the term almost exclusively with political
violence carried out by non-state actors.57
Stampnitzky has located the origins of this trend in the Palestinian nationalist
Black September Organization’s attack on the Israeli Olympic team during the
September 1972 Munich Games, after which a new community of terrorism experts,
supported in part by Nixon’s newly formed Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism,
invented the modern concept of “terrorism” and gained influence among state officials
in the U.S. and elsewhere.58 This study, however, demonstrates that U.S. officials began
to frame “terrorism” as a “governable problem” two years earlier, in order to devise
police responses to American guerrillas’ bombings and police assassinations.59 Hoover
and his men viewed 1970s leftist guerrilla “terrorism” as distinct from the anarchist
bombers of the early twentieth century. Writing in internal documents that they never
imagined would one day be declassified for public viewing, Hoover and other FBI
officials discussed the Weather Underground, with its clandestine infrastructure
resistant to surveillance and infiltration, as an unprecedented national security threat
that they were unprepared to confront. During the final years of Hoover’s life, before
56 Thorup,
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U.S. officials developed “counterterrorism” strategies for managing Palestinian
nationalist militants’ international hijackings, kidnappings, and hostage situations,
America’s covert war with domestic leftist guerrillas prompted the FBI and Nixon
administration to develop the United States’ first policing tactics, surveillance
measures, and policies dedicated to combatting a problem state officials explicitly
framed as “terrorism.”
Finally, the FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas played a critical—and
heretofore overlooked—role in the chain of events that culminated in the Watergate
Scandal and Nixon’s August 1974 resignation. Historians have long acknowledged the
FBI’s role in exposing the White House crimes that led to the Watergate Scandal. Stanley
Kutler’s book The Wars of Watergate (1992), the most comprehensive study on the
topic, argued that a bureaucratic “War of FBI Succession” following J. Edgar Hoover’s
death on May 2, 1972 motivated the leaks that led to Watergate.60 Scholars have further
examined the FBI’s role in Watergate since 2005, when W. Mark Felt, the Bureau’s
Associate Director from May 1972 to June 1973, came forward as “Deep Throat,” the
confidential source whose disclosures enabled Washington Post journalist Bob
Woodward to expose Nixon Cabinet members’ involvement in the June 17, 1972 breakin at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington’s Watergate
office complex and the President’s efforts to cover-up his staffers’ crimes.61 In her 2013
article “Deep Throat, Watergate, and the Bureaucratic Politics of the FBI,” Beverly Gage
demonstrated that both the crimes of Watergate and the exposure of those crimes were
products not only of a power struggle within the FBI hierarchy, but of a nearly six-year60
61
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long institutional conflict between Hoover’s FBI and the Nixon White House. Gage
explained Hoover-loyalist Mark Felt’s decision to disclose information on the Nixon
administration’s misdeeds not as merely a matter of personal vendetta or jockeying for
promotion, but as an effort to safeguard the FBI’s autonomy from White House efforts
to control the Bureau.62 While Gage rightfully acknowledged that “concern over the rise
in domestic bombings stemming from a radicalized antiwar left” played an important
role in fomenting this bureaucratic struggle, her article did not fully explore how leftist
guerrilla attacks informed the conflict.63 Building upon Gage’s analysis, this dissertation
demonstrates that leftist guerrilla violence was the central catalyst for the FBI’s
institutional conflict with the Nixon White House and a key source of the Watergate
Scandal.
Some researchers have implied that a dearth of declassified sources has severely
limited possibilities for substantial revision of scholarship on FBI operations against the
Black Power and antiwar movements. Donna Jean Murch, for example, has stated that
because of “the tremendously difficult, intricate, and expensive protocols of Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests, combined with the near impossibility of accessing
state, local, and federal law-enforcement records,” “we simply do not know the full
extent and scale of state surveillance and repression … of radical social movements of
the 1960s.”64 Journalist Bryan Burrough has asserted, “FBI files, those the Bureau has
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made publicly available, are almost useless to a historian. Only a fraction of the
paperwork these investigations generated has been issued, and almost all of it is dreck,
either highly redacted headquarters summaries or page after page of highly redacted,
and highly repetitive, ‘airtels’ and telegrams.”65
These statements are misleading. Though many of the FBI’s files on American
leftist guerrillas remain classified, hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of pages
of public and declassified sources related to Bureau investigations of 1960s era social
movements and guerrilla violence are hidden in plain sight. My dissertation draws upon
the reports and published hearings of Church Committee and other government
entities, as well as from thousands of pages of declassified FBI files available on
microfilm, online, in physical archives, or through Freedom of Information Act requests.
These include the Weather Underground file (published on microfilm); the Black
Liberation Army file (published in the Gale Cengage Archives Unbound digital
database); digitized files on the FBI’s online database (including COINTELPRO files and
the Black September file); files in the Kenneth O’Reilly Papers at Marquette University
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and L. Patrick Gray’s 6,510-page Director’s File, which I
obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.66 I also utilized FBI and
White House documents housed in the Richard Nixon Library, including sources from
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october2012/countering-subversion.
65 Burrough, Days of Rage, xi.
66 Ivan Greenberg first obtained this file in 2008 through a FOIA lawsuit. See Greenberg, The Dangers of
Dissent, 9. The L. Patrick Gray File was particularly critical to my research. This file contains documents
released through the pretrial discovery process in 1978 when Gray faced federal felony charges in
connection with FBI’s break-ins targeting suspected Weather Underground associates carried out during
his term as Acting Director. Sources in this file offer the most detailed surviving evidence of the FBI’s use
of break-ins and other illegal surveillance tactics during the late 1960s and early 1970s. A reference book
that helped me to decipher FBI documents was Gerald K. Haines and David A. Langbart, Unlocking the
Files of the FBI: A Guide to Its Records and Classification System (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.,
1993).

27

the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT). In addition to researching
government and FBI sources, I examined newspaper articles; archival sources on leftist
movements housed at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts and the Freedom
Archives in San Francisco, California; and published memoirs and oral histories of
former FBI personnel, Nixon White House officials, and leftist guerrillas.67 My main
research challenge was not a lack of declassified sources, but navigating and translating
an overabundance of publicly available primary documents and a massive body of
secondary literature.

Americans today tend to associate J. Edgar Hoover with a host of nefarious covert
operations against his perceived political enemies.68 During the late 1960s, however,
Hoover was highly reluctant to expand surveillance of American dissident movements.
Throughout his four-decade career as Director, Hoover had carefully crafted the FBI’s
public image as trusted crime-fighters and defenders of national security, knowing that
this image played a key role in enabling the Bureau to maintain powerful institutional
Digital technology was central to my research. Nearly all of the FBI documents I used for my research
were digitized. I either accessed these sources from online digital databases; received them as digital files
from the FBI in response to FOIA requests; received emailed scanned copies of FBI files from librarians at
physical archives; or digitized files on my own, using a digital camera at physical archives or scanning
files published on microfilm using the ScanPro 2000 microform scanner available at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst’s W. E. B. Du Bois Library. I also used Adobe Acrobat Pro DC software to convert
scanned FBI documents into text-readable PDF files, allowing me to search thousands of pages of FBI
documents for key words (“terror,” “bomb,” etc.). This software also allowed me to type notes directly
onto the digitized FBI documents. In other words, digital technology and online access to FBI files
enabled me to write a dissertation that would have been impossible ten years ago.
68 Hoover is also known for rumors that he cross-dressed and kept a secret homosexual relationship with
his close friend, FBI Associate Director Clyde Tolson. For a popular fictionalized film portrayal with actor
Leonardo DiCaprio playing the role of J. Edgar Hoover, see J. Edgar, directed by Clint Eastwood, Imagine
Entertainment, 2011. For an historical discussion of Hoover’s alleged homosexuality, see Doug Charles,
Hoover’s War on Gays: Exposing the FBI’s ‘Sex Deviates’ Program (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2015).
67

28

autonomy from Congress and the White House.69 But in the mid-1960s dissident
activists and politicians began to challenge the FBI’s authority, and as Hoover aged into
his seventies, President Lyndon B. Johnson started to question the Director’s continued
ability to lead. In an effort to safeguard the FBI’s institutional autonomy during the
period of growing political dissent from 1965 to 1967, Hoover restricted the Bureau’s
use of teenaged informants, mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and break-ins.70
The story of how the FBI came to revive these tactics begins on January 20, 1969,
the day of President Richard Nixon’s inauguration, an event marred by militant,
disruptive protests in Washington D.C. and leftist radicals’ bombing of a transmission
tower servicing a Colorado munitions plant. Nixon’s inauguration was a critical turning
point in what I refer to as a “violent dialectic” of state and insurgent violence that had
escalated over the previous five years of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration,
amid police brutality, urban riots, the war in Vietnam, and the largest antiwar
demonstrations in U.S. history. State violence and insurgent violence profoundly
influenced one another during Nixon’s time in office, kindling internal cleavages within
both the state and the left, while pushing a small number of radicals to embrace
violence as a means to achieve social change. Guerrilla bombings and police
assassinations, in turn, profoundly reshaped FBI surveillance practices and the Bureau’s
relationship with the Nixon White House.
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As I explain in Chapter One, Nixon came to office determined to clamp down on
rioters, bombers, and other law-breaking political dissidents by fulfilling his campaign
promise to restore “law and order” to American society, but his efforts largely
backfired. The Nixon administration strained relations with FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover, who resisted White House requests for illegal political surveillance measures
that risked jeopardizing the Bureau’s public image and institutional autonomy.
Meanwhile, federal and state indictments, violent police raids, and covert FBI
counterintelligence operations targeting the Black Panther Party and SDS further
radicalized members of the militant left, who increasingly embraced Third Worldimported strategies of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Chapter Two illustrates how by
the end of 1969, militant SDS members had committed themselves to forming the
Weather Underground, the United States’ first clandestine revolutionary urban guerrilla
organization, and members of the Black Panther Party were making similar plans for
armed resistance. At the same time, William C. Sullivan, the FBI’s Assistant Director for
Domestic Security, had begun meeting with young Nixon aide Tom Huston in June 1969
to discuss strategies for combating leftist violence. Over the next year, they would
become key figures in Hoover’s bureaucratic struggle with the Nixon White House.
In 1970, leftist bombings and the emergence of the Weather Underground
precipitated a full-blown institutional conflict between Hoover’s FBI and the Nixon
administration, a development I analyze in Chapter Three. On March 6, 1970, three
Weather Underground members died from an accidental explosion in a Greenwich
Village townhouse they were using as a bomb-making laboratory. Hoping to prevent the
Weather Underground from carrying out deadly bomb attacks, Nixon called on
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intelligence officials to develop a plan to combat what he called “revolutionary
terrorism.” The result was what would become known during the Senate Watergate
hearings as the “Huston Plan,” a proposal for the greatest consolidation of federal
intelligence agencies in U.S. history. Drafted behind Director Hoover’s back by William
Sullivan and Tom Huston, the Huston Plan coordinated the FBI, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Army Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) under the direct command of the White House, while lifting Hoover’s
restrictions on domestic warrantless wiretapping, underage informants, mail-opening,
and break-ins. The Plan’s core objective was to expand intelligence agencies’ capacity to
obtain “preventative,” advance warning of “terrorist” attacks.
Nixon approved the Huston Plan on July 14, 1970, but cancelled it two weeks
later under pressure from Hoover. Hoover had no moral qualms with illegal
surveillance techniques; rather he sought to preserve the FBI’s autonomy, public image,
and jurisdiction over domestic surveillance. Hoover informed the President and
Attorney General John Mitchell that he would not authorize FBI involvement in any of
the illegal surveillance measures outlined in the Huston Plan without written approval
from the White House or the Justice Department. Nixon backed out of the Huston Plan
because, like Hoover, he sought to avoid liability for the outrage that would likely ensue
if details of its existence ever leaked to the public.
After Hoover sabotaged the Huston Plan, relations between the FBI and Nixon
White House deteriorated while leftist guerrilla violence surged. On August 7, 1970,
seventeen-year-old black militant Jonathan Jackson launched an armed raid on a
courtroom in Marin County, California that left him and two others dead. Later that
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month, on August 24, the bombing of a University of Wisconsin research facility by a
group of young white radicals resulted in the accidental death of postdoctoral
researcher. I explain in Chapter Four how in response, under increased pressure from
Nixon, Hoover dramatically expanded domestic surveillance of the American Black
Power and antiwar movements, initiating a plan to cultivate informants in every African
American and New Left university student group in the country. The measure was a
clear violation of law-abiding citizens’ privacy, but Hoover was desperate to combat the
problem of guerrilla violence. FBI officials called upon agents to “identify potential and
actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to assess their threat to the
internal security of the Government,” while Hoover asserted that radical campus groups
collectively constituted a “a breeding ground for revolutionaries, extremists, and
terrorists.”71 Between 1969 and 1972, the FBI expanded domestic surveillance
investigations of political radicals by over fifty percent, opening thousands of new
investigations in response to bombings and other acts of domestic insurgent violence.72
The FBI also began to reintroduce illegal surveillance tactics outlined in the
Huston Plan. During the fall of 1970, Hoover lowered the FBI’s minimum age for
university campus informants from twenty-one to eighteen. Furthermore, through
euphemistic threats and suggestions, Hoover pressured local field offices to informally
reinstitute warrantless wiretapping, mail-opening, and break-ins in domestic
FBI memo, Executives Conference to Tolson, “Proposed Intensification of Certain Investigations in the
Security Field,” October 29, 1970; and FBI airtel, Director to SAC Albany, “Security Investigations of
Individuals who are Members of the Students for a Democratic Society and Militant New Left Campus
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Inc., 1991), Microfilm (hereafter FBI WUO), Roll 6, Section 66.
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That Need To Be Resolved: Report to the House Judiciary Committee by the Comptroller General of the
United States, February 24, 1976 (hereafter GAO, FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations), 133-134.
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“terrorism” investigations, a move that removed FBI Headquarters from liability for its
agents’ involvement in illegal surveillance practices.
Instead of preventing violence, however, Hoover’s zealous efforts to combat
leftist guerrillas backfired. On November 27, 1970, amid a wave of leftist bombings
throughout the country, Hoover publically accused eight East Coast peace activists of a
far-fetched plot to set off bombs in Washington D. C. and kidnap Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger. One of the individuals Hoover falsely accused was physics professor
William Davidon, who interpreted the charges as part of a covert FBI conspiracy to
destroy the American left. Seeking evidence of such a conspiracy, Davidon led a group of
peace activists in burglarizing a small FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania and releasing
stolen classified surveillance documents to the press. In the spring of 1971, newspaper
articles on the stolen documents unleashed a tidal wave of controversy over revelations
of FBI spying as well as unprecedented calls for Hoover’s resignation. In response,
Hoover quietly cancelled all of the FBI’s counterintelligence programs. Over the next
four years, controversy over FBI surveillance would continue to grow, culminating in
the extensive Church Committee hearings of 1975. Few realized, however, that the
Bureau had initiated much of the surveillance uncovered through the Media burglary in
a desperate attempt to thwart leftist guerrilla violence.
While the Media burglary brought about increased public scrutiny of FBI
operations, the ongoing problem of guerrilla violence kindled a mounting crisis inside
the Bureau, a topic I explore in Chapter Five. The Black Liberation Army began its
campaign of assassinating cops on May 1971 with a pair of bloody police ambushes in
New York City. The attack prompted renewed demands from Nixon that the FBI prevent
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guerrilla violence, and another round of Hoover orders for his agents to “intensify” their
leftist guerrilla investigations. Just as the arrest of two BLA members began to ease
tensions between Hoover and Nixon, however, the New York Times’ publication of
excerpts from the top-secret “Pentagon Papers” on June 13, 1971 enflamed institutional
conflict between the FBI and the White House. The leaked documents revealed a
pattern of U.S. presidents lying about the war in Vietnam over two decades, and Nixon
feared that further leaks could damage his war efforts in Southeast Asia. When Hoover
refused the President’s request that the Bureau aggressively investigate whistleblower
Daniel Ellsberg, Nixon went through the roof. He even tried to fire the aging FBI
Director, but thought twice after Hoover subtly reminded him that doing so would
alienate many of his conservative supporters ahead of the 1972 election.
In response to Hoover’s inaction in the “Pentagon Papers” case, Nixon’s staff
established a secret team of operatives known as “the Plumbers,” who broke into the
Los Angeles office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in September 1971, searching for
information they could use to discredit him. A year later, the Plumbers would set off the
Watergate Scandal after getting caught burglarizing the Democratic Party headquarters
in Washington’s Watergate office complex. Meanwhile, FBI agents carried out their own
break-ins in search of Weather Underground fugitives. They did so anxiously, however,
growing increasingly worried about whether or not officials at FBI Headquarters would
support them if they got caught. The simmering crisis guerrilla violence, illegal
surveillance, and institutional conflict generated within the FBI during the last year of
Hoover’s life would boil over after his death on May 2, 1972.
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The man Nixon chose as Hoover’s successor was L. Patrick Gray, a Bureau
outsider and longtime supporter of the President. Nixon’s choice did not go over well
with W. Mark Felt, a Hoover-loyalist and longtime bureaucrat who had worked his way
up to the FBI’s number three position during the last year of the late Director’s life,
surpassing the rank of William Sullivan, whom Hoover pushed out of the Bureau after
discovering his disloyalty. Felt resented Nixon’s appointment of Gray to the position of
the FBI’s Acting Director not only because he viewed himself as a more suitable
candidate for the position, but also because he saw the move as part of a Nixon effort to
exert a power over the Bureau that the White House had been unable to obtain while
Hoover was alive. Two years after leftist guerrilla violence prompted a bureaucratic
struggle between the FBI and the Nixon White House, Felt became a central figure in
this institutional conflict. In Chapter Six I analyze how during the year after Hoover’s
death, Felt used his new position as the FBI’s second ranking Associate Director to
conduct two secret wars: one against leftist guerrillas, and the other against the
President and the Acting Director of the FBI.
Felt sought to discredit Nixon and Gray in an effort to defend the FBI’s autonomy
from the White House, and to officially reinstitute the FBI’s use of break-ins in leftist
guerrilla investigations, a move he hoped would ease the anxieties of field agents
engaged in the practice on an informal basis. To achieve these goals, Felt exploited two
critical, unexpected events. The first was the June 17, 1972 Watergate break-in. In the
days and months following the incident, Felt leaked information from the FBI’s
Watergate investigation to several reporters, including Washington Post journalist Bob
Woodard, who gradually exposed to the world how President Nixon and his staff
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attempted to cover-up their role in the burglary. Not until 2005, however, would Felt
come forward as the mysterious “Deep Throat,” the pseudonym Woodward had coined
for his top-secret source.
While leaking information on Watergate to the press, Felt seized on Black
September’s deadly, internationally televised September 5, 1972 raid at the Munich
Olympics as an opportunity to officially reinstitute the Bureau’s use of illegal break-ins,
an initiative the FBI’s Assistant Director Edward Miller had been unsuccessfully
requesting from Gray since he took office. Two days after the Munich attack, without
Gray’s knowledge, Felt and Miller authorized a request from the Bureau’s Dallas field
office for a break-in at the office of the Arab Information Center, a public relations outfit
affiliated with the Arab League. Fearing a bloody Munich-style attack in the United
States, the FBI sought information on Palestinian militants dwelling inside the country.
Two weeks later, Nixon formed the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT),
comprised of Secretary of State Kissinger, the FBI’s Acting Director Gray, and the other
top intelligence and military officials. After the aborted Huston Plan, the CCCT was
America’s first federal institution explicitly dedicated to combating “terrorism.” In the
midst of his staffers’ involvement in the Watergate cover-up, however, Nixon did not
attempt another consolidation of U.S. intelligence agencies. Instead, he gave the FBI sole
jurisdiction over terrorist attacks inside the United States.
After the Munich attacks, Gray faced tremendous pressure to prevent an
international terrorist attack in the U.S. After Nixon formed the CCCT, and Felt and
Miller informed him that they had approved the Dallas break-in, Gray gave the latter
officials verbal approval for authorizing further break-ins. During the next seven
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months, Felt and Miller approved at least twelve more FBI break-ins, two of them
targeting Arabs, seven of them focused on suspected associates of the Weather
Underground, and three related to foreign espionage investigations. In the midst of
growing public concern over FBI surveillance and Americans’ civil liberties, Gray also
initiated an overhaul of the Bureau’s domestic surveillance operations. For the first
time in the FBI’s history, Gray authorized FBI agents to conduct undercover operations,
a tactic Hoover had always forbidden out of concern for his men’s safety. In Los Angeles,
a small unit of FBI agents had already gone undercover on an unofficial basis, growing
beards and long hair in order to infiltrate the leftwing Vietnam Veterans Against the
War. Under Gray’s top-secret orders, undercover agents, known as “beards,” went deep
undercover with FBI Headquarters approval, smoking pot, infiltrating hippy communes,
and having sex with leftist women in attempts to track down Weather Underground
fugitives. Beginning in early 1973, amid a decline in bombings and mass street protest,
Gray also began to cut back on the FBI’s domestic surveillance operations, closing
hundreds of investigative files that officials determined were not related to the
prevention of espionage or terrorism.
Just as Hoover’s efforts to combat guerrilla violence backfired, Felt’s secret wars
accomplished the exact opposite of what they intended. Felt’s leaks enflamed the
Watergate Scandal and helped bring down Nixon and Gray, but they ended his own
career as well. Moreover, they badly damaged the FBI’s reputation. On April 27, 1973,
after brutal Senate confirmation hearings in which lawmakers grilled him over
authorizing political surveillance and obstructing the Watergate investigation on behalf
of the White House, Gray dropped his bid to become the permanent Director of the FBI.
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Two weeks later, at Nixon’s insistence, the FBI’s new Acting Director William D.
Ruckelshaus fired Felt, whom the President secretly suspected of being Deep Throat. It
would be another year before Nixon’s resignation, but by this point Watergate
conspirators in the President’s Cabinet had already begun to confess or resign from
their positions. Institutional conflict between the FBI and Nixon White House—sparked
three years earlier by leftist guerrilla violence—had already set the President on the
road to his downfall. Furthermore, In 1978, when President Jimmy Carter’s Justice
Department indicted Felt, Miller, and Gray for authorizing the Weather Underground
break-ins. Gray managed to beat the charges, but Felt and Miller gained felony
convictions in November 1980, though President Ronald Reagan pardoned Felt and
Miller in April 1981, shortly after taking office. Meanwhile, most members of the
Weather Underground, the primary organization responsible for sparking the HooverNixon feud, came out of hiding during the late 1970s without facing serious criminal
charges.
The FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas was not the only cause of
Watergate. Given Nixon’s fervid desire to crush his perceived political enemies, a
similar scandal could have taken place even if Hoover had faithfully complied with the
President’s requests for illegal political surveillance. In telling the history of Watergate
as it happened, however, there can be no denying that clandestine urban guerrilla
violence played a critical role in provoking the institutional conflict that precipitated
both the crimes of Watergate and the exposure of those crimes. In other words, without
the Weather Underground and other leftist insurgents, there would have been no
Huston Plan, no mass expansion of FBI surveillance against the Black Power movement
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and New Left, no reviving of illegal FBI surveillance practices, no Media burglary, no
COINTELPRO controversy, and no motivation for Mark Felt to become Deep Throat.
Though they severely damaged each other and themselves, the FBI and the
Nixon White House failed to prevent guerrilla violence. Indeed, through their punitive
responses to the Black Power movement and New Left, and through their
encouragement of police violence, Hoover and Nixon helped inspire those who
embraced revolutionary guerrilla resistance. The core reason officials failed to preempt
America’s guerrilla insurgency is because officials never asked what Chalmers Johnson
called the “forensic question”: “what were their motives?”73 FBI and White House
officials rarely gave seriously thought to why a small number of young American leftists
made the difficult decision to transform themselves into urban guerrilla
revolutionaries, and they certainly did not seek abiding remedies to the racial
inequality and state violence that led many to see violence as a necessary means for
social change. Instead, drawing upon earlier inaccurate understanding of Communists,
FBI and Nixon officials characterized leftist guerrilla “terrorists” as innately irrational
and deranged, and as a national security problem to be managed through mass
“preventative” surveillance, covert operations, police raids, and incarceration. As I
discuss in the Epilogue, this is the greatest legacy of the FBI’s war with America’s leftist
guerrillas, one that continues to shape our world today.

Johnson quoted in Why We Fight, directed by Eugene Jarecki, Sony Pictures Classics, 2006. See also
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 3rd ed. (New York: Owl
Books, 2004).
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CHAPTER 1
VIOLENT DIALECTIC: NIXON, THE FBI, AND AMERICA’S GUERRILLA INSURGENCY

President Richard Milhous Nixon spoke of peace. In his first inaugural address, on
January 20, 1969, Nixon conveyed his desire to move the country beyond the previous
four years of domestic turmoil. Under the administration of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, urban rebellions, rowdy university protests, and massive demonstrations
against the U.S. war in Vietnam had become regular features of American life. The new
president sought unity and calm. “The peace we seek to win,” Nixon proclaimed, “is not
victory over any other people, but the peace that comes ‘with healing in its wings’; with
compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have
opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this earth to choose their own
destiny.”1
On the same day in Colorado, a group of leftist radicals used stolen dynamite to
blow up a transmission tower outside of Denver. The explosion temporarily disrupted
power at a Coors Porcelain plant that manufactured missile and helicopter components
for the U.S. military’s use in Vietnam, where over 30,000 Americans and two million
Vietnamese had died since 1964 as a result of the war.2 Back in Washington D.C., Nixon
faced a direct assault from antiwar militants. Before he could even move into the White
House, city police, National Guardsmen, and members of the Army’s 82nd Airborne
Division lined Pennsylvania Avenue to protect the armored presidential limousine from
Richard Nixon, inaugural address, January 20, 1969, Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural
Ceremonies website, http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-richard-mnixon-1969 (accessed June 1, 2015).
2 UPI, “Grand Jury Indicts Man for Bombing,” Lodi News-Sentinel, February 15, 1969, 3.
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several hundred angry young protesters. The demonstrators, led by a militant faction of
the predominantly white New Left organization Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS), broke away from the thousands of other nonviolent protesters who had
descended on Washington for the day’s “counterinaugural” events. The militants hurled
stones, bottles, smoke bombs, firecrackers, and paint-filled light bulbs at Nixon’s
procession. One protester, SDS leader Mark Rudd, took satisfaction in flipping Nixon the
finger as the President happened to glance at him from less than twenty feet away while
speeding by in his limo.3 Afterwards, the militants rampaging through a nearby
business district, blocking traffic while smashing bank windows and police windshields.
Cheering on Vietnam’s Communist guerrilla resistance to America’s military onslaught,
the crowd chanted “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, the NLF is going to win!”4 Police clubbed
protesters with their batons and made one hundred and nineteen arrests. The New York
Times noted that the disruptions were “the first at an inaugural ceremony in the 180
years of the Presidency.”5 A week later, on January 28, Denver-area bombers blew up
two more transmission towers.6
Nixon narrowly won the 1968 election on a campaign to end the war in Vietnam
and restore “law and order” to American society. The latter pledge appealed to a large
constituency of working and middle class white Americans—a group Nixon soon
referred to as the “Silent Majority”—who felt threatened by increasing Black radicalism,
Rudd, Underground, 131.
The chant referred to North Vietnamese president Ho Chi Minh and the South Vietnamese National
Liberation Front (NLF). Ben A. Franklin, “Young Demonstrators at Parade Throw Smoke Bombs and
Stones at Nixon’s Car,” New York Times, January 21, 1969.
5 Franklin, “Young Demonstrators at Parade Throw Smoke Bombs.” For further accounts of the 1969
counterinaugural protests, see Gloria Emerson, Winners & Losers: Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses and Ruins
from the Vietnam War, 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 314-317; and Perlstein,
Nixonland, 357-359.
6 UPI, “Grand Jury Indicts Man for Bombing.”
3
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white youth counterculture, and violent civil disorder on America’s college campuses
and city streets. Despite calling for “healing,” “peace,” and “compassion” in his inaugural
address, Nixon had no intentions of eliminating the root causes of violent social conflict,
problems that social scientists of the day and peace activists such as the late Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. had identified as racism, economic inequality, and militarism. On the
contrary, Nixon came to power determined to clamp down on rioters, protesters,
bombers, and other political dissidents through punitive law-and-order policing.
Nixon’s inauguration marked a new phase in a cycle of state and insurgent
violence that had escalated over the previous five years of the Johnson administration.
1969 was a particularly tumultuous year for the FBI, the Black Panther Party (BPP), and
SDS. During Nixon’s first year in office, federal and state officials indicted dozens of
Black Panthers and New Left radicals on various felony charges. Nixon’s Department of
Justice, for example, indicted SDS organizer Cameron David Bishop on charges related
to the Denver transmission tower bombings. When Bishop went underground, Director
J. Edgar Hoover placed the young man on the FBI’s list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives,
making him the first leftist radical to ever earn such a distinction. Several groups of
other indicted radicals became well known in leftist shorthand as symbols of state
repression: the “Chicago Eight,” the New York “Panther Twenty-One,” the “New Haven
Nine.” As the Nixon administration implored Director Hoover to intensify operations
against political radicals, the FBI expanded its secret surveillance of American leftists
and escalated its covert counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) designed to
destroy the Black Power movement and New Left, with the BPP and SDS being its
primary targets. Both BPP and SDS members also endured regular harassment from
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local police, though the Panthers bore the brunt of direct police violence. In the first half
of 1969, while imprisoned Panther co-founder Huey P. Newton awaited trial on murder
charges for the 1967 death of an Oakland cop and fellow Panther leader Eldridge
Cleaver adjusted to a life of foreign exile, local police staged at least ten armed raids on
BPP offices and homes throughout the country, and arrested hundreds of the group’s
members.7
Despite heightened law-and-order policing, domestic upheaval remained on the
rise during Nixon’s first year in office. The Black Panther Party, for example, remained
visible advocates of revolution throughout 1969, buoyed by international television
coverage of its black-leather-clad male leaders and their calls for armed resistance, as
well as wide distribution of the Black Panther newspaper. Amid heightened police
attacks, the Party shifted its political organizing efforts towards developing local
“survival programs,” such as the popular Free Breakfast for Children Program, though
leaders continued to promote armed violence against the state officials.8 Black
Panthers’ advocacy of armed revolution was not just talk. In several instances, Panthers
responded to police violence with violence of their own, injuring officers in the process.
Looking up to the Panthers as the “vanguard” of America’s coming revolution, members
of SDS also stepped up their confrontational tactics. After the January 1969
Scholars have estimated the number of Panthers killed by police over the course of the Party’s existence
at between twenty-four and twenty-eight. See Murch, Living for the City, 162, 262 fn209. On police raids,
see Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 212-215; and Frank J. Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red
Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 180.
8 Bloom and Martin argued that the Black Panther Party grew significantly over the course of 1969,
expanding its chapters from approximately twenty cities, to sixty-eight. The evidence casts doubt on this
assertion, however, since as Bloom and Martin acknowledge, and as I further analyze later in this chapter,
Bobby Seale froze the Party’s membership in January 1969, at which time he claimed that the Party
already had over forty chapters. It appears that the fall of 1968 was actually the Party’s greatest period of
national growth, though it was also a time of increasing factionalism amid increasing violent
confrontations with police. Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 2, 179-198, 344-345.
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“counterinaugural” melee, SDS militants clashed violently with police on several other
occassions. Bombings, moreover, became an increasingly popular expression of political
dissent after Nixon took office. A small number of young radicals first adopted bombing
as a political tactic in 1968. By year’s end, they had launched over fifty such attacks,
mostly targeting campus Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) offices and urban
police stations. Over the course of 1969, as Nixon escalated the U.S. air war on Vietnam
and police amplified attacks on radicals, incidents of revolutionary violence surged.
Between January 1969 and April 1970, leftist militants carried out over four hundred
bombings and arsons in the United States.9
While historians have done a fine job examining how Nixon era FBI and police
operations influenced the Black Panthers and SDS, they have not adequately explained
how leftist violence and violent rhetoric influenced the FBI and the Nixon
administration. Indeed, much of the literature seems to imply that while police violence
radicalized the Black Panthers and their supporters, leftist violence had little influence
upon police agencies and American politics.10 Conflict between America’s militant left
and the various agencies of the state flowed both ways, however, and must be
understood as inter-relational.
Over the course of Nixon’s first five months in office, the FBI and the militant left
reshaped one another through a mutually constitutive “violent dialectic” of insurgent
and state violence.11 Insurgent violence included rioting, street fighting, gun-battles
Sale, SDS, 632. For a discussion on bombing statistics, see footnote 1 in my introduction.
Recent prominent examples include Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire; and Berger, Captive
Nation.
11 I base this concept from Mikkel Thorup’s notion that “one has to write the history of terrorism as a
dialectics or ‘dialogue’ between the state and its violent challengers.” Thorup, An Intellectual History of
Terrorism, 2.
9
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with police, armed ambushes of police officers, bombings, and violent rhetoric calling
for “revolutionary” urban guerrilla warfare. State violence included normalized violence
commonly understood as legitimate “force,” namely arrests, incarceration, and any sort
of physical violence carried out in order to overcome resistance to police apprehension,
as well as illegal activity, like harassment, beatings, and killings.12 These distinctions
often blurred, however, as in the cases of warrantless police raids, unauthorized
surveillance, police brutality, police shootings in the name of “self-defense,” and arrests
on trumped-up charges. State violence was not a conspiracy. Local police carried out
their operations autonomously or in response to local rebellion, though the FBI often
provided local police agencies with intelligence that emphasized or exaggerated
radicals’ violent rhetoric and actions. Moreover, through their promotion of “law and
order” and dismissal of African Americans’ and leftists’ complaints of police brutality,
the Nixon White House, Attorney General John Mitchell’s Department of Justice, and
Hoover’s FBI gave local police forces a green light to suppress leftist militants with
impunity through heavy-handed tactics.
During the first half of 1969, conflict between state authorities and American
political dissidents wrought important changes in the Nixon administration, the FBI,
and the militant left. Leftist violence contributed to tensions between Nixon, who
sought the FBI’s assistance in implementing a punitive response to law-breaking
political dissidents, and Hoover, who resisted White House requests for FBI
surveillance measures that he believed risked making the Bureau vulnerable to public
criticism. Unaware of friction between Nixon and Hoover, members of the BPP and SDS

12

Charles Tilley, The Politics of Collective Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27.
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mistakenly viewed federal and state-level indictments, local police attacks, and FBI
operations as facets of a creeping fascism, part of a centralized conspiracy to crush the
U.S. left. They responded with increased militancy, inciting further police attention,
while also heightening factionalism and paranoia within their own organizations. The
FBI, in turn, endeavored to further destabilize the left though its covert
counterintelligence programs. Ironically, though the FBI targeted the BPP and SDS in
order to “neutralize” the groups’ capacities to engage in violent disorder, the Bureau’s
covert operations and encouragement of police attacks on the organizations prompted
a significant number of militant leftists to embrace urban guerrilla warfare as a
revolutionary strategy for combating state violence.

“State of Emergency”
Nixon’s “law-and-order” policing was not the only available state response to America’s
violent domestic social conflict. In mid-1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (better known as the Kerner Commission) issued a 511-page report on civil
disorders commissioned by the Johnson administration following the massive 1967
riots in Newark, Detroit, and dozens of other cities. The Kerner Report explained
America’s urban uprisings as byproducts of longstanding poverty, segregation, lack of
opportunity, and police brutality in African American ghettos. “Our society is moving
toward two societies,” it’s authors warned, “one black, one white—separate and
unequal.” “The alternative,” the report concluded,
…is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness. It is the realization of
common opportunities for all within a single society.
This alternative will require a commitment to national action—
compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most
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powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every American it will
require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will.13
In other words, the Kerner Report called for massive federal spending on programs to
eliminate the conditions of economic and racial inequality that gave rise to violent
unrest. In its call for a large scale transformation of American society, the report’s
recommendations echoed Martin Luther King Jr.’s appeal the previous year for a
nonviolent “radical revolution of values” to eliminate from the United States the “triple
evils of racism, economic exploitation, and militarism.”14
President Richard Nixon never intended to address the root causes of violent
social conflict. Indeed, by 1968, even President Johnson had given up on the ambitious
plan to eliminate poverty in America that he had announced upon taking office four
years earlier. Amid repeated “long hot summers” of urban rioting and the escalating
war in Vietnam, the Johnson administration and Congress increasingly directed federal
funds away from the “War on Poverty” towards urban policing and overseas military
expenditures.15 Published two months after Martin Luther King’s April 4, 1968
assassination triggered uprisings in over one hundred and fifty American cities, the
Kerner Report had zero impact on federal policy.
Nixon came into office determined to deliver on his promise to establish “law
and order” in American society through aggressive policing and punishment of lawbreaking political dissidents. During its first five months in office, his administration

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report: The 1968 Report of the National
Commission on Civil Disorders, 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 1-2.
14 Martin Luther King Jr., “Why I am Opposed to the War in Vietnam,” sermon at the Ebeneezer Baptist
Church, Atlanta, Georgia, April 30, 1967, Real News Network,
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=47
31 (accessed June 1, 2016).
15 Hinton, “‘A War within Our Own Boundaries.’”
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responded to domestic social conflict with federal indictments of leftist radicals and
demands that J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI accelerate its efforts to prevent revolutionary
bombings, civil disturbances, and leaks of classified state secrets. Nixon did not
comprehend the scope or scale of the FBI’s domestic surveillance and
counterintelligence operations, however. Furthermore, Hoover was unwilling to obey
all of the new President’s orders—the Director would comply only with directives that
he did not perceive as potentially damaging to the FBI’s public image and institutional
autonomy. Disagreements over the FBI’s operations against American dissidents led to
growing tensions between Hoover and the Nixon administration.
The first target of the Nixon White House’s efforts was the leader of Denver’s
transmission tower bombers. On February 14, 1969, within a month of Nixon’s
inauguration, the new Attorney General John Mitchell indicted twenty-six-year-old SDS
organizer Cameron David Bishop for his alleged role in the Denver bombings. Mitchell
charged Bishop under an amendment to the Federal Sabotage Act of 1918 that made it a
federal crime to sabotage “war utilities… when the United States is at war, or in times of
national emergency as declared by the President.”16 It was only the second such
indictment since World War II. Two months earlier, President Johnson’s outgoing
Attorney General Ramsey Clark launched the first one against Michael Siskind, a
twenty-one-year-old SDS member who firebombed an ROTC building on the St. Louis
campus of Washington University in December 1968. Siskind pled guilty four days prior
to the Bishop indictment.17

United States v. Bishop, 555 F. 2d 771 - Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit 1977, 773.
UPI, “Grand Jury Indicts Man for Bombing”; Department of Justice, United States Attorneys Bulletin 17,
no. 9., February 28, 1969, 210.
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It is unclear what legal basis determined the “state of emergency” cited in the
Bishop indictment. Was Mitchell’s Justice Department referring to President Franklin
Roosevelt’s 1933 “state of emergency” declared as a means to assert executive
intervention in the American economy amidst the Great Depression? Or President
Harry Truman’s 1950 “state of emergency” declared during the Korean War?18 Or had
Nixon declared his own state of emergency?19 Eight years later, in 1977, as the nation
continued to reel from the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s resignation, a federal judge
dismissed the charges against Bishop after determining that there was no legal basis for
the “state of emergency” declared in the indictment.20 In the meantime, however, the
Bishop indictment conveyed the Nixon administration’s view on domestic revolutionary
bombings: America was at war not only in Vietnam, but also at home.
The Justice Department’s indictment of Cameron Bishop also put pressure on
Hoover’s FBI. Denver-based FBI agents had detained Bishop after discovering stolen
dynamite and blasting caps similar to those used in the transmission tower bombings
hidden in a mineshaft near a mountain cabin in Idaho Springs where the young radical
lived with three of his alleged accomplices. The agents questioned Bishop for five-and-

In 1973, a special Senate committee led by Frank Church (D, ID) and Charles Mathias (R, MD)
determined that a series of vaguely defined “states of emergency” declared since the Roosevelt
administration remained in effect during the Nixon presidency. See James N. Naughton, “Wartime Powers
Studied by Panel,” New York Times, January 14, 1973, 8; and New York Times, “National Emergency,” April
19, 1973, 42.
19 A February 1969 Justice Department memo noted that the section of the Federal War Sabotage Act of
1918 used to indict Bishop had been “extended to cover a period of national emergency declared by the
President.” It is unclear, however, if this statement refers to Eisenhower, whose administration amended
the Act, or Nixon. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys Bulletin 17, no. 9., February 28, 1969,
210.
20 United States v. Bishop, 555 F. 2d 771 - Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit 1977, 774.
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a-half hours, but released him after determining they lacked enough evidence to press
charges. Almost immediately after leaving FBI custody, Bishop went into hiding.21
Because Bishop’s FBI file remains classified today, it is impossible to determine
exactly how FBI and White House officials felt about the Denver bombing suspect’s
flight from federal authorities. But Bishop’s escape must have been embarrassing to
Hoover, who placed a high premium on the FBI’s reputation as a force that always
captured its suspects. Such embarrassment must have been particularly acute during
the first months of Nixon’s presidency, as Mitchell’s decision to indict Bishop under the
Federal Sabotage Act underscored the White House’s determination to clamp down on
domestic bombings. Soon after the Justice Department’s indictment, Hoover publicly
signaled that the FBI too was committed to thwarting revolutionary bombings. On April
15, 1969, the Director added Bishop to the FBI’s list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives.
Nearly three hundred others had appeared on the list since 1950, when the FBI
established it in order to attract public assistance in capturing America’s most violent
and elusive criminals. The Ten Most Wanted typically included gangsters, bank robbers,
and others sought on murder or kidnapping charges. Bishop, however, was the first
leftist revolutionary to appear on the list.22
Shortly after pressing charges against Cameron Bishop, Nixon’s Justice
Department launched conspiracy indictments against other leftwing radicals. On March
Ibid, 773; Cameron Bishop interview, June 5, 1975, audio recording, Freedom Archives, San Francisco,
CA, Call number PM 197A.
22 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives, 1950-2010,” FBI website,
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/ten-most-wanted-fugitives-60th-anniversary-19502010/ten-most-wanted-fugitives-60th-anniversary-1950-2010-pdf (accessed June 1, 2016); UPI, “Radical
Leftists Dot Most Wanted List,” Hartford Courant, October 21, 1971, 35. Bishop’s three alleged coconspirators were Steven Knowles, Susan Parker, and Linda Goebel. Parker and Goebel testified against
Bishop in exchange for immunity. Knowles also went underground. The FBI targeted Bishop on their
Most Wanted list because they considered him to be the group’s leader.
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20, 1969 Attorney General Mitchell charged the “Chicago Eight”—peace activist David
Dellinger, SDS leaders Tom Hayden and Rennie Davies, Yippie leaders Jerry Rubin and
Abbie Hoffman, antiwar activist professors Lee Weiner and John Froines, and Black
Panther chairman Bobby Seale—on a number of charges, including conspiracy to cross
state lines with intent to incite a riot.23 With flimsy evidence, Nixon’s Justice
Department charged the Chicago Eight for their alleged role in the massive antiwar
protests at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, which generated live television
coverage of Chicago police teargasing and brutally beating young antiwar activists.24
President Johnson’s Attorney General Ramsey Clark had refused to prosecute
demonstrators after the Convention, siding with a federally funded report that
determined Chicago police had been the main perpetrators of the violence.25 In
contrast, Mitchell’s decision to charge the Chicago Eight reflected the Nixon
administration’s view that the protesters were primarily responsible for the violence,
and that state punishment, rather than federal programing to address the root causes of
violent conflict, was the appropriate response to disruptive political protest. Mitchell

The Chicago Eight also faced charges of conspiring to cross state lines to teach the making of incendiary
devices and commit acts to impede police officers from their lawful duties. Dellinger, Davis, Hayden,
Hoffman, Rubin, and Seale also faced charges of crossing state lines to incite a riot, and Froines and
Weiner faced charges of instructing other persons how to make incendiary devices. The indictment
named sixteen unindicted conspirators from various segments of the antiwar movement. “Indictment in
the Chicago Seven Conspiracy Trial,” in Famous Trials online exhibit and database, Douglas O. Linder, ed.,
University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/indictment.html (accessed June 1, 2016);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on
Terrorism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004), 484.
24 The Justice Department charged the Chicago Eight under provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that
Congress had passed in response to militant SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, whom
the FBI inaccurately accused of inciting the hundreds of urban riots that disrupted American cities in
1967 and 1968. See David Farber, Chicago ’68 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 147.
25 Ibid, 205; Stone, Perilous Times, 484.
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conveyed this view in regards to the Chicago Eight when he quipped to reporters, “The
Justice Department is an institution for law enforcement, not social improvement.”26
Another way Nixon responded to political dissent was by pressuring J. Edgar
Hoover’s FBI to expand its surveillance of radical activists and other opponents of his
policies. Hoover was reluctant to comply, however. Understanding why requires an
examination of the Bureau’s changing relationship to domestic social conflict and
political violence during the previous two decades.
Since World War II, the FBI had maintained extensive surveillance files on
African American activists and other leftists, especially those associated with the
Communist Party (CPUSA). Carried out during the height of Cold War anticommunist
paranoia, the ostensible purpose of this surveillance was to prevent radicals from
“subverting” the United States by infiltrating the labor and civil rights movements and
organizing a Communist revolution backed by the Soviet Union. The FBI began
employing widespread “preventative” intelligence measures in 1939, when President
Roosevelt issued a wartime directive granting the Bureau exclusive jurisdiction over
domestic “espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters.”27 Hoover used
Roosevelt’s directive as a license to establish the FBI as an autonomous police
institution with minimal government oversight, and to carry out a range of secret

Milton Viorst, “Attorney General Mitchell’s Philosophy is ‘The Justice Department is an Institution for
Law Enforcement, not Social Improvement,’” New York Times Magazine 10 (August 10, 1969).
27 Church Committee, Book III, 403. In 1924, after the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 and the Teapot Dome
Scandal of 1921-1922—a bribery scandal involving the Department of Justice that ruined the reputation
of President Warren Harding and was widely considered the greatest political scandal in U.S. history
prior to Watergate—Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone banned the Bureau of Investigation from
engaging in political surveillance as President Calvin Coolidge appointed the young J. Edgar Hoover to
serve as the Bureau’s Acting Director (he was promoted to permanent Director the following year). See
Schmidt, Red Scare, 324-326.
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operations unknown to presidents, lawmakers, or the American public.28 To this end,
Director J. Edgar Hoover oversaw the FBI’s creation of its “Security Index,” a secret list
containing names of thousands of Americans with suspected Communist sympathies to
be rounded up and detained in a “time of war or national emergency.”29 The FBI
gathered intelligence on suspected Communists with the help of thousands of paid
informants and “confidential sources,” including bankers, landlords, and telephone
operators.30 The FBI also targeted CPUSA with a range of illegal surveillance tactics,
including break-ins (known in Bureau parlance as “surreptitious entries” or “black bag
jobs”), safe-breaking, “mail covers” (surveillance of addresses on the envelopes of a
target’s mail), mail-opening, “trash covers” (surveillance of a target’s curbside garbage
bins), warrantless electronic telephone wiretaps, and hidden microphones (also known
as “bugs”).31
During the early 1950s, Hoover’s FBI played a critical role in the postwar Red
Scare typically associated with anticommunist crusader Senator Joe McCarthy (R, WI).
Indeed, historian Ellen Schrecker argued, “had observers known in the 1950s what they
have learned since the 1970s, when the Freedom of Information Acted open the
Bureau’s files, ‘McCarthyism’ would probably be called ‘Hooverism.’”32 Hoover’s FBI
provided intelligence on American leftists to the anticommunist House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senate Internal Security Committee, and gathered
Church Committee, Book III, 403.
Ibid, 412-413.
30 Church Committee Book II, 60-65, and Book III, 228-229.
31 FBI personnel officially referred to break-ins as “surreptitious entries” while colloquially using the
term “black bag jobs” in reference to the black bags containing lock-picking tools agents would bring with
them on such operations. For an overview of the FBI’s extralegal surveillance techniques directed at the
CPUSA, see Senate Select Committee, Book II, 60-65, and Book III, 228-229.
32 Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (New York: Little, Brown and Company,
1998), 203.
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evidence used to convict Eugene Dennis, Gus Hall, Henry Winston, and other CPUSA
leaders on shaky conspiracy charges.33 Hoover’s FBI also gathered evidence used to try,
convict, and execute CPUSA members Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.34 In 1956, after the
Supreme Court curtailed the government’s ability to prosecute suspected Communists,
Hoover launched a secret counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), designed to
covertly destroy the CPUSA, whose membership had already diminished from an alltime high of over 75,000 at the close of World War II to only a few thousand, many of
them FBI informants.35 Tactics included mailing anonymous, inflammatory materials

Ibid, 192.
Julius Rosenberg led a spy ring that transferred information about the U.S. military and weapons
technology to the Soviet Union, but he was not, as the government claimed, responsible for passing the
secrets of America’s nuclear bomb to the USSR or for starting the Korean War. The 2015 declassification
of the 1950 grand jury testimony of David Greenglass, Ellen’s brother and a member of Julius’s spy ring
who worked in Los Alamos labs, confirms the long-held suspicion of Rosenberg supporters that
Greenglass fabricated a story of Ethel’s involvement in the espionage that the government used in an
effort to compel Julius to confess. Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes, 176-178; Michael Meeropol and Robert
Meeropol, “The Meeropol Brothers: Exonerate Our Mother, Ethel Rosenberg,” New York Times, August 10,
2015.
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World War II as a means to undermine German, Japanese, and Soviet spies operating inside the United
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Smith Act made it a crime to advocate “the overthrow of any government in the United States by force of
violence,” the Court’s new interpretation pronounced that promotion of ideas alone was not punishable.
The Director continued to emphasize the CPUSA’s supposed threat to U.S. internal security to American
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President Dwight Eisenhower’s approval for a covert effort to defeat the CPUSA during a March 8, 1956
National Security Council meeting. During the early 1960s, the FBI initiated two more COINTELPROs
targeting leftist movements deemed “subversive” threats to U.S. national security: the Socialist Workers
Party and the Puerto Rican independence movement. For more on COINTELPRO-CPUSA, see James Davis,
Spying on America, 31-32. On the FBI’s development of COINTELPRO operations against Axis and Soviet
spies, see Raymond J. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage during World
War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), and The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). On the FBI’s counterintelligence program against the
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intended to sow distrust and discord within the Party; providing true or falsified
derogatory information about the organization to the news media; informing local
police about members’ criminal or civil violations; and notifying employers of
individuals’ membership in the group.36 By 1971, the FBI had carried out 1,388
separate COINTELPRO operations against the CPUSA.37
During the Johnson years, two changes in the FBI’s operations against the U.S.
left set the stage for the Bureau’s Nixon-era war with leftist guerrillas. First, amid the
decline of the CPUSA and the growing problem of urban riots, the FBI’s Domestic
Security Division increasingly shifted its investigative priorities from preventing
Communist “subversion” to preventing violent “civil disorder.” Between 1964 and 1967,
urban riots prompted a severe crisis for the President Johnson, who repeatedly
implored Hoover to investigate and contain violent civil disturbances. In response, the
FBI expanded its surveillance of African American communities in hopes of detecting
urban riots in advance. The Bureau initially focused its efforts on black activists, tapping
the phones of prominent Black Nationalist leaders Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, and
Maxwell Stanford between 1964 and 1966, and maintaining surveillance notes on
thousands of civil rights demonstrations.38 After the Newark and Detroit riots of 1967,
however, the FBI widened surveillance beyond black radicals to entire African
American communities. Through the “Ghetto Informant Program,” thousands of
informants provided FBI agents with information used to gauge the potential for violent
one of countering “subversion” to preventing revolutionary anticolonial violence. See FBI Vault online
archive, COINTELPRO Puerto Rican Groups Files, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/puerto-rican-groups
(accessed June 1, 2016).
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37 James Kirkpatrick Davis, Assault on the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement (Westport, CT:
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civil disturbance.39 Under the rubric of violence prevention, the FBI also expanded
surveillance of the antiwar movement. In 1966, hoping to gain foreknowledge of
“potentialities for violence outbreaks,” Hoover ordered his agents to develop
“awareness and alertness” of antiwar demonstrations, though he provided no specific
evidence of impending violence.40 “I want to stress to you,” he wrote, “that the emphasis
in these matters must be on advance detection… We are an intelligence agency and as
such are expected to know what is going to or is likely to happen. National, state, and
local authorities rely upon us to obtain this information so they can take appropriate
action to avert disastrous outbreaks.”41 For the most part, however, the FBI’s
surveillance operations were unsuccessful in preventing the riots, street protests, and
other disruptive social conflict that rattled American society during the 1960s.
While Hoover expanded the FBI’s surveillance of African Americans and antiwar
protesters during the Johnson years, the Director also reigned in the Bureau’s use of
illegal surveillance techniques. Throughout his four-decade career as Director, Hoover
had carefully crafted the FBI’s public image as trusted crime-fighters and defenders of
national security, knowing that this perception played a key role in enabling the Bureau
to maintain powerful institutional autonomy from Congress and the White House. But
during the mid-1960s, dissident activists and politicians began to challenge U.S.
intelligence agencies’ authority. This made Hoover nervous. A Senate subcommittee’s
investigation of IRS surveillance in 1965 and 1966, for example, caused Hoover to
worry that legislators would launch a similar investigation of FBI practices, and from
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1965 to 1967 Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark implemented
formal restrictions on the Bureau’s wiretapping and microphone surveillance powers.42
Hoover also turned seventy in 1965, the FBI’s mandatory retirement age, but President
Johnson passed an executive order allowing him to stay on as Director.43 In an effort to
safeguard the FBI’s institutional autonomy growing political dissent and public scrutiny
of his age, between 1965 and 1967 Hoover restricted the Bureau’s use of break-ins,
mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and teenaged informants.44 After 1965, the FBI
also cut back its surveillance and counterintelligence operations against Martin Luther
King and other civil rights leaders, whom the Bureau had targeted in conjunction with
its war on Communists.45
Hoover did not restrict all of the FBI’s illegal operations during the Johnson
administration, however. In efforts to meet the Johnson administration’s repeated
demands that the FBI prevent violence, the Director established new top-secret
counterintelligence programs. The first one, code-named COINTELPRO-White Hate
Groups, targeted violent rightwing organizations, particularly the Ku Klux Klan. For
decades Hoover had tacitly supported Klan violence. A conservative supporter of “states
rights” who had come of age as a white man in segregated Washington D.C., Hoover
considering the Klan a problem to be solved by local authorities—the very same
Southern white leaders who maintained the racist Jim Crow regime with the aid of the
vigilante organization’s violence. When the June 1964 disappearance of three young
Theoharis, Spying on Americans, 17.
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civil rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi prompted international outcry,
however, Johnson demanded that Hoover take swift action to take down the Klan.
Flooding the organization with paid informants, and utilizing covert tactics similar to
those employed against the Communist Party, the FBI succeeded within five years in
destroying the Ku Klux Klan as a functional national organization.46
Towards the end of Johnson’s term, Hoover established counterintelligence
programs targeting the Black Power and student antiwar movements. Though more
research on these programs is needed, critical review of key documents reveals that the
Director established both of these COINTELPROs in response to violent civil disorder, a
problem Johnson implored Hoover to crack down on throughout his presidency. After
the Newark and Detroit riots of 1967, the FBI established COINTELPRO-Black
Nationalist-Hate Groups, designed to “to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or
otherwise neutralize” Black freedom organizations who allegedly threatened America’s
“internal security” due to their “propensity for violence and civil disorder.”47 The
founding memo for COINTELPRO-BNHG inaccurately characterized a wide spectrum of
African American groups as “black nationalist, hate-type organizations,” including
Martin Luther King Jr.’s nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
Elijah Muhammad’s separatist Nation of Islam (NOI), and a number of groups
advocating philosophies of Black Power and armed self-defense: the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), Revolutionary
Action Movement (RAM), and Deacons for Defense and Justice. Prior to Nixon’s election,
O’Reilly, “Racial Matters,” 199, 225-226.
FBI airtel, Director to SAC Albany, “Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist – Hate Groups,
Internal Security,” August 25, 1967, 1-2, FBI Vault online archive, COINTELPRO-Black Extremist Files
(hereafter COINTELPRO-Black Extremist), Section 1.
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however, the program focused primarily on SNCC, whose leaders Stokely Carmichael
and H. Rap Brown had become the Black Power movement’s most visible spokesmen
and critics of nonviolence.48 Violence prevention also informed the FBI’s COINTELPRO
against SDS and the student antiwar movement. Hoover authorized COINTELPRO-New
Left in April 1968, after a disruptive weeklong student strike at Columbia University
gained international media coverage, including images of university administrators’
offices ransacked by student protesters. Officials in the FBI’s Domestic Security Division
explained that the objective of the new COINTELPRO was to “expose, disrupt, or
otherwise neutralize” the vaguely defined “New Left.” The program focused on SDS,
seeking to prevent its members from engaging in “violent and illegal activities,” though
agents were concerned about the group’s “subversive” potential as well.49 In the cases
of both COINTELPRO-BNHG and COINTELPRO-New Left, the FBI sought to prevent
disruptive civil disturbances by “neutralizing” leftist radicals and organizations whose
members promoted militant protest tactics and violent revolution.
Though officials’ biases alone do not explain the FBI’s domestic security
operations during the Nixon administration, the Bureau’s war on the Black Power
movement and student New Left was certainly political. The FBI targeted insurgent
violence while overlooking or even encouraging state violence. In both the 1967 riots
and the 1968 Columbia University student strike, for example, police engaged in far
more violence than did protesters; during the Detroit riots, police and National
For more on the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations against SNCC, see Clayborne Carson, “White
Repression,” Chapter 16 in In Struggle.
49 FBI memo, C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, “Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption
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Guardsmen were responsible for the deaths of at least twenty-seven people (most of
them African American), and in New York police brutally beat student occupiers while
clearing out Columbia’s administrative buildings.50 Yet throughout the 1960s, indeed,
throughout his forty-eight-year career as FBI Director, Hoover disregarded the problem
of police violence, dismissing African Americans’ and student protesters’ complaints of
police brutality as “wild charges” or “false allegations” lodged to justify violent criminal
activity.51 African American Chicago policeman Howard Saffold observed that Hoover’s
stance communicated to local police that “it was open season”; officers would not “have
to worry about the law” when inflicting violence upon blacks and political radicals.52
And, of course, the FBI did nothing to prosecute American leaders who violated
international law by waging a war of aggression in Vietnam. On the contrary, FBI
officials saw SDS’s attempts to disrupt the U.S. war effort as one of the reasons the
organization needed to be “neutralized.”53 The FBI helped uphold a consensus among
America’s political leadership and much of its population, who in the words of war
correspondent Gloria Emerson, perceived U.S. state violence in Vietnam as “normal—
war normal.”54
Nixon, meanwhile, did not understand the scope of the FBI’s secret domestic
security operations. The new president knew of Hoover’s longstanding commitment to
fighting Communist “subversion.” Indeed, Nixon had first risen to national prominence
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in 1948, with the FBI Director’s assistance, by leading the House Un-American Activities
Committee’s investigation of accused Soviet spy Alger Hiss. Nixon was also well aware
of the incredible power Hoover wielded as gatekeeper of the FBI’s vast catalog of
information on thousands of Americans, including the personal secrets of U.S. political
leaders. Shortly before Nixon took office, outgoing President Johnson advised him that
Hoover was “a pillar of strength in a city of weak men.” “You will rely on him time and
time again to maintain security,” Johnson said; “He’s the only one you can put your
complete trust in.”55 But Nixon was not privy to the changes Hoover had implemented
during the Johnson administration, changes that even LBJ did not completely
comprehend—the expansion of domestic security priorities to include violence
prevention in addition to countersubversion, the restrictions on illegal surveillance
practices, and the secret counterintelligence programs against the Black Power
movement and New Left. Upon taking office, President Nixon expected his old friend
Hoover to faithfully execute his administration’s domestic security agenda. The
Director, however, was determined to do things his own way, balancing the President’s
demands with his personal efforts to safeguard the FBI’s image, autonomy, and
historical legacy.
One of Nixon’s concerns, informed by his anticommunist paranoia, was that
foreign Communist regimes like the USSR, China, and Cuba were secretly calling the
shots behind the scenes of the United States’ Black Power and antiwar movements. He
inherited several surveillance-reporting programs designed to inform him of such
activity. The FBI, for example, issued regular reports to the White House on the
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activities of dissident political organizations and leaders, and on Congress members’
and congressional staffers’ contacts with foreign embassies. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) also provided reports on tax investigations of select American activists,
while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported on antiwar and civil rights
activists’ foreign contacts, and the National Security Agency provided information
gleaned from domestic dissidents’ international telecommunications.56 The President
and his staff were not satisfied with the quality of this surveillance, however. Nixon’s
counsel John Ehrlichman was especially dissatisfied with the FBI’s surveillance reports.
“In general the FBI investigative work I saw was of poor quality,” he complained.57
Indeed, while Nixon was a longtime friend of Hoover from their time working together
on the Hiss case, and felt compelled to keep him employed as FBI Director, Ehrlichman
and other Cabinet members resented the aging bureaucrat’s power and political
autonomy, and wished to see him replaced.58 Nonetheless, in April 1969, at Nixon’s
request, Ehrlichman ordered the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies to produce
evidence tying domestic dissidents to foreign Communist governments.59
Nixon’s Justice Department, like Johnson’s, also pressured Hoover’s FBI to
thwart insurgent violence through the use of preventative intelligence. Immediately
upon taking office, Attorney General Mitchell strengthened the Department’s
Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU), which Attorney General Clark had established
in order to coordinate intelligence from the FBI and other agencies with the aim of
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obtaining advance warning of urban riots.60 Mitchell expanded the unit’s mission to
encompass forecasting campus antiwar demonstrations. Writing on behalf of the IDIU,
Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley instructed Hoover on February 18, 1969
“to determine whether there is any underlying subversive group giving illegal
directions and guidance to the numerous campus disorders throughout the country.” A
few weeks later, on March 3, Yeagley asked the FBI to furnish “the names of any
individuals who appear at more than one campus either before, during, or after any
active disorder or riot and the identities of those persons from outside the campus who
might be instigators of these incidents.”61
In addition, Nixon enlisted the FBI’s assistance in investigating a series of leaks
that exposed his administration’s secret war efforts in Indochina. On May 9, 1969, the
New York Times published a front-page story announcing that the United States had
secretly expanded its aerial bombing efforts from Vietnam to Cambodia, a move that
directly contradicted Nixon’s campaign promise to end the war in Indochina. The article
claimed its information came from anonymous “Nixon Administration sources.”62 This
was the most serious of the more than a dozen leaks Nixon faced during his first year in
office.63 At the requests of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Attorney General Mitchell,
and White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, the FBI subsequently established
seventeen warrantless wiretaps in hopes of finding the leakers, targeting the phones of
Church Committee Report, Book III, 495-500.
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National Security Council staffers, news journalists, and personnel in the White House,
Department of Defense, State Department, and Justice Department.64 These illegal
wiretaps would later become known as the “Kissinger wiretaps” after their existence
became known during the Watergate hearings.
Hoover, however, did not passively comply with the Nixon administration’s
requests for expanded domestic surveillance. Although he agreed with Nixon that
revolutionary bombings, disruptive protests, and leaks of classified state secrets posed
serious threats to the United States’ national security, Hoover remained reluctant to
authorize illegal FBI operations. The seventy-four-year-old longtime FBI Director
continued to worry that amid the United States’ tumultuous political climate, public
discovery of FBI involvement in such tactics would undermine the Bureau’s upstanding
reputation and lead to calls for government oversight and reform.
Accordingly, Hoover resisted the Nixon administration’s demands, and complied
with surveillance requests only when he could ensure that in the case of public
exposure, the White House, rather than the FBI, would be held responsible for
authorizing the measures. For instance, Hoover rejected Assistant Attorney General
Yeagley’s March 1969 request for expanded FBI surveillance of American university
campus radicals. Though he instructed his field offices to maintain “student informant
coverage,” Hoover insisted that “additional student informants cannot be developed.”65
Hoover also sought to protect the FBI by acquiring White House approval for the
seventeen Kissinger wiretaps. Though Nixon wanted no written record of the wiretaps,
Hoover maintained logs of the secret recordings, and obtained Attorney General
64
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Mitchell’s written authorization for the operations. The Director kept these records
hidden outside of the FBI’s normal filing system, storing them within the top-secret
“Official and Confidential” files he kept inside his personal inner office.66 Meanwhile, the
FBI’s reports to the Nixon administration consistently demonstrated that New Left and
Black Power radicalism grew largely from domestic conditions; there was little
evidence, if any, that America’s new generation of leftists was directly supported by
foreign Communist governments.67 Unbeknownst to Nixon, Hoover also continued to
authorize the FBI’s COINTELPROs against the dwindling Communist Party, the Socialist
Workers Party, the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Power movement, and the New Left. Hoover
was serious about defending the nation’s status quo from foreign and domestic
revolutionary movements, even if the threats posed by such movements were remote
and the FBI’s actions violated law-abiding Americans’ civil liberties. But he was
determined to go about this on his own terms, regardless of who was in control of the
White House.

“Cult of the Gun”
While Richard Nixon and FBI officials worried about the growing rate of revolutionary
bombings, American leftists feared the rise of Nixon. Most leftists correctly recognized
Nixon’s pledge to achieve an “honorable victory” in Vietnam through an unspecified
“secret plan” to end the war as a subterfuge designed to conceal his plans for an
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escalation in U.S. hostilities.68 Moreover, to many on the U.S. left, Nixon’s election on a
“law-and-order” platform—one that scapegoated rioters, protesters, and political
radicals as the main source of the country’s problems—portended the rise of fascism in
the United States. This analysis was not accurate. It is true that Nixon escalated the war,
that police violence continued unabated, and that leftist movements had yet to change
these problems. But the United States was not a dictatorship. Nonetheless, with options
for achieving social change through the normal channels of the U.S. political system
seeming increasingly limited, some American radicals looked to import revolutionary
guerrilla war strategies from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The most vocal
proponents of guerrilla warfare came from the ranks of the Black Panther Party and
SDS. Influential factions within each organization embraced Ché Guevara’s foco theory
of guerrilla warfare as a strategy for achieving socialist revolution in the United States.
Ultra-leftists’ increasing militancy, in turn, enflamed tension with police and heightened
factionalism within the left, which the FBI eagerly sought to exacerbate through its
counterintelligence programs.
Insurgent violence was nothing new to U.S. history. From Indian wars and slave
revolts since the seventeenth century to anarchist bombings and other forms of labor
revolt during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, America’s oppressed had periodically
taken up arms to resist colonialism, slavery, economic exploitation, and other forms of
violence sanctioned or carried out by the state. After World War II, however, worldwide
anticolonial movements inspired a new form of insurgent violence in the United States,
as revolutionary regimes in countries such as China, Cuba, Algeria, and Tanzania
Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014).
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endeavored to build socialist societies, and as armed national liberation struggles
against U.S.-backed dictatorships and allied European colonial powers raged
throughout Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. In this context, a handful of
influential African American leaders began to question the civil rights movement’s
strategy of nonviolent direct action and promote revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the
United States. African American and Third World revolutionaries’ ideas on guerrilla
warfare, developed amidst the global uprisings of the mid-1960s, would later inform
militant Black Panther and SDS responses to the Nixon administration.
The black freedom struggle’s most visible critic of nonviolence was Malcolm X.
Born in Malcolm Little in Omaha, Nebraska in 1925, Malcolm X gained prominence
during the late 1950s and early 1960s as a spokesperson for the Nation of Islam (NOI),
the black separatist religious sect led by Elijah Muhammad. In 1964, amid a fallout with
Muhammad and his growing interest in Black Nationalism and Pan-African socialism,
Malcolm X parted NOI to found the Organization for Afro-American Unity.69 Malcolm X
spoke before audiences throughout the United States, critiquing nonviolence on both
moral and practical grounds. He affirmed African Americans’ right to self-defense,
calling upon blacks to form rifle clubs to protect themselves from racist white
vigilantes, while presciently warning that growing numbers of black youth would
embrace armed revolt if denied the opportunity to gain self-determination for their
Others in the African American freedom struggle questioned nonviolence earlier. Many Southern black
activists, for example, adopted nonviolence reluctantly, after a great deal of persuasion from movement
leaders like Bayard Rustin and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Most embraced nonviolence not out of a
commitment to pacifism, but because of their belief in its strategic value in the struggle to overturn
Southern states’ racist Jim Crow regimes. Moreover, the Southern civil rights movement was not as
nonviolent as it typically appeared in the media. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, groups of
armed African Americans provided security for nonviolent activists in a variety of settings, in some cases
exchanging fire with white racist vigilantes. See Akinyele O. Umoja, We Will Shoot Back: Armed Resistance
in the Mississippi Freedom Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
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communities through the electoral process. “Just as guerrilla warfare is prevailing in
Asia and in parts of Africa and in parts of Latin America,” he declared before a Cleveland
audience on April 3, 1964, “you’ve got to be mighty naïve, or you’ve got to play the black
man cheap, if you don’t think that some day he’s going to wake up and find that it’s got
to be the ballot or the bullet.”70 Malcolm X again predicted the coming of guerrilla
warfare to America six days later in New York. Referring to a recent incident in which
black youth in Jacksonville, Florida fought police with homemade gasoline bombs,
Malcolm X observed, “There’s a new strategy coming in. It’ll be Molotov cocktails this
month, hand grenades next month, and something else the next month.”71 “You should
not feel that I am inciting someone to violence,” he explained. “I’m only warning of a
powder keg situation.”72
While Malcolm X prophesized about guerrilla warfare, a lesser-known militant
named Robert F. Williams directly called upon African Americans to adopt the tactic. As
leader of the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Williams gained international notoriety as an
advocate for armed self-defense after his group employed gunfire to fend off an attack
by local Klansmen in October 1957.73 Later, as a political exile in Cuba and China, where
he fled to escape an FBI manhunt predicated upon false kidnapping charges, Williams
gained attention as an apostle of armed revolution. In the spring 1964 issue of his
newsletter, The Crusader, Williams published an article entitled “The USA: The Potential
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of a Minority Revolution,” in which he insisted that nonviolence was ineffective, and
asserted that black Americans “must prepare to wage an urban guerrilla war of selfdefense.”74 He called upon “Afroamerican freedom fighters” to learn the art of building
Molotov cocktails, homemade acid bombs, and booby traps for use against racist
police,” and to clandestinely purchase “hand grenades, bazookas, light mortars, rocket
launchers, machine guns and ammunition” from American servicemen.75
Williams’ outlook differed from that of Malcolm X, who prior to his death at the
hands of NOI gunmen on February 21, 1965, maintained openness to the possibility that
African Americans could gain self-determination for their communities by voting black
political leaders into office.76 Chased into exile by the Ku Klux Klan, North Carolina
police, and the FBI, Williams believed that America’s racist whites were responding to
the civil rights movement with an organized effort to physically exterminate black
people. “The fascist elements are arming,” he argued, “not to liberate our brutally
oppressed people, but to liquidate us.”77 In Williams’ view, the rise of American fascism
precluded the possibility of African American electoral organizing and necessitated
guerrilla warfare. “What is integration,” he asked, “when the law says yes and the police
and howling mob say no? Our only logical and successful answer is to meet organized
and massive violence with organized and massive violence.”78 Williams argued that
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African American guerrilla violence was a form of self-defense because its aim was to
eliminate “the source of evil and terror.”79
During the middle and late 1960s several African American political
organizations inspired by Malcolm X and Robert F. Williams sought to channel urban
black rage into a national movement. These included the semi-clandestine
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and SNCC, whose leaders Stokely Carmichael
and H. Rap Brown became outspoken critics of nonviolence and advocates of Black
Power at the same time that their organization began to crumble amidst internal
conflict.80 By the time Nixon won the November 1968 presidential election, however,
leaders of the Black Panther Party had become the most visible African American
proponents of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the United States.
Merritt College students Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black
Panther Party in Oakland in 1966. Frustrated with pervasive police brutality in their
community, Newton, Seale, and their recruits dedicated much of their initial energy
towards patrolling the Oakland police. When police stopped African American
motorists, Black Panthers would emerge on the scene displaying loaded guns and law
books, stating their intent to lawfully observe police behavior and ensure that the
officers were not violating the rights of community members.81 Newton and Seale also
drafted the group’s influential “Ten Point Program,” an ideological hybrid of Black
Nationalism, Third World Marxism, and social democratic liberalism that called for full
employment, public housing, culturally relevant education, reparations, an end to police
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brutality, freedom for black prisoners, and black men’s exemption from U.S. military
service.82 The Black Panthers became a national sensation after staging a dramatic
armed protest at California’s State House. On May 2 1967, thirty Black Panthers, armed
with rifles and decked out in black berets and leather jackets, stormed the state capitol
to protest the Mulford Act, a new gun control bill outlawing public display of firearms
that lawmakers had intentionally drafted to outlaw the Panthers’ police patrols. As the
Panthers hoped, the specter of young black men with guns attracted widespread
television coverage and interest in their organization.83
The Black Panthers’ confrontations with police entered a new phase after
October 27, 1967, when Oakland police arrested Huey Newton at a traffic stop following
a shootout that left Officer John Frey dead and Newton and another officer wounded.
The arrest turned Newton into a leftist cause célèbre, as mass media attention on his
case and efforts to battle murder charges and the death penalty buoyed national
interest in the Panthers.84 Newton’s imprisonment also created an opening in the
Party’s leadership, into which stepped Eldridge Cleaver. An ex-convict in the California
prison system whose bestselling memoir Soul on Ice (1968) became notorious for its
assertion that raping white women was an “insurrectionary act,” Cleaver had gained
prominence in Bay Area radical circles after taking a position as a writer for Ramparts, a
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magazine published by white New Leftists.85 As the Black Panthers’ Minister of
Communication, Cleaver edited and expanded production of the Black Panther
newspaper and led the “Free Huey” campaign. He also became well known for his vocal
calls for urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of police officers, and other violence,
threatening to burn down the White House on one occasion and to beat Governor
Ronald Reagan (“the punk”) to death with a marshmallow on another.86
Militant rhetoric was not confined to Cleaver. A popular Panther slogan, often
chanted as members of the group marched in military formation, was a call-andresponse: “Revolution has come! Off the pigs! Time to pick up the gun! Off the pigs!” In
Sixties street slang, “off” meant kill and “pigs” referred to the police and anyone whom
ultra-left militants believed to be collaborating with them.87 Huey Newton had
intentionally directed the Panthers to use the term “pigs” in order to “stigmatize” police,
giving them a “label other than that fear image they carried in the [black] community.”88
Meanwhile, the weekly Black Panther newspaper regularly published illustrations of
young blacks posing with guns or using various weapons to kill police officers
portrayed as pigs. The paper’s headlines and graphics incited violent retaliation for
police attacks against Panthers and African American communities: “Free Huey or the
Sky’s the Limit”; “Blow Oink Oink Away”; “Snipe the Hogs.”89
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The Black Panthers broadcast violent revolutionary rhetoric as the organization
rapidly expanded, opening offices in more than forty cities across the country over the
course of 1968 and 1969, while also enduring in heightened violent conflict with local
police agencies.90 Police in the Bay Area, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and other
cities regularly harassed Black Panthers and their supporters, sometimes arresting
them on trumped-up charges. Violent confrontations between police and Panthers
during 1968 included: a February 25 Berkeley police raid on the home of Bobby Seale
and his wife; a March police shooting that left Black Panther Glen Carter dead; an April
3 police raid on a black Episcopal Church in West Oakland whose pastor loaned the
Panthers space for community meetings; an April 6 shootout at a West Oakland house
that resulted in the death of Black Panther Bobby Hutton and the wounding of Eldridge
Cleaver and two officers; the August 1 police beating of New York Panther Gordon
Cooke; an August 5 gunfight at a traffic stop in Los Angeles that ended with the deaths
of three Panthers and the wounding of two police officers; the shooting up of the
storefront windows at the Oakland Panther headquarters by two on-duty cops; and the
October 15 police shooting death of Seattle Panther Welton Armstead.91
The Panthers publicly portrayed most of these incidents as unprovoked police
attacks. In many cases, however, the Panthers antagonized police with confrontational
rhetoric or open displays of firearms—activities that were legal, and responses to past
experiences with state violence, but nonetheless prompted violent police reactions.
Moreover, as historian Jama Lazerow, has pointed out, with many of BPP’s recruits
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drawn from the urban underclass whom Party leaders sought to politicize, there was
often a “porous boundary” between some members’ criminal and political activity.92 At
least one of these deadly incidents came about a result of a Panther attempt at antipolice violence. The April 6 firefight in West Oakland that resulted in the police killing of
Bobby Hutton erupted after Eldridge Cleaver bungled an attempt to ambush a group of
police officers. By putting his advocacy of guerrilla warfare into practice, Cleaver had
hoped to establish the Black Panther Party’s position as the “vanguard” of America’s
coming revolution amid the nationwide urban riots that had erupted following Martin
Luther King’s assassination two days earlier.93 In November 1968, Cleaver fled the
country after jumping bail on murder changes. He made his way to Cuba before
surfacing in Algeria in July 1969, where his wife Elaine Cleaver and several other
Panthers joined him in establishing the Black Panther Party’s “International Section”
headquartered in a downtown Algiers “Panther Embassy” provided by the country’s
socialist government.94
In the years leading up to Nixon’s election, a large portion of SDS had also come
to philosophically embrace revolutionary guerrilla warfare. This was a far cry from the
principles outlined in the group’s foundational 1962 Port Huron Statement. Drafted by
Tom Hayden and inspired by the nonviolent civil rights movement, the Port Huron
Statement had laid out an idealistic vision for “participatory democracy,” in which
Americans of all races would contribute equally and directly in the political processes
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that governed the nation and their everyday lives.95 During the mid-1960s, SDS
chapters organized civil rights campaigns in solidarity with SNCC and the civil rights
movement, a series of grassroots Economic Research and Action Project social justice
initiatives in Midwestern cities, and several large demonstrations against the U.S. war in
Vietnam.96 By 1966, however, amid President Johnson’s escalation of the war and
ongoing police attacks on protesters, SDS had joined the larger antiwar movement in
moving, in organizer Greg Calvert’s words, “from protest to resistance.”97 To most
antiwar activists, resistance meant draft refusal or other forms of nonviolent direct
action. But in the fall of 1967, antiwar militants in Berkeley and New York resisted
police batons and teargas grenades with helmets, shields, sticks, bottles, and rocks.98
Such tactics expanded during 1968, as groups of participants in the Columbia University
student strike, protests outside Chicago’s Democratic National Convention, and other
mass demonstrations incorporated vandalism and street fighting into their protest
repertoires, and as SDS membership surged from approximately five thousand in 1965
into the tens of thousands. Militant protests in the United States were part of the much
larger global uprising of 1968. The year’s rebellions began when Vietnamese
Communist guerrillas carried out a devastating nationwide ground attack on U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces during the January “Tet Offensive,” and continued with youth-
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led revolts on both sides of the Cold War’s “Iron Curtain,” from France, West Germany,
and Czechoslovakia to Mexico, China, and Japan.99
American leftist militants championed guerrilla warfare not only in response to
U.S. state violence, but also as part of a global trend in the revolutionary left. Guerrilla
warfare became increasingly popular among revolutionaries throughout the world
following the January 1966 First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia,
and Latin America (popularly known as the Tricontinental Conference) in Havana,
Cuba. As historian Vijay Prashad explained, the Tricontinental Conference inaugurated
a period in which growing sectors of the international left embraced the “cult of the
gun,” reviving armed struggle “not only as a tactic of anticolonialism but significantly as
a strategy in itself.”100 The Tricontinental Conference was one in a series of meetings of
Third World leaders convened in the decades following World War II for the purpose of
advancing anticolonial struggles for land, peace, and freedom among the peoples of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Earlier meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement had
emphasized cooperative efforts to promote political independence and nonviolent
international relations within the United Nations.101 By 1966, however, the war in
Vietnam had driven an ideological wedge into the Third World movement. While some
leaders sought to continue efforts at building UN institutions while maintaining
peaceful co-existence with the U.S. and its allies, increasing numbers of revolutionaries
drew inspiration from the Vietnamese people’s success using guerrilla warfare to bog
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down the mighty U.S. military—since March 1965, the U.S. had deployed over 200,000
troops to South Vietnam and dropped millions of tons of bombs on the North and South,
yet had gained neither new territorial control nor support from the Vietnamese people.
Nguyen Van Tien of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and Tran Danh
Tuyen of the government of North Vietnam provided some of the Tricontinental’s most
popular presentations, while the conference’s host President Fidel Castro hailed the
Vietnamese guerrillas’ efforts. Guinea-Bissauan anticolonial leader Amilcar Cabral also
extolled the necessity of revolutionary violence. “We do not think we will shock this
assembly,” he declared, “by stating that the only effective way of definitively fulfilling
the aspirations of the peoples, that is to say of attaining national liberation, is by armed
struggle.”102
The most influential statement on revolutionary violence to come out of the
Tricontinental was from Argentine hero of the 1959 Cuban revolution, Ernesto Ché
Guevara. Guevara did not attend the conference, but he sent a letter to the delegates
from Tanzania, where he had recently gone into hiding after retreating from a failed
mission to spark revolutionary insurgency in the Congo. In his “Message to the
Tricontinental,” Guevara outlined a strategy for global socialist revolution centered on
guerrilla warfare. He argued that defeat of U.S. imperialism in the Third World—
manifested in military interventions, economic domination, and backing of dictators
friendly towards American business interests—necessitated that “two, three, many
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Vietnams flourish throughout the world with their share of deaths and their immense
tragedies, their everyday heroism and blows against imperialism, impelled to disperse
its forces under the sudden attack and the increasing hatred of all the peoples of the
world.”103 Guevara called upon revolutionaries to pick up the gun, arguing that a
proliferation of armed insurgencies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America would
overextend U.S. military capacities, foment dissent and class struggle within the U.S.,
and ultimately result in the overthrow of U.S. imperialism and the liberation of Third
World nations.104
While a “people’s army” was a model of anti-imperialist resistance in places like
Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies of Africa, in countries where a mass movement
was less developed, armed struggle, according to Guevara, could still play an important
role in the form of the “foco.” French Marxist Regis Debray further popularized
Guevara’s revolutionary strategy in his 1967 book, Revolution in the Revolution?,
published the same year that he participated in Guevara’s failed guerrilla campaign in
Bolivia. Debray, argued that focos—small, mobile cells of disciplined guerrillas—could
quickly strike enemy targets with spectacular attacks before retreating into hiding, and
in the process, recruit and train other focos that could eventually unite as a people’s
army capable of bringing about general insurrection and the ultimate overthrow of
capitalist regimes.105
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Amidst the global and domestic turmoil of 1968, young American leftists eagerly
circulated the writings of Guevara and Debray, often reading them in conjunction with
Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book, Franz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, works by Vladimir
Lenin and Karl Marx, and Robert F. Williams’ writings on guerrilla warfare, which
prescribed a formula for foco revolution in the United States.106 Manuals for
manufacturing bombs and other homemade weapons also made the rounds through
leftist circles—titles included the English translation of the 1963 Cuban booklet “150
Questions for a Guerrilla,” an article entitled “Grenades and Bombs: Anti-Property and
Anti-Personnel” published in the November 16, 1968 issue of the Black Panther
newspaper, and U.S. Army field guides on guerrilla warfare and explosives
manufacture.107 According to observers, copies of a bomb-making guide called
“Mechanical Methods of Sabotage” “were scooped up with unabashed enthusiasm” at
the October 1968 national SDS convention held in Boulder, Colorado, not far from
where Cameron Bishop and his friends were in the process of refining their skills in
explosives manufacture.108 Meanwhile, images of Ché Guevara, along with the NLF flag,
became fixtures at U.S. antiwar protests, in Black Panther offices, and on the walls of
American college dormitories.109 The New Left newspaper the Berkeley Barb reported
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that entreaties to “kill a white cop” drew enthusiastic applause at radical student
gatherings.110
The “cult of the gun” had arrived in the United States. On August 1, 1968, a
surprise armed attack on Cleveland police officers by a group calling itself the Black
Nationalists of New Libya resulted in the deaths of three cops and four militants.
Eldridge Cleaver praised the assault, saying it demonstrated “that psychologically
blacks are not only prepared to die but kill.”111 During the fall of 1968, New Left radicals
carried out approximately forty bombings and arsons, including attacks on a CIA office
in Ann Arbor and ROTC facilities at UC Berkeley, University of Delaware, Oregon State
University, Texas State University, Washington University, and the University of
Washington.112 The Michigan-based White Panther Party, comprised of working-class
white radicals who emulated the Black Panthers, issued a statement reading, “Get a gun,
brother, and learn how to use it. You’ll need it pretty soon.”113
Writing from jail in 1968, Black Panther Minister of Defense Huey Newton
outlined his vision of developing a focoist clandestine revolutionary guerrilla
organization. “When the people learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to
resist by going into the streets in large numbers; and when they see the advantage in
the activities of the guerrilla warfare method, they will quickly follow this example,” he
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wrote. “When the vanguard group destroys the machinery of the oppressor by dealing
with him in small groups of three and four, and then escapes the might of the
oppressor,” Newton contended, “the masses will be overjoyed and will adhere to this
correct strategy.”114 During the same year, the BPP started to secretly build a
clandestine underground infrastructure. Los Angeles Panther Geronimo Pratt, a
decorated Vietnam veteran and former Green Beret, helped organize the Panther
underground while travelling the country in 1968, simultaneously facilitating the
formation of new BPP chapters in Atlanta, Dallas, New Orleans, and other Southern
cities.115 Panther leadership passed a rule that “no party member can join any other
army force other than the Black Liberation Army.”116 Little is known about the activities
of the Panther underground, though its members have been suspected of engaging in
illegal, armed fundraising activities. Not until May 1971, however, after the BPP
formally split into two rival factions, would the Black Liberation Army begin to publicly
take credit for police ambushes and other guerrilla attacks.
Nixon’s narrow triumph in the 1968 presidential election was a key moment in
the violent dialectic of state and insurgent violence that escalated over the course of the
Johnson administration. On one hand, the riots and bombings had helped Nixon, who
coopted the language of civil rights to advance his law-and-order policing agenda; upon
accepting his nomination as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate he
proclaimed that the “first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic
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violence.”117 On the other hand, to many radicals already inclined towards supporting
revolutionary guerrilla warfare, Nixon’s electoral victory was further confirmation that
U.S. policies could not be changed through normal political mechanisms or through
traditional leftist strategies of grassroots organizing and party-building. Throughout the
first half of 1969, the Black Panther newspaper warned of emerging “fascism” in the
United States, attributing mounting police attacks on its members to the “pig power
structure’s” nationwide conspiracy to “suppress the will of the black community.”118
State and municipal-level actions against the Black Panther Party, carried out as
the Justice Department indicted Cameron Bishop and the Chicago 8, also gave leftists
the impression that U.S. authorities would stop at nothing to crush domestic dissent. On
April 2, 1969, using information provided by three paid police informants, a New York
grand jury indicted twenty-one members of the New York BPP for conspiring to
assassinate police officers and bomb police precincts, department stores, and the Bronx
Botanical Garden. In early morning raids, New York City police arrested ten of the
accused. Two of the suspects were already in police custody on robbery charges, while a
few managed dodge the police raid and join Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria. Police caught
up with the rest over the next weeks and months. A judge set bail at $100,000 for each
of the detained defendants. Two years later—after an eight-month trial, then the
longest in New York history—a jury acquitted all members of the Panther 21. Most of

Richard Nixon, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention
in Miami Beach, Florida, August 8, 1968, The American Presidency Project online database,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25968.
118 Black Panther Black Community News Service 2, no. 20 (January 15, 1969), 1; 3, no. 8 (June 14, 1969),
1; 3, no. 12 (July 12, 1969), 1.
117

82

the defendants remained incarcerated in the meantime, however, leaving the New York
Panthers without most of its core leaders and organizers.119
Did the New York authorities indict the Panther 21 because they viewed the BPP
as a threat to the state’s political order? Or did they act to prevent what they believed to
be an impending deadly guerrilla attack on New York police officers? The Black
Panthers and their supporters portrayed the Panther 21 indictments as trumped-up
charges similar to those Nixon’s Justice Department had lodged against the Chicago 8 a
month earlier, part of a broader campaign of state repression that made no distinction
between state agencies and denied any Panther involvement in illegal activity. The
Black Panther newspaper, for example, called the Panther 21 raids part of a “Pig
Conspiracy” to “Destroy the Panthers.”120 Over the course of 1969 and 1970, many on
the militant left, particularly white supporters of the Panthers, came to see the Panther
21 as the prime symbol of U.S. political repression. In his now famous article that coined
the term “radical chic,” journalist Tom Wolfe wrote about a fundraiser for the Panther
21 held in composer Leonard Bernstein’s swanky Park Avenue penthouse. In the article,
Wolfe recalled the Panther 21’s young white leftist attorney Gerald P. Lefcourt speaking
before Bernstein’s crowd of celebrity guests and comparing his defendants’ case to the
Reichstag fire, the 1933 arson at Germany’s parliament building that precipitated Adolf
Hitler’s mass arrest of the country’s communists. “I believe this odious situation can be
compared to the Reichstag Fire,” Lefcourt said, warning that a Gestapo-like round-up of
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U.S. leftists “could be an outcome of this case.”121 “The only thing that can stop it,” he
insisted, “is for people like ourselves to make a noise and make a noise now.”122
The NYPD’s arrests of the Panther 21 were preemptive, yes. But it is plausible
that least some members in the group may have been involved in a plan to launch a
guerrilla attack on police officers. After all, the Oakland Panthers’ promotion of
revolutionary violence had been a central factor inspiring many of the young radicals
who formed the New York BPP chapter in the spring of 1968 after Martin Luther King’s
assassination. Panther 21 defendant Kuwasi Balagoon (formerly Donald Weems), a
tenants’ rights organizer who had previously endured a police beating during a protest
inside the House of Representatives, later recalled that one reason he joined the Party
was because he appreciated “that the cadre believed that political power stems from the
barrel of a gun.”123 Fellow Panther 21 defendant Afeni Shakur similarly recollected
joining the BPP after being impressed with the California Panthers’ armed 1967 protest
in Sacramento.124 Panthers and city police had also participated in a series of violent
exchanges since the BPP set up shop in New York City. On August 1, 1968, a protest
outside the Brooklyn BPP office in which twenty-year-old Panther Gordon Cooke used a
bullhorn to deride police as “racist,” “pigs,” and “crackers” ended with police severely
beating and arresting Cooke and seventeen-year-old fellow Panther Darrell Baines.125
The next morning two men wielding a shotgun ambushed two cops in Brooklyn’s
Crown Heights neighborhood, wounding the officers with birdshot; some police blamed
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the Panthers despite New York Party captain Joudon Ford’s denial. A few weeks later,
Brooklyn Panthers participated in a rebellion with other African American youths in
which protesters attacked police and firefighters with projectiles, smashed shop
windows, and looted stores. During the next day’s arraignment for seven rebels
arrested during the mayhem, 150 white men, including off-duty police officers wearing
pins supporting white supremacist presidential candidate George Wallace, shouted
racial epithets while beating a small group of New York Panthers and white SDS
members in a sixth floor lobby of the Brooklyn Criminal Court. The following week, in
the early morning hours of September 12, gunmen carried out another police ambush
near the site of the previous month’s shotgun attack, wounding two officers with .308
rifle blasts fired through their patrol car window.126
Amid escalating violence between the New York Panthers and city police, some
soon-to-be members of the Panther 21 studied the art of guerrilla combat. Kwando
Kinshasa (formerly William King), a former marine sergeant, authored a mimeographed
guide entitled “Urban Guerrilla Warfare.” Police seized a copy of the handbook upon
arresting fellow Panther 21 defendant Dhoruba bin Wahad (formerly Richard Moore),
along with a map of the Bronx annotated with pencil marks noting the locations of train
stations. From the apartment of Curtis Powell, a research chemist, police seized bottles
of hydrochloric and nitric acid in addition to a book entitled High Explosives and
Propellants. Police also confiscated five pistols, two rifles, and three shotguns during the
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Panther 21 raids.127 Following their acquittals in February 1971, members of the
Panther 21 would go on to form the nucleus of the Black Liberation Army.
The truth of whether or not the members of the Panther 21 were planning an
assault on police officers prior to their arrest may never be known. Details of Panther
involvement in various attacks on police, such as the December 1968 machine-gunning
of a Newark police station, may likewise remain a mystery.128 It is clear, however, that
violence flowed both ways between the Panthers and police, and that elements of each
understandably saw the other as a threat to its existence. Hoover’s FBI, encouraged
local police agencies to target members of the Black Panthers and SDS with arrest, while
carrying out its own covert counterintelligence programs against both groups.
Historians have repeatedly highlighted the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations
against the Panthers, arguing the officials carried them out because they viewed the
BPP as a threat to America’s political order, and in some cases pointing to the
counterintelligence programs as the primary reason for the Party’s downfall.129 A brief
review of the FBI’s COINTELPROs against the BPP, however, reveals that the Bureau’s
main intention was to preempt the Party’s capacity to carry out insurgent violence. To
the extent that the FBI was successful in undermining the Black Panther Party, it was
because COINTELPRO agents exploited the Party’s factionalism, violent tendencies, and
undemocratic paramilitary structure, traits that had ironically developed within the
BPP in the context of its members’ ongoing struggles to confront police violence. During
the first half of 1969, the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations exacerbated factionalism and
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paranoia within the BPP, leading to more violence and criminal charges that Panthers
and their supporters in SDS attributed to a government conspiracy to crush the left.
After launching COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist-Hate Groups in August 27, 1967,
Hoover expanded the program from twenty-three to forty-one of the FBI’s fifty-one field
offices on March 4, 1968, explaining that the primary goal was to “prevent violence on
the part of black nationalist groups.”130 In a reference to the previous decade’s Kenyan
armed revolt against British colonial rule, Hoover called on agents to preempt a “‘Mau
Mau’ in America.” He directed his men to prevent “coalition of militant black nationalist
groups” and “the rise of a ‘messiah’ who could unify … the black nationalist movement,”
in part, by “pinpoint[ing] potential trouble-makers and neutraliz[ing] them before they
exercise their potential for violence.”131 The FBI did not begin to direct COINTELPROBNHG operations against the Black Panther Party, however, until the summer of 1968.
On September 27, 1968—six weeks prior to Nixon’s election victory—Headquarters
ordered agents to make the BPP the main focus of COINTELPRO-BNHG. In the memo
approving this shift in COINTELPRO-BNHG’s priorities, FBI Domestic Security Division
official G. C. Moore described the BPP as “the most violence-prone organization of all
the extremist groups now operating in the United States,” one that “puts particular
emphasis on not only verbal attacks but also physical attacks on police.”132 Warning,
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“more violence can be expected from this organization in the immediate future,” FBI
officials ordered agents to “accelerate” investigations of the BPP, increase informants
within the organization, and launch counterintelligence operations that “may bring
about results which could lead to prosecution of these violence-prone leaders and
active members, thereby thwarting their efforts to perpetrate violence in the United
States.”133
By time the BPP became the focus of COINTELPRO-BNHG, the Party had been
active for two years; Huey Newton had been in prison for nearly one year; and the BPP
had established chapters in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Seattle. Why had the
FBI not targeted the BPP with its COINTELPRO operations sooner? According to Joshua
Bloom and Waldo Martin, the BPP gained the FBI’s attention due to its “growing
national scope, and the political challenge it now posed to the status quo.”134 FBI
officials indeed observed in September 1968 that the BPP was “rapidly expanding”—in
the fall of 1968 the BPP formed new chapters in De Moines, Baltimore, Denver, and
other cities.135 However, a more probable explanation is that Charles Bates, Special
Agent in Charge of the FBI’s San Francisco office (which held jurisdiction over Oakland)
was resistant to implementing the program. On several occasions Hoover reprimanded
Bates for his failure to develop effective COINTELPRO operations against the BPP.136
According to former San Francisco Special Agent William Cohendet, the office was also
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unsuccessful in developing reliable informants within the Oakland Black Panthers.137
Moreover, the COINTELPRO documents clearly stated that the FBI was targeting the
Panthers not because of the group’s political ideology or program, but because of its
“violence prone” nature.138
COINTELPRO-BNHG documents also reveal that by the time the BPP attracted
the FBI’s attention, the Party was already beset with violent factionalism. In an August
8, 1968 memo to Headquarters, the FBI’s New York office reported information, likely
gleaned from informants, that a “break between SNCC and the Black Panthers appears
severe and perhaps final.”139 SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, and
James Forman had entered an alliance with the Panthers the previous February in an
attempt to unite a national Black Power movement, but the seasoned civil rights
activists remained critical of the Panthers on several grounds, including their heavy
reliance on whites for fundraising and media access.140 According to the New York FBI
memo, Forman and Brown had “resigned their BPP membership because they find it
difficult to go along with BPP violent schemes.”141 The incident that precipitated this
split may have been one that Carmichael recalled in his memoir, when “a group of ‘West
Coast Panthers’… invaded the [New York SNCC] office, held Jim Forman at gunpoint, and
threatened his life.”142
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Similarly, a September 25, 1968 memo from the Los Angeles FBI office reported
“friction” between the local BPP chapter and most of the city’s other radical groups,
including SNCC, the Black Congress, and the Brown Berets (a militant Chicano
organization). Tensions were especially high between the Panthers and Ron Karenga’s
black cultural nationalist US organization. Citing information likely gained from
informants, the LA office reported that the BPP “has ‘let out a contract’ on Karenga
because they feel that he has sold out to the establishment.”143 On November 25, 1968,
Hoover observed that “the struggle” between the BPP and US was “taking an aura of
gang warfare with attendant threats of murders and reprisals.”144
It was only after observing the Panthers’ violent internal factionalism and
friction with other groups that the FBI began to employ COINTELPRO operations
designed to further exacerbate such tensions. For example, FBI agents posing as Black
Nationalists telephoned the homes of SNCC members to inform them that Panthers
intended to kill them (one of these calls reached the terrified mother of Stokely
Carmichael), and sent fake letters and cartoon drawings to leaders of both the BPP and
the US organization designed to agitate conflict between the groups, exacerbating fears
that each side wanted to kill the other.145 In Chicago, FBI agents sent Blackstone
Rangers gang leader Jeff Fort anonymous messages quoting local Black Panther leaders
with a full SNCC merger with the BPP—was a product of FBI COINTELPRO operations. The authors cited
the Church Committee reports and evidence of FBI operations designed to exacerbated tensions between
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who had criticized his lack of support for the political struggles in the city’s black
communities, hoping to provoke violence between the two groups.146
By the time Nixon came into office, tensions within the BPP—and between the
Panthers and other militant groups—had already reached a boiling point. These
tensions increased even further amid Eldridge Cleaver’s flight from the country, local
police attacks on the organization, FBI COINTELPRO operations, and the Party’s rapid
growth. On January 12, 1969, less than four months after the FBI shifted the focus of
COINTELPRO-BNHG to the BPP, Bobby Seale closed the Party’s membership, fearful that
the organization’s rapid expansion was creating too many opportunities for infiltration
by police informants. “We now have 45 [chapters],” he told the press, “We aren’t taking
in any new members for the next three to six months … We are turning inward to
tighten security, [to] get rid of agents and provocateurs and the promote political
education among those who have joined the Panthers but still don’t understand what
we’re all about.”147 Amidst his tightening of Party security, Seale decided to make
“survival programs,” such as free breakfast programs for children and community
medical clinics, a prime focus of the organization’s activities.148
Violence continued nonetheless. Five days later, conflict between the LA
Panthers and the US organization resulted in bloodshed. On January 17, US gunmen
shot dead local Panther leaders John Huggins and Alprentice “Bunchy” Carter on the
University of California Los Angeles campus, were members of both groups had
participated in a contentious meeting over control of the university’s black student
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group. Local police initially responded by arresting seventeen local Panthers while the
US assailants went free.149 After the death of her husband John, Los Angeles Panther
Ericka Huggins, moved to his hometown of New Haven, Connecticut, where she soon
became the target of a conspiracy indictment resulting from the torture and murder of
BPP member and accused police informant, Alex Rackley.
Details around the Rackley torture-murder remain contested, but most agree on
the key facts. In May 1969, a traveling Panther named George Sams—who many later
accused of being an FBI informant—joined New Haven Panthers Warren Kimbro and
Lonnie McLucas in tying Rackley to a chair. In a farcical “trial” that Huggins taperecorded, fellow Panthers accused Rackley of working as a police informant and
tortured him with beatings, death threats, a coat-hanger twisted around his neck, and
boiling water dumped on his body. On May 20, Sams, Kimbro, and McLucas drove
Rackley to the nearby town of Middletown, where they shot him to death and left his
body in a swamp. The next evening, after recovering Rackley’s body, police arrested
Kimbro, McLucas, Huggins, and four other local Panthers. In August, authorities
extradited Sams from Canada, where he had been arrested on weapons charges while
trying to start up a BPP chapter in Halifax.150 Police arrested Bobby Seale in Berkeley
during the same month, and transported him to Connecticut on charges that he had
ordered the Rackley’s execution amid his ongoing efforts to purge the Party of
suspected police infiltrators.151 The defendants became known as the New Haven Nine.
Their trials in 1970 became rallying points for the militant left, though revelations of
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Panther involvement in torture and murder contributed to a decline in support for the
Party. Charges were eventually dropped against Seale and Huggins.
Like the case of the Panther 21, details of state involvement in the assassinations
of LA Panthers and the events leading to charges against the New Haven 9 will likely
remain unknown and debated for years to come. Panther sympathizers and some
scholars, for example, have alleged that police informants played critical roles in both
the Huggins-Carter killings and Rackley killings. There is no documentary evidence of
direct state involvement in either of these incidents, however. What is clear, is that
these killings occurred as Panther militancy, cultivated as a response to police violence
and inspired by Third World guerrilla revolutionaries, contributed to a cycle of further
police violence and deadly factionalism within the Black Panther Party and the broader
Black Power movement.
The BPP’s new focus on developing community “survival programs” did not
dampen this violent escalation, as Panther leaders continued to romanticize violence
against police and other authority figures. Speaking before a San Francisco antiwar rally
on November 15, 1969, for example, Black Panther chief of staff David Hilliard called for
President Nixon’s assassination. “We say down with the American fascist society!” he
proclaimed; “Later for Richard Milhous Nixon, the motherfucker! … We will kill Richard
Nixon … We will kill any motherfucker that stands in the way of our freedom!”152 Black
Panther historians have pointed to the FBI’s efforts to undermine the BPP’s breakfast
programs as evidence that Hoover viewed the initiatives as a threat to America’s
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political order.153 But the FBI documents show that it was not the act of feeding children
that bothered Bureau officials, but their view that the breakfast programs were a
vehicle through which the Party promoted the “insidious poison” of anti-police violence
among children and the wider community. In a May 27, 1969 message to the San
Francisco FBI office, Hoover provided an example from a Panther wedding at an
Oakland church that hosted BPP breakfast programs. Citing a recent article on the
wedding in the Black Panther newspaper, Hoover described how Seale and other
Panthers led children in a song with the refrain “We Want a Pork Chop Off the Pig.”154
Panther-related violence continued over the summer of 1969. A prominent
incident occurred on August 15, 1969, amid the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations designed
to enflame the violent US-Panther conflict, when US gunmen murdered Black Panther
Sylvester Bell in a San Diego parking lot. Three days later, the San Diego FBI office
expressed satisfaction with Bell’s slaying. “Shootings, beatings, and a high degree of
unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego,” the San Diego
Special Agent in Charge wrote in a memo to Headquarters. “Although no specific
counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this situation, it is felt
that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program.”155
When Nixon came to office, SDS was also fraught with internal disagreement,
though in a form less deadly than that of the Black Panthers. The key points of
contention were whether or not to support the Panthers, the NLF, and the concept of
guerrilla warfare. An “action faction” led by Bernadine Dohrn and other future Weather
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Underground leaders had gained a strong presence in the organization’s Chicago
National Office the previous summer, as well as predominance among SDS chapters in
Michigan, Ohio, and New York. Action faction leaders sought to develop a MarxistLeninist cadre organization while calling for increasingly militant tactics to support the
Black Panthers, confront police, and end the war in Vietnam. Action faction leaders Bill
Ayers and Jim Mellen, who would both also go on to join the Weathermen, wrote a
paper in the spring of 1969 calling for armed revolution. “The reactionary nature of
pacifism, the need for armed struggle as the only road to revolution [are] essential
truths,” they wrote; “We [must] recognize the urgency of fighting white supremacy by
building the material strength of the white movement to be a conscious, organized,
mobilized fighting force capable of giving real support to the black liberation
struggle.”156 In addition to organizing the disruptions at Nixon’s inauguration, Mark
Rudd and other SDS action faction militants went on a window and limousine-smashing
spree on Wall Street in April after a New York judge refused bail for imprisoned
members of the Panther 21.157
The main organized opposition to the action faction within SDS was the Bostonbased “praxis-axis” faction, a group of activists associated with the Maoist Progressive
Labor Party (PLP), well known for their members’ clean-cut appearances and
denunciation of the counterculture, revolutionary violence, the Black Panthers, and
anything else they perceived as alienating to the American working class they claimed
to represent. Members of PLP were highly doctrinaire, and spent much of their time
attempting to take over SDS policies through bloc-voting, long meetings, and a barrage
156
157

Ayers and Mellen quoted in Sale, SDS, 515-516.
Rudd, Underground, 133-134.

95

of sectarian articles submitted to New Left Notes and other SDS publications. One PLP
article criticizing the BPP alleged that the Panthers “ignore the working-class demands
… don’t attempt to organize Black workers … have not stressed political study and
development … have no class outlook and believe they are out to fight a war against
white people in general.”158
Amid the SDS’s factionalism, historian-activist Staughton Lynd warned, “both
PLP and the national collective are working to recruit a revolutionary cadre out of SDS
no matter what the cost to SDS as an organically evolving revolutionary movement.”159
Factionalism turned many young radicals away from SDS just as local campus rebellions
and bombings skyrocketed in response to Nixon’s escalation of the war in Indochina, as
a new movement of GI resistance against the war took hold, as Catholic leftists carried
out nonviolent raids on draft boards, and as the women’s liberation movement soared,
with many women leaving mix-gender groups like SDS to form their own feminist
organizations. Kirkpatrick Sale noted the irony:
At precisely the time of the greatest explosion of the American left in all of the
decade, SDS, its leading organization by every index—size, fame, geographical
scope, energy—was gradually but unmistakably isolating and diminishing itself,
losing its student constituency, its women, its alumni, failing to connect with the
high schools, the soldiers, the workers. The SDS revolutionaries were on the
barricades, but they had forgotten to look behind: their troops were no longer
following.160
Amid SDS’s increasing factionalism, the FBI endeavored to destroy the
organization by exacerbating the growing feud between the National Office and the PLP.
In January 1969, the Bureau conducted a series of covert counterintelligence operations

Sale, SDS, 534.
Ibid, 514.
160 Ibid, 528.
158
159

96

against Bernadine Dohrn. Agents distributed several cartoons designed to defame the
twenty-five-year-old National Office organizer among SDS activists throughout the
country. Portraying Dohrn holding a bag of cash in one instance, and sunbathing in a
bikini on a Malibu beach in another, the FBI’s sexist graphics sought to depict the
charismatic female SDS leader as someone squandering the organization’s funds for
personal benefit.161 Local police harassed SDS members as well. On May 12, 1969,
police and firemen showed up at SDS’s Chicago National Office in response to
anonymous reports of gunshots and fire in the office. Though National Office staffers
refused to let the police inside, the cops barged in anyway, and some of the SDSers
pushed back. The police arrested Mike Klonsky, Les Coleman, Tim McCarthy, Ed
Jennings, and Dave Slavin, and held them on $12,000 bail for “battery of an officer,”
“interfering with a fireman, “ and “inciting mob action.”162 SDS militants interpreted the
police raid as yet another example of a Nixon-backed campaign to destroy the left. New
Left Notes responded:
It is clear that until the power to control the institutions of this society is in the
hands of the people, the people will never have justice or freedom.
Power to the People!
DEATH TO THE PIG!163
Conclusion
There is little evidence that FBI COINTELPRO operations against the Black Panther
Party and SDS succeeded in their objective of preventing leftist violence. G. C. Moore, a
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Domestic Security official at FBI Headquarters, acknowledged this in his 1975 Church
Committee testimony:
It is not easy to measure effectiveness … There were policemen killed in those
days. There were bombs thrown. There were establishments burned with
Molotov cocktails … We can measure that damage. You cannot measure over on
the other side, what lives were saved because … suspicion was sown on
[someone’s] leadership and this organization gradually declined … or this
organization did not join with [that] organization as a result of a black power
conference which was aimed towards consolidation efforts.164
Moore acknowledged that the “ineptitude” of groups such as the Black Panthers and
SDS could have been the main reason for their decline. But Moore also stated that he
and other FBI personnel hoped that counterintelligence “did play a part” in
undermining these organizations and their capacity to carry out political violence.
“Maybe we just gave it a nudge,” he said.165
While it is unclear weather or not the FBI prevented leftist violence, the Bureau
clearly provoked deadly violence against members of the Black Panther Party. Citing
COINTELPRO operations designed to enflame violent tensions with US in Southern
California and the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago, the Church Committee found that
“some of the FBI’s tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and
many others could reasonably have been expected to cause violence.”166 But this was
not the only violence the FBI was responsible for provoking. Hoover’s FBI also actively
encouraged police attacks on radicals, and collaborated with federal, state, and
municipal efforts to criminally indict and arrest leftist militants. These combined
efforts, carried out amid Nixon’s call for “law and order,” helped encourage the very sort
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of violence the FBI’s counterintelligence programs sought to prevent, as more and more
leftists—unaware of growing tensions between Hoover and Nixon—felt the need to
fight back against what they interpreted as a concerted government effort to repress
the Black Power movement and the New Left.
It would be disingenuous, however, to blame the militant left’s turn to violence
completely on the state. American radicals’ decisions to embrace the “cult of the gun”
were conscious and deliberate, part of an international (though almost completely
ineffective) revolutionary strategy. Plenty of people within the U.S. left disagreed with
the ultraleft militants in their midst. It was common within the New Left, for example, to
refer to members of SDS’s “action faction” and others who promoted violence as
“crazies.”167 Feeling disempowered, alienated, or afraid, many leftists turned away from
politics altogether as violent “revolutionary” rhetoric increased.168 Nonetheless, the
“violent dialectic” of state and insurgent violence continued. During the second half of
1969, such violence would lead to increased divisions within both the movements of the
left and the state, and push some radicals further down the path towards clandestine
urban guerrilla warfare.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNAL WARS: FACTIONALISM AND THE TURN TO CLANDESTINITY

Two months after J. Edgar Hoover placed Denver transmission tower bomber Cameron
Bishop on the FBI’s list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives, a top Bureau official participated
in a fateful meeting with a representative of the Nixon administration. On June 19, 1969
in Washington D.C., the FBI’s Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence William C.
Sullivan met for the first time with Nixon aide Tom Huston. Huston went to see Bill
Sullivan under orders from President Richard Nixon. Although the FBI had reiterated to
White House Council John Ehrlichman in April that their was no direct foreign influence
upon America’s Black Power movement and New Left, the President remained
convinced that the mass street protests and growing number of revolutionary
bombings sweeping the country were not merely expressions of domestic anger over
the war in Vietnam and entrenched racism, but part of a foreign-funded Communist
conspiracy. When Ehrlichman and his assistant Egil “Bud” Krogh were unable to find
evidence of such funding, Nixon was unsatisfied. Allegedly, the President turned to
Ehrlichman and said, “Get Huston on this.”1
Huston was a twenty-eight-year-old self-described “conservative hard-liner.”2 In
1966 and 1967, while completing his law degree at Indiana University, he served as
president of Young Americans for Freedom, the nation’s leading conservative student
organization. In 1968 he campaigned for Nixon while working at the Pentagon as an
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analyst for the Army’s Defense Intelligence Agency, building crucial support for the
Republican candidate among grassroots conservatives who had backed Barry
Goldwater in 1964. After the election, Huston took a position in the Nixon
administration, working under Ehrlichman and speechwriter Pat Buchannan.3
Sullivan was happy to meet with Huston. One of the Bureau’s top officials,
Sullivan had worked his way up the FBI hierarchy since 1941, when at the age of
nineteen, the Massachusetts native first took a position as special agent in the
Milwaukee field office. In 1961, after working a number of other positions, Sullivan was
promoted to Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division. In this capacity,
Sullivan oversaw the FBI’s counterintelligence programs, including one of the most
notorious COINTELPRO operations: the mailing of an anonymous letter to Martin
Luther King Jr. in November 1964, urging the civil rights leader to commit suicide or
else the sender would leak tape recordings of his extramarital affairs to the press.4 The
reason Sullivan was glad to meet with Huston is because he immediately recognized the
young White House aide as a potential ally in a growing dispute with his boss, Director
Hoover, over the problem of revolutionary violence. As militant street protests
expanded along with violent revolutionary rhetoric and increased incidents of political
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bombings, Sullivan wished to revive the FBI’s use of illegal surveillance techniques such
as break-ins, mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and use of teenaged informants.
During the first months of Nixon’s presidency, the Colorado transmission tower
bombings and Hoover’s wrangling with Cabinet officials over domestic surveillance had
caused friction between the FBI and Nixon administration. Now this friction was
worsening, causing a split within the top of the FBI hierarchy. Without Hoover’s
knowledge, Sullivan used his meeting with Huston as an opportunity to advance secret
plans to reinstitute illegal FBI surveillance practices in order to combat leftist violence.
Over the next year, Sullivan and Huston would meet on several more occasions to
discuss strategies for combating revolutionary violence, setting the stage for what
would soon become a full scale bureaucratic conflict between Hoover and the Nixon
administration.
Escalating violence between the state and revolutionary insurgents kindled
internal wars not only within the Executive Branch of the federal government, but also
within the U.S. left. Coincidentally, the debates over the strategic merits of urban
guerrilla warfare that had given rise to cleavages within the Black Panther Party and
SDS reached a critical turning point on the very same weekend in June 1969 when
Sullivan first met with Huston. On June 21, at the organization’s National Convention in
Chicago, the Weatherman faction took over SDS and announced plans to build
America’s first revolutionary urban guerrilla army. Over the next six months, ongoing
violence between leftist radicals and the state accelerated Weatherman’s transition
towards clandestine urban guerrilla warfare. This development, in turn, confirmed
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Sullivan and Huston’s belief that the FBI was not adequately equipped to respond to
leftist violence.

“A Position of Militant Extremism”
According to Sullivan, Hoover’s restrictions on illegal surveillance tactics caused
widespread frustration within the FBI and among officials in the Central Intelligence
Agency ad other intelligence agencies, who complained that the Bureau “seemed
incapable of dealing with the domestic turmoil—the bombings, murders, and riots—of
the 1960s.”5 Remembering his own frustrations, Sullivan recollected feeling that
“Hoover in effect put the Domestic Intelligence Division of the FBI out of business.” “Our
hands were tied,” he recalled; “it became virtually impossible to do our job.”6 Charles D.
Brennan, the Domestic Intelligence Division’s Internal Security Chief, who joined
Sullivan in his first meeting with Huston, shared these sentiments. Brennan later
reflected that Hoover’s limitations on investigative practices during the 1960s, coupled
with a shift of FBI manpower towards organized crime and civil rights cases, “provided
a drain which materially affected those of us who were involved in security and
intelligence investigations.”7 Sullivan and Brennan found a sympathetic and earnest ally
in Huston. In his 1978 memoir, Sullivan recalled his first time meeting the young White
House aide. “As far as I was able to tell,” Sullivan remembered, Huston’s “only interest
was in doing a good job for his country… The fact that I, a liberal Democrat, could find
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so much to admire in Huston only proved to me that a man’s politics have little bearing
on his true worth.”8
During their meeting, Sullivan and Brennan confirmed what Ehrlichman had
already established in his earlier report to Nixon: there was no evidence that Cuba,
China, or any other foreign Communist power was financing U.S. leftist organizations.
However, Sullivan did see domestic radicals as a serious threat, one that he believed
Hoover was failing to take seriously. Sullivan used his meeting with Huston to convey
his frustrations with the FBI Director. Hoover, he argued, placed too much of the
Bureau’s emphasis on fighting Communist subversion, when the main threat to internal
security came from domestic groups that preached violent revolution and engaged in
bombings and other violent acts. According to Huston, the Colorado transmission tower
bombings were among those Sullivan cited as examples.9
Sullivan and Brennan argued that Hoover’s restrictions on illegal surveillance
tactics were severely limiting the Bureau’s capacity to prevent revolutionary violence.
Moreover, Sullivan argued that Hoover, in his personal desire to maintain the FBI’s
hegemony over domestic intelligence operations, regularly withheld information from
the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies. According to Sullivan, this practice
infuriated the other intelligence agencies’ directors, and further undermined the fight
against leftist violence. Sullivan believed that in order to prevent bombings and other
revolutionary attacks, the FBI needed to work with other intelligence agencies to learn
about radicals’ plans for violence before they had a chance to carry them out. If the
greater good of defending America’s national security required breaking a few laws, so
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be it. In their subsequent meetings over the next year, Sullivan and Huston would hatch
a plan to overcome Hoover’s restrictions on extralegal surveillance practices and his
stonewalling of coordination with other U.S. intelligence agencies.
Meanwhile, leftist violence in America was on the rise. At the very same moment
that Sullivan and Huston were meeting for the first time in Washington D.C., SDS was
holding their annual meeting in Chicago. Bitter sectarian debates—over the best
approaches for ending the war in Vietnam, challenging police attacks on the Black
Panthers, and creating a revolutionary movement among America’s youth—were
tearing the organization apart. Though the 1969 National Conference resulted in the
collapse of SDS as a national organization cable of uniting student opposition to the war,
it gave birth to something new. Emerging from the wreckage of SDS came the
Weathermen, which within seven months would become the Weather Underground,
America’s first homegrown clandestine urban guerrilla organization, and the central
source of a major crisis for both the FBI and the Nixon administration.
SDS met from June 19 to 21. By the third long day of agonizing debate, SDS split
into two rival factions. The losing faction was the Worker-Student Alliance (WSA), a
group of activists associated with the earlier “action-praxis” faction and the Progressive
Labor Party (PLP). Coming out on top was the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM)
faction, an outgrowth of the “action faction” which was itself made up of two subfactions united in their hatred of the PLP and their support for the Black Panther Party
and Vietnam’s National Liberation Front. Leading RYM was the Weatherman subfaction, named after its position paper, “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know which
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Way the Wind Blows,” the title taken from a line in a hit Bob Dylan song.10
Drawing on foco theory and hailing the martyrdom of Ché Guevara, the
Weatherman statement called for the development of a revolutionary anti-racist
movement among America’s working-class white youth, which it’s signatories sought to
mold into “one division of the International Peoples’ Army” they hoped would
“dismember and dispose of U.S. imperialism.”11 Like the Black Panthers, Weatherman
saw no possibilities for creating social change through nonviolent direct action or
normal avenues of the U.S. political process. They also did not acknowledge that leftist
violence and militant rhetoric informed police responses to radicals. In the context of
violent U.S. imperialism and Nixon’s “law and order” agenda, Weatherman generalized
“pigs” as the domestic military arm of the “repressive imperialist State.” Acting on
behalf of the “ruling class,” police would “inevitably” escalate their “repression” of the
left, not in response to perceived threats of violence, but according to “how threatening
the Movement is to their power.”12 The analysis was self-serving. It enabled
Weatherman to plot a course towards armed guerrilla struggle while shirking
responsibility for their own role in shaping police actions against the movements of the
U.S. left.
In their manifesto, Weatherman held on to movement-building as part of their
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revolutionary strategy. Ultimately, however, Weatherman asserted that armed struggle
would be necessary to counter a forthcoming wave of “all-out military repression.”13
Over the next six months, the group would abandon movement-building while
preparing for clandestine urban guerrilla war, training in martial arts and bombmaking, and studying the focoist texts of Guevara and Debray.14 The move to focoinspired clandestinity set Weatherman apart from Cameron Bishop and other late
1960s radical bombers, as well as from anarchist insurgents of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. Previous revolutionary bombers and saboteurs had maintained
public activist lives while occasionally engaging in secretive acts of political violence.
Weatherman, in contrast, set out to construct an underground infrastructure into which
they could escape completely from state surveillance.15 From the underground, they
hoped to launch a protracted campaign of urban guerrilla warfare, one that could divert
the state’s resources away from its attack on the Black Liberation movement, and,
according to their interpretation of foco theory, ignite a broader revolutionary uprising
among America’s youth.
Though the Columbia strike and concerns over disruptive student unrest had
been the impetus behind COINTELPRO-New Left, prior to the June 1969 National
Convention FBI officials also worried that a revolutionary movement led by a united
and powerful SDS could also threaten American society. In the view of FBI domestic
security officials, the threat of New Left “subversion” was distinct from the supposed
foreign-backed threat posed by the Communist Party. As R. L. Shackelford explained to
Ibid.
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his supervisors Charles Brennan and William Sullivan in November 1968:
It appears the New Left is gravitating towards establishing a power base within
the structure of higher education. It is well established the basic ideological
difference between the New Left and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) rests
on this point. The CPUSA believes revolution must come from the laboring class,
the New Left believes from the intelligentsia.
The Latin American version of universities being corrupted into power
bases for revolution is well known. The evolution of their universities, as
sacrosanct places, off limits to their governments, is not something we can afford
to sit by and see followed here.16
In the year leading up to the 1969 National Convention, the FBI’s dual
objectives—of preventing both subversion and violence—each informed COINTELPRO
operations against SDS, sometimes in conflicting ways. Indeed, shortly before the
National Convention, the FBI worried that the PLP’s “praxis action” faction could
transform SDS from “a shapeless and fractionalized group into a militant and
disciplined organization” capable of consolidating a revolutionary student movement.17
With these fears taking immediate precedent over violence prevention, the FBI
undertook several COINTELPRO actions designed to prevent PLP from dominating
SDS.18 In one instance, FBI officials directed their numerous informants inside SDS to
vote for the National Office faction (which would soon become known as the
Weatherman faction) in the vote for officers during the National Convention. The
Special Agent in Charge of the Cleveland Field Office later reported that although the
“precise effect” of this initiative could not be measured, the FBI’s preferred outcome
materialized nonetheless, as Weatherleaders Mark Rudd, Bernadine Dorhn, Bill Ayers,
FBI memo, R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan, November 5, 1968, COINTELPRO New Left, Headquarters
file, section 1.
17 FBI memo, SAC Cleveland to Director, August 1, 1969, FBI COINTELPRO-New Left, Cleveland File.
18 Aaron Leonard, “The FBI and the Shattering of Students for a Democratic Society,” Truthout, October 2,
2014, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/26558-the-fbi-and-the-shattering-of-students-for-ademocratic-society (accessed June 1, 2016); Cunningham, There’s Something Happening Here, 62-64.
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and Jeff Jones assumed their new positions as SDS national officers. “The SDS as the
mainstay of the national New Left Movement is now seriously divided and, to this
extent, weakened,” he reported, noting, “the National Office faction is gradually being
forced into a position of militant extremism which hopefully will isolate it from other
elements of the libertarian community and eventuate its complete discrediting in the
eyes of the American public.”19
After the National Convention, however, the FBI shifted the focus of its New Left
surveillance and counterintelligence operations towards the Weatherman faction,
hoping to prevent the group from carrying out disruptive or lethal violence. On July 25,
1969, a few days after Weatherman took over Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),
FBI Internal Security Chief Charles D. Brennan warned Assistant Director William C.
Sullivan about the faction’s embrace of clandestine guerrilla violence. Weatherman, he
explained, sought to move SDS “into the position of a clandestine organization of
Marxist-Leninist revolutionists which will support similar groups throughout the world
and use force and violence to achieve their objectives in this country.”20 Indeed, the
emergence of Weatherman, a development the FBI had ironically encouraged, now
served as confirmation of Sullivan and Brennan’s view that leftist violence presented a
new urgent threat to U.S. national security, one that the FBI was not fully prepared to
confront.

Clandestinity
Although Charles Brennan observed a significant shift in SDS’s strategy, the FBI had no
19
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specific knowledge of Weatherman plans for violence. Brennan and other FBI Domestic
Security officials also had no new counterstrategy for undermining Weatherman or
clandestine urban guerrilla groups. In the absence of such a new strategy, Brennan
responded to Weatherman with a counterintelligence operation similar to those the FBI
had been directing against SDS since April 1968. Brennan recommended furnishing
information on SDS’s factionalism to “friendly news services” with the aim of promoting
“a wider split in this revolutionary youth group.”21 The FBI would carry out many
COINTELPRO operations aimed to undermine Weatherman before the group’s
membership went fully underground in March 1970; agents’ pressure on landlords, for
example, managed to get a two Weatherman collectives kicked out of their apartments
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.22
In addition to precipitating new counterintelligence operations, the June 1969
SDS National Convention marked the beginning of a dramatic expansion in the FBI’s
surveillance of American leftist organizations. In July, replicating programs targeting
the CPUSA, SNCC, and the Black Panthers, the Bureau initiated a program to develop
“top level informants” within SDS’s National Office, whom they hoped could provide
daily reports on the activities of the organization’s leadership. In a message to FBI
Headquarters, the Chicago Field Office affirmed their support for such efforts,
expressing dismay with their lack of informants inside the Weatherman faction, whom
they described as “extremely security conscious permitting very few individuals, even
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though known members of the SDS, to visit the National Office.”23 After this initiative
the FBI continued to expand its domestic surveillance operations. Between July 1969
and July 1972, the FBI increased new domestic surveillance by over fifty percent, as
agents initiated over 1,000 new investigations of “subversives” and “extremists.”24 A
1976 federal government report on FBI practices attributed this development to “the
increasing number of radical new left groups associated with militant demonstrations
and either involved or suspected of involvement in arson, bombings, and destruction of
Government property.”25 According to the report, the FBI was especially concerned
with Weatherman as well as “black militant groups, particularly the Black Panther
Party.”26
The FBI tracked Weatherman with growing alarm during the summer of 1969, a
period of surging popular protest against the U.S. war in Vietnam. Gleaning information
from informants and SDS publications such as New Left Notes, the FBI watched as
Weatherman planned their “SDS National Action,” otherwise known as the “Days of
Rage,” in which organizers sought to deliver tens of thousands of militant protestors to
downtown Chicago from October 8-11 to “bring the war home” and engage police in
hand-to-hand combat.27
Weatherman conceived the Days of Rage as a means to achieve their goal of
sparking a white working-class youth revolt and opening a front against U.S.
imperialism in the heart of America. Organizers extolled violence, pronouncing their
FBI airtel, SAC Chicago to Director, “Top Level Informant Development (TOPLEV),” July 28, 1969, WUO
FBI, Roll 5, Section 53.
24 GAO, FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations, 133.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 133-135.
27 Cunningham, There’s Something Happening Here, 64; Varon, Bringing the War Home, 61-62.
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intentions to “tear up pig city” and “kick ass” in confrontations with the police, as they
attempted to recruit participants at high schools, community colleges, and youth
hangouts.28 Weatherwoman Cathy Wilkerson later recalled that such activities “gave
voice to the frustration, anger, and growing abandon that so many young activists felt,”
and “seemed to electrify the imagination of a new constituency of young people,
especially teenagers.”29 “Some of the leaders of Weatherman, however, mistook these
youthful expressions of alienation for political consciousness,” Wilkerson wrote; “Many
wanted to be convinced” of the erroneous notion “that if a few threw up the barricades,
hundreds of thousands would follow.”30
Upon observing an escalation in Weatherman’s militant rhetoric and plans for
violence, FBI Field Offices in Chicago and other cities shifted the “major thrust of [New
Left] counterintelligence activity” towards the group.31 One way the FBI sought to
undermine Weatherman was by discrediting them in the eyes of the public. Achieving
this objective was not difficult, given the group’s nearly non-existent popular support.
To further tarnish Weatherman’s image, the FBI simply helped to publicize its leaders’
outrageous violent rhetoric. In one August 1969 counterintelligence operation, for
example, Cleveland agents tipped off a local television news station that SDS was
holding a regional conference in the city, and suggested reporters seek interviews with
the organization’s leaders. As a result, Station WJW televised an interview in which
Mark Rudd and two other Weatherleaders, in the FBI’s words, “exhibited an insolent,
arrogant attitude and openly proclaimed their communistic philosophy and intent to
Varon, Bringing the War Home, 61.
Wilkerson, Flying Close to the Sun, 284.
30 Ibid.
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‘smash’ the United States Government.” Cleveland’s Special Agent in Charge reported
with satisfaction that “Rudd’s statements have served to alarm and alert citizens of this
area and have convinced many who were previously indifferent to this problem posed
by the SDS.”32 In another instance, Chicago agents distributed among “moderate
groups” a twenty-seven-page cartoon book designed to lampoon Weatherman’s
“revolutionary ideals” and advocacy of violent street-fighting tactics.33 According to
Chicago’s Special Agent in Charge, the book “caused concern over SDS activities” and
“appeared to be especially successful among high school students where SDS was
attempting to organize.”34
The FBI also endeavored to promote fissures between Weatherman and other
radical groups. Spreading rumors through informants and anonymously mailed letters,
FBI agents sought to sow divisions between the SDS National Office and the Chicago
Black Panthers, deepen animosity between Weatherman and the PLP, and promote
distrust between Weatherman and Revolutionary Youth Movement II, the anti-PLP
faction that split from Weatherman after the SDS National Convention.35 Factionalism
ran so high in SDS after the June 1969 National Conference, however, that such FBI
operations were barely needed to undermine the crumbling SDS. Observing in August
1969 that the Weatherman faction had “expelled” several members who “expressed
opinions differing from the ‘line’ established by the current leaders,” the Special Agent
in Charge of Cleveland’s field office warned FBI Headquarters that attempting to disrupt
FBI memo, SAC Cleveland to Director, October 3, 1969, COINTELPRO-New Left, Headquarters File,
section 2.
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SDS through the use of paid informants was not worth the risk.36 “At present,” he wrote,
“it does not seem wise to risk valuable informants by engaging them in the delicate task
of injecting disruptive opinions into SDS policy-making decisions.”37
While carrying out COINTELPRO operations against Weatherman, the FBI also
conducted surveillance in an effort to ascertain the group’s plans for the Days of Rage
and other potentially violent actions. The FBI started tapping the phones in SDS’s
Chicago National Office in May 1969, a month before Weatherman coalesced during the
organization’s June National Convention.38 William Dyson was one of four Special
Agents who logged more than 160 hours per week listening in on SDS phone
conversations, as the organization’s activists began to consider the merits of guerrilla
warfare. He later remembered the excitement he felt while monitoring SDS activities on
a recording machine in the “Central Tesur Plant,” a locked, windowless room located in
“the bowels of the Chicago Office.”39 “I watched them become the Weathermen! I was
with them when they became the Weathermen!” he recalled, claiming, “I knew more
about these people than they knew about themselves.”40
With the Attorney General’s approval, the FBI also installed a hidden
microphone in SDS’s Chicago Regional Office in September 1969.41 FBI Headquarters
wished to “bug” SDS’s National Office as well, but Chicago agents were unable to
FBI memo, SAC Cleveland to Director, August 1, 1969, COINTELPRO New Left, Cleveland file.
Ibid.
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conduct the break-in required for microphone installation due to the presence of
Weatherman security volunteers stationed outside the office’s steel-plated door
twenty-four hours a day.42 Weatherman’s “guard watch” was only one of several
security measures the group took to counter FBI and police surveillance. Having
become radicalized amid a political counterculture in which activists were accustomed
to police surveillance, harassment, and brutality, Weatherman militants correctly
assumed that their phones were tapped and that police informants sought to infiltrate
their meetings and organization.43 An August 1969 Chicago FBI report noted that
activists in the SDS National office had adopted an “extreme concern for security” after
Chicago police arrested five leaders on the premises the previous May. “Since then and
particularly after the new [Weatherman] leadership took over the [National Office],” the
report noted, “their security procedures increased to the extent that at the present no
one not known personally to one of the three national secretaries may be admitted.”44
Despite Weatherman’s counter-surveillance measures, the FBI managed to
obtain a great deal of information from its wiretaps on the SDS National Office phones
and its microphone inside the Chicago Regional Office. William Dyson and other
eavesdropping agents compiled extensive notes on Weatherpeople’s plans and other
activities, taking particular interest in members’ travels to Cuba, conversations with
Black Panthers, and communications with activists in local SDS chapters.45 In a report
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to Director Hoover, Chicago’s Special Agent in Charge summarized that the electronic
surveillance had “furnished numerous identities of SDS leaders in other parts of the
United States, plus information concerning aims and purposes and future plans as well
as information concerning finances of SDS.”46
The Days of Rage fell far short of the white revolutionary urban insurrection
Weatherman leaders had envisioned. Only a few hundred activists showed up in
Chicago for the pre-planned riot, a fraction of the fifteen thousand that organizers had
hoped for.47 Although the FBI’s counterintelligence efforts likely enhanced the
alienating effects of the militants’ factionalism and lurid rhetoric, Weatherman had
largely succeeded in turning-off would-be recruits on their own. Mark Rudd had a point
when he reflected decades later, with heavy self-criticism, that Weatherman had
“played into the hands of the FBI.” “We might as well have been on their payroll,” he
said.48 The FBI was unable, however, to prevent Weatherman violence on Chicago’s
streets. Indeed, by disrupting the New Left and Black Panthers, and giving local police a
green light to harass, arrest, and beat radical activists, the FBI had helped inspire
Weatherman’s turn to “revolutionary” violence.
On October 6, in an attempt to inspire revolutionary militancy at the “Days of
Rage,” Weatherman activists carried out their first bombing. The blast demolished a
statue commemorating Chicago police killed during the 1886 Haymarket riots (radicals
despised the monument because it neglected to memorialize the four anarchist labor
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activists authorities hanged in 1887 in retaliation for the officers’ deaths).49 Days later,
Weatherman militants who showed up for the demonstrations provoked clashes with
the police, and smashed hundreds of residential, store, and car windows. Sixty-four
police officers sustained injuries during the confrontations, as did many of the rioters,
who suffered brutal police baton beatings. Police also shot six protesters, and arrested
287, utilizing FBI intelligence to identify Weathermen.50 Chicago Assistant Corporation
Council Richard Elrod became paralyzed during the street fights after hitting his neck
against a concrete wall while trying to tackle Weatherman Brian Flanagan.51 Utilizing
language that the FBI would soon regularly use to characterize Weatherman, the
Chicago Tribune echoed the feelings of many Americans who watched footage of the
violence on television, describing the rioters’ actions as a “carnival of mindless terror.”
In a statement legitimizing the FBI’s efforts to destroy the Weatherman organization,
the Tribune called on police to stamp out the “New Barbarians.”52 Chicago FBI agents, in
turn, seized on the fact that the Days of Rage had “resulted in wide spread publicity
unfavorable to the Weatherman faction of SDS,” and proposed new counterintelligence
actions designed to eliminate any remaining popular support for the group.53
The FBI accurately foresaw the “Days of Rage” as a prelude to Weatherman’s
involvement in a new form of violence: clandestine urban guerrilla warfare. In an airtel
sent to thirteen major Field Offices on October 23, 1969, Director Hoover reported
receiving intelligence, likely gleaned from informants, “that the New York City area
Varon, Bringing the War Home, 76.
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‘Weatherman’ faction of SDS is going underground and forming commando-type units
which will engage in terroristic acts, including bombings, arsons and assassinations.”54
Hoover still had no clear strategy for combatting clandestine leftist guerrillas, however.
Lacking such a strategy, Hoover and his men drew upon time-tested investigative and
“preventative” surveillance techniques the FBI had developed in its previous
investigations of criminals, Communists, and Klansmen. Noting that members of the
Ohio SDS Regional Office organized weekly karate and firearms training courses during
the summer of 1969, Hoover directed recipient offices to “thoroughly review pertinent
files” and consult “logical knowledgeable sources” in order to “determine whether any
indications of such activity exists in those territories” and if “the ‘Weatherman’ faction
intends to follow this pattern on a national basis.”55 In late November, under Hoover’s
direction, FBI offices throughout the country began compiling biographies of all known
members of SDS’s Weatherman faction, gathering approximately 270 in under a month,
and adding most names to the Bureau’s Security Index.56 Hoover also ordered over a
dozen Field Offices to develop informants capable of infiltrating local Weatherman
collectives.57
In spite of these efforts, FBI investigators felt frustrated with their limited
knowledge of Weatherman’s plans and activities. On December 19, 1969, Internal
Security Chief Charles Brennan conveyed such feelings to Assistant Director William
Sullivan, lamenting that because of the Weatherman’s secrecy, the Bureau had been
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“unable to obtain the penetrative coverage we desire.”58 In addition to revealing the
challenges Weatherman’s turn to clandestinity posed to FBI surveillance efforts,
Brennan’s memo conveyed the accumulating frustration he and Sullivan felt over
Hoover’s ban on illegal surveillance techniques. Brennan and Sullivan had something
important in common with the Director, however: an ongoing failure to acknowledge
that police violence and FBI counterintelligence operations—particularly those directed
against the Black Panther Party—helped strengthen Weatherman’s resolve to prepare
for guerrilla warfare.
A critical deadly police attack on the Black Panthers occurred in Chicago during
the predawn hours of December 4, 1969. At 4:00 A.M., in an alleged effort to seize illegal
weapons on behalf of the Illinois State’s Attorney, fourteen Chicago police armed with
five shotguns, a submachine gun, and twenty-one other firearms raided the Monroe
Street apartment of the city’s Black Panther leader, twenty-year-old Fred Hampton.
When the occupants of the apartment refused to let them in, the police opened fire
through the door, and continued shooting as they barged their way inside, unloading
over 90 rounds in a matter of minutes. When the shooting stopped, Fred Hampton laid
dead on his blood-soaked mattress, having been killed in his sleep. The police had also
taken the life of Mark Clark, leader of the Peoria BPP chapter, who had decided to spend
the night in the apartment. Fellow Panther Deborah Johnson, who was also Hampton’s
fiancé, pregnant, and sleeping in the same bed, miraculously survived the attack. She
was immediately arrested, along with six other surviving Panthers, most of them
teenagers, four with serious wounds. The police initially asserted that they had opened
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fire in response to shots coming from inside the apartment, a claim reprinted without
question in the next day’s newspaper. A few months later, however, an FBI investigation
carried out on behalf of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division determined that
all of the bullets fired in the raid had come from police guns with the exception of one,
which Mark Clark shot into the floor after a police round pierced his heart.59
Like other police killings of Black Panthers, the deaths of Fred Hampton and
Mark Clark occurred amid escalating violence between local police and Panthers.
Tensions in Chicago had been building since the previous summer, when Hampton was
serving a jail sentence for “appropriating” $71 worth of ice bars from an ice cream truck
and distributing them to neighborhood children. FBI agents and Chicago carried out
several raids on the local Panther office during the summer and fall, resulting in arrests
and shots fired. Panthers and Chicago police engaged in firefights in July and October.
This violence occurred among broader tensions between African Americans and
Chicago police; fifty-nine blacks died at the hands of Chicago police in 1969 and 1970.
On November 13, nineteen-year-old former Panther Spurgeon Jake Winters initiated a
spontaneous police ambush and prolonged firefight that resulted in his own death, the
death of two officers, and the wounding of seven more.60
Many in the law enforcement community blamed Panther violence on Hampton,
who led the Party’s Chicago chapter, even though he had been out of town during the
November 13 incident. Hampton had been one of the most successful Panther
organizers in the country, overseeing a successful Free Breakfast Program and Free
Health Clinic, and forging alliances—albeit sometimes strained ones—with local
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chapters of SDS, the radical Puerto Rican Young Lords Organization, and the Blackstone
Rangers street gang.61 Amid escalating police violence against the Panthers in Chicago
and beyond, Hampton, like Bobby Seale, opposed immediate offensive armed attacks on
police officers. Instead he saw Panther “survival programs” as means to unite
oppressed communities into a social movement capable of overthrowing U.S. capitalism
and imperialism through future organized popular revolutionary violence. “We not
gonna fight reactionary pigs … with any reaction on our part,” he told a large multiracial
audience in 1969, “We gonna fight their reaction when all of us get together and have an
international proletarian revolution.”62 During the same gathering, Seale, then on trial
in the Chicago Eight case, exclaimed to the crowd, “We’re going to stand together. We’re
going to have a Black Army, a Mexican American Army, and alliance in solidarity with
progressive Whites, All of us. And we’re going to march on this pig power structure. And
we’re going to say: ‘Stick ‘em up motherfucker. We Come for what’s ours.’”63
Unconcerned with the nuances of violent Panther rhetoric, police and other officials
saw Hampton as a threat. After the bloody November 13 gun battle, rumors began to
spread on Chicago’s streets that the police wanted Hampton dead, and some activists
urged him to leave the city.64
The Black Panthers portrayed the Hampton and Clark killings as premeditated
murder, and as part of the state’s larger campaign of repression against their
organization. Given the facts of the raid, their argument was convincing. For several
days after the killings, Chicago Panthers kept Hampton’s apartment open to the public.
O’Reilly, “Racial Matters,” 310-312.
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Taking careful precautions to ensure that nobody disturbed the crime scene, Panthers
toured neighbors, activists, and journalists through the apartment to view Hampton’s
bloody mattress and the dozens of bullet holes that riddled the apartment’s walls.
Media coverage of the apartment generated international outrage and forced the Justice
Department mandate the FBI’s investigation of the killings. For nearly a decade,
however, the FBI concealed the fact that their own paid informant William O’Neal, who
served as Fred Hampton’s bodyguard, had provided his handler Special Agent Roy
Mitchell with a hand-drawn floor plan of the apartment featuring the location of
Hampton’s bed that police had used in the raid.65
As with other incidents of deadly conflict between radicals and police during the
Nixon era, critical facts surrounding the Hampton-Clark killings remain unknown and
hotly debated. In particular, the belief persists that Hoover’s FBI ordered the killings as
part of its counterintelligence program against the Black Panthers.66 There is no
documentary evidence to support this assertion, however. FBI Special Agent Mitchell
certainly did provide Chicago police with O’Neal’s sketch of the Hampton apartment’s
floor plan. But did he do so under orders from FBI Headquarters or the Chicago Special
Agent in Charge Marlin C. Johnson? Or did he do so on his own? And did he know how
the Chicago police were going to use it? Did he care?67 Why did Hoover conceal the FBI’s
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connection to the raid? To cover-up an FBI plot? To cover-up other illegal FBI activity?
To preserve the Bureau’s public image? Although it is unlikely that we will ever have
definitive answers to these questions, one critical fact is clear: the Hampton-Clark
killings served to confirm militant leftists’ suspicions that the government would stop at
nothing, including murder, to crush America’s radical left.
The Hampton-Clark killings were a critical factor guiding Weatherman’s path
toward clandestine urban guerrilla warfare. As historian Jeremy Varon explained,
“Hampton’s murder deeply affected the Weathermen, underscoring a basic premise of
theirs and the New Left as a whole: that race constituted a primary basis of oppression
and vastly separated the experiences of black and white activists.”68 Weatherman David
Gilbert recalled, “it was the murder of Fred Hampton more than any other factor that
compelled us to take up armed struggle.”69 Similarly, Cathy Wilkerson remembered,
“the murders [of Hampton and Clark] seemed to call for yet a greater escalation, so that
at least this kind of police behavior would not silently become the accepted norm… The
rules had changed, and whatever Weatherman was planning, I wanted to be part of it.”70
Three weeks after the Hampton-Clark killings, on December 27-30, 1969, the
Weathermen (and women) engaged in a frenzied, final call for armed revolution during
their National Council in Flint, Michigan. The meeting of about 300 people, dubbed the
“National War Council” by organizers, was Weatherman’s last public gathering. At the
Flint War Council, Weatherleaders engaged in some of the most flamboyantly violent
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rhetoric to ever come out of the New Left as they engaged in their last open recruitment
effort before going underground. Organizers of the event couched their exhortations to
armed revolution in counterculture imagery and parlance, decorating their meeting
area with images of Ché Guevara and Fred Hampton, and posters featuring hand drawn
gun sights and the words “P-I-E-C-E N-O-W.”71 One of the most widely publicized
statements to come out of the gathering was one that Bernadine Dorhn and other
Weatherpeople later deeply regretted. Romanticizing the Charles Manson cult’s murder
of actress Sharon Tate and six other individuals the previous summer, Dohrn exclaimed,
“Dig it; first they killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the room with them, then they
even shoved a fork into pig Tate’s stomach. Wild!”72 Weatherleaders made such
proclamations as they announced their plans to go underground, and worked to psych
each other up for the task of building a clandestine urban guerrilla organization.73 At
the War Council, Weather militants also conducted martial arts classes and discussed
plans for securing weapons, choosing targets, and building a secure underground
infrastructure.74
Discouraged with the shortcomings of their intelligence gathering, FBI officials
looked to the Flint War Council as an opportunity to widen their surveillance on
Weatherman. The FBI compiled an annotated list of over a hundred core activists who
attended the War Council, drawing on information provided by their own informants in
the crowd, as well as by the Flint Police Department, whose officers pulled over at least
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twenty cars containing suspected Weatherman militants en route to the gathering.75 In
their reports on the conference, FBI officials underscored some of the Weatherleaders’
most inflammatory comments, including Bill Ayers’ remarks on the “necessity to take
on arms and off the pigs.”76 Director Hoover forwarded information on Weatherman
obtained at the War Council to President Richard Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell,
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, the State Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Secret Service, and three different military intelligence
agencies. The contents of Hoover’s declassified correspondence with these officials are
heavily redacted, but the letters probably contained warnings of Weatherman’s plans to
carry out guerilla violence.77 President Nixon later recalled reading Hoover’s reports on
Weatherman’s War Council with grave unease over the organization’s plans to “begin a
new campaign of underground warfare, police murder, and bombing.”78
The FBI gained a great deal of information about those who attended the War
Council, but they gained no specific knowledge about Weatherman’s plans for urban
guerrilla warfare. Though vocal in their advocacy of armed revolution, Weatherman
militants, maintaining their usual security precautions, intentionally kept the specific
details of their plans secret. Immediately following the conference, Weatherman
members commenced their process of going “underground” to build a clandestine
revolutionary organization committed to sustained urban guerrilla warfare.
Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal
Security Laws, Weather Underground: Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
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To this end, Weatherman initiated a process of “consolidation.” After closing
down the SDS National Office in Chicago in January 1970, the organization orchestrated
a series of “purges” designed to eliminate police informants and individuals deemed
lacking in commitment. One FBI informant managed to survive Weatherman’s purges:
Larry Grathwohl, a Vietnam veteran who infiltrated the group the previous summer,
and survived an “acid test” in which members of the group consumed LSD while
Weather leaders taunted and interrogated them.79 Weatherman’s remaining members,
numbering approximately 150, also commenced a painful process of breaking ties with
family members and aboveground acquaintances in order to establish new, assumed
identities based on fake IDs. In the San Francisco Bay area, Chicago, Detroit, and New
York City, Weatherman established collectives where members lived clandestinely in
rented “safe houses” in counter-culture enclaves or urban white working-class
neighborhoods. They accumulated skills with explosives, document forgery, and
disguise, financing their activities with inherited family money, stolen checks, and
shoplifting. Reinventing themselves as a paramilitary organization, Weatherman also
fortified a rigidly hierarchical command structure, with a Weatherbureau comprised of
Bernadine Dohrn, Jeff Jones, John Jacobs, and Terry Robbins, making most of the group’s
major decisions.80 After a decade of escalating political violence, the 1960s had birthed
America’s first clandestine revolutionary urban guerrilla organization.
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Conclusion
As Weatherman formed an underground infrastructure and hatched secret plans for
revolutionary guerrilla warfare inside the United States, the FBI faced a challenge
unlike any other it had confronted in its forty-five year history. The threat of
Weatherman violence likely informed Hoover’s proclamation during a February 1970
Congressional hearing that “Weatherman is the most violent, persistent and pernicious
of revolutionary groups,” a statement that suggested the organization had replaced the
Black Panthers as the FBI’s public enemy number one.81 The FBI suspected
Weatherman involvement in two February 1970 bombings of Bay Area police stations,
one of which mangled the arm of Berkeley policeman Paul Morgan, and another that
killed San Francisco police officer Brian McDonnell. Forty-five years later, it would turn
out that their hunch was correct, after an anonymous former Weather militant
confessed to a journalist that the group had staged the attacks.82 Weatherman did not
publicly take credit for the bombings, however. As far as the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies knew at the time, these attacks could have been carried out by
any number of the anonymous radicals then involved in nighttime bombing and
sabotage activities; at least seventeen other leftist bombings occurred throughout the
United States in February 1970.83 Weatherman’s future violent attacks, and the
consequences of such actions, remained impossible to foresee.
As Weatherman transitioned into the underground, the group’s leadership had
no qualms with killing police officers. The FBI was well aware of this, thanks to their

WUR, 38.
Burrough, Days of Rage, 94-97.
83 Ibid, 96.
81
82

127

surveillance of the December 1969 Flint War Council. An influential faction of the
organization, led by John Jacobs and Terry Robbins, also advocated deadly attacks with
serious casualties as a means to give Americans a taste of the violence their government
inflicted daily upon the people of Vietnam. Fatefully, a Weather Underground antipersonnel bomb would take the lives of Robbins and fellow Weather militants Ted Gold
and Diana Oughton before the group had a chance to inflict a mass-casualties bloodbath.
The death of three Weatherpeople in an accidental explosion on March 6, 1970 would
nonetheless have far-reaching consequences for the FBI and the Nixon administration.
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CHAPTER 3
COUNTERING A NEW THREAT: THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND, “TERRORISM,”
AND THE HUSTON PLAN

A key turning point in the FBI’s Weather Underground investigation occurred after
twenty-three-year-old militant Terry Robbins made a fatal mistake. On March 6, 1970,
while preparing antipersonnel nail-bombs intended for a dance at New Jersey’s Fort Dix
Army base, he crossed live wires. Within an instant, a series of explosions leveled the
upscale Greenwich Village townhouse that he and other Weather Underground
members were using as a bomb-making laboratory. The blast killed Robbins and fellow
Weatherpeople Diana Oughton and Ted Gold, mangling their bodies beyond
recognition. The explosion could have been much worse. More than eighty sticks of
dynamite stored within the house failed to detonate, thereby saving the surrounding
city block from destruction, and sparing the lives of Weather radicals Cathy Wilkerson
(whose father and stepmother owned the townhouse) and Kathy Boudin. Escaping the
wreckage, the pair briefly sought shelter in the home of a neighbor before disappearing
into the revolutionary underground.1
Occurring amid a steep increase in leftist bombing incidents in the U.S. and
around the world, the townhouse explosion demonstrated to the FBI that the Weather
Underground was serious about its plans to form America’s first clandestine
revolutionary urban guerrilla organization. Indeed, immediately after the blast, a
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nationwide FBI-led manhunt forced the group’s members to immediately go
underground. Remaking themselves as urban guerrillas living under assumed identities
in secret safe houses throughout the country, the group’s young members adopted
clandestinity as a means to carry out a sustained campaign of armed revolutionary
struggle while deliberately avoiding state surveillance and repression. This reality,
along with the Weather Underground’s plans for further violence, presented the FBI
with an urgent dilemma: How could agents preempt and capture violent revolutionaries
whose guerrilla organization was impermeable to surveillance and informant
infiltration?
The FBI responded to this dilemma, in part, by framing leftist guerrilla violence
as “terrorism.” On March 31, 1970, FBI officials held a secret conference to “coordinate
guidelines for recommendations concerning bombing matters and extremist terroristic
activities.” During the meeting, Internal Security Chief Charles Brennan and his
colleagues identified “leftist terrorist activity” as an unprecedented new national
security threat, and proposed several new measures designed to address this problem.2
It was the first time in FBI history in which officials strategized around a problem they
explicitly defined as “terrorism.”
President Richard Nixon also initiated new efforts to combat leftist guerrilla
“terrorism.” On June 5, 1970 Nixon and a few of his aides met with leaders of the FBI,
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence
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Agency, ordering the men to devise a plan to counter the growing threat of what he
called domestic “revolutionary terrorism.”3 Three weeks later, Nixon approved a plan
drafted by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan and White House aide Tom Huston
for what was then the greatest consolidation of federal surveillance power in U.S.
history. The initiative, which later became known as the “Huston Plan,” coordinated all
federal intelligence agencies’ activities under the direct command of the White House.
The plan also lifted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s mid-1960s restrictions on
warrantless electronic surveillance, break-ins, mail-opening, and use of informants
under the age of twenty-one. Designed to preempt revolutionary violence with
expansive “preventative” surveillance measures, the Huston Plan outlined the United
States’ first state institution dedicated to combating the new problem of “terrorism.”
Nixon backed out of the agreement five days later, however, under pressure from
Hoover. Determined to preserve the institutional autonomy he had carefully cultivated
throughout his forty-six-year career, Hoover blocked the Huston Plan in an effort to
defend the FBI’s jurisdiction over domestic surveillance and shield the Bureau from the
public outcry he knew would occur if the American people ever learned about the
secret project.
Constituting “terrorism” as a “governable problem,” distinct from other forms of
violence, criminality, and “subversive” activity, enabled officials to devise new tactics
and strategies to counter this novel threat.4 As FBI Weather Underground investigator
Special Agent William E. Dyson recalled, prior to officials’ framing insurgent violence as
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“terrorism,” “it was difficult to develop a common strategy to deal with the problem.”5
In 1970, fighting the Weather Underground and other leftist guerrillas became a top FBI
priority as the Bureau shifted its focus from battling Communist “subversion” to
preventing leftist “terrorism.” As the aborted Huston Plan indicated, however, Nixon
and other officials were far from satisfied with Hoover’s efforts to thwart revolutionary
guerrilla violence.
Most historical scholarship on the Huston Plan mirrors public criticism that
emerged after its initial disclosure during a June 1973 Senate Watergate hearing,
viewing the secret initiative primarily as evidence of President Nixon’s paranoia and
utilization of U.S. intelligence agencies to advance his personal political agenda.6 But
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clandestine leftist guerrilla “terrorism” and the FBI’s inability to prevent it were the
primary concerns driving Nixon and the plan’s architects. The Huston Plan was an
attempt by the Nixon administration and FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan to
override Director Hoover’s longstanding semi-autonomous authority, which they
viewed as an impediment to their war against domestic “revolutionary terrorism.” A
product of Sullivan’s secret meetings with Tom Huston on the problem of revolutionary
bombings during the second half of 1969, the Huston Plan was also the first major
showdown in what was now a full-scale institutional conflict over guerrilla violence and
FBI autonomy, a bureaucratic struggle that would later culminate in the Watergate
Scandal.

“Large-Scale Shift to Terrorism”
Despite watching Students for a Democratic Society’s (SDS) Weatherman faction with
growing alarm since June 1969, it was not until the March 6, 1970 Greenwich Village
townhouse bombing that FBI officials began to fully reckon with the new challenge the
Weather Underground presented to police agencies. Though accidental, the deadly
explosion demonstrated the seriousness of the organization’s plans to carry out
revolutionary guerrilla warfare inside the United States, and signaled the likelihood of
more violence in the near future. The detonation of anti-personnel devices also seemed
to indicate that the group had no qualms killing civilians in their quest for revolutionary
change. Moreover, the townhouse blast shined a spotlight on the group’s evasion of the
FBI’s vast intelligence infrastructure. In response, and under mounting pressure from
the Nixon administration, Director J. Edgar Hoover and other FBI officials both
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intensified and reevaluated their Weatherman investigation, instituting several new
investigative measures designed to combat what they called leftist “terrorism.”
The townhouse bombing accompanied other developments that raised FBI
officials’ alarm over Weather Underground plans for future violence. On the same day
as the townhouse blast, Detroit police located two undetonated dynamite bombs, one in
a women’s bathroom in their Department’s 13th precinct, and a second inside the offices
of the Detroit Police Officers Association. Faulty ignition devices, crudely constructed
from cigarettes and firecracker fuses, had prevented the explosives from detonating.
Like those in the townhouse, the Detroit bombs were designed to inflict casualties, and
they probably would have had they exploded as intended. Though they lacked hard
evidence, the FBI strongly suspected Weather Underground involvement.7 Bureau
investigators also traced dynamite recovered from the Greenwich Village townhouse to
Keene, New Hampshire, where a man identifying himself as David Bellar had purchased
it from the New England Explosives Company four days prior to the explosion. In an
urgent teletype, Hoover ordered agents in Boston, Albany, and other Field Offices to
immediately investigate the incident, as well as a second dynamite purchase in Barre,
Vermont, on March 6, the day of the townhouse explosion, by suspected Weatherman
Ronald Fliegalman.8 In another lead, agents uncovered stolen student ID cards and
checkbooks from the townhouse wreckage, items they believed Weather militants had
used “to fraudulently purchase quantities of firearms.”9
Further distress ensued on March 12, when a group calling itself Revolutionary
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Force 9 bombed three Manhattan skyscrapers. Security forces avoided casualties by
heeding the bombers’ evacuation instructions and shepherding thousands of workers
from the buildings. More than 600 additional bomb threats issued over the following
three days wrought havoc in the city, as police scrambled to investigate false leads and
evacuate thousands of additional people.10 Three days later, a car in Maryland carrying
black activists Ralph Featherstone and William “Ché” Payne exploded, killing both men.
Police contended that Featherstone and Payne were on their way to carry out a
bombing when the explosive in their vehicle prematurely detonated, though rumors of
a covert FBI or police assassination circulated within the Left.11 Two days after that,
another bomb tore through the corner of a nearby courthouse where SNCC leader H.
Rap Brown was to be tried on charges of inciting a riot in the town of Cambridge in
1967. After the bombings, Brown immediately went underground.12 The explosions
prompted Hoover to warn his agents of the likelihood “terrorist acts” by “black
extremists,” in addition to those carried out by Weatherman militants, would “increase
in frequency and violence unless aggressive investigation is undertaken to bring about
Murray Schumach, “Fewer Bomb Calls are Made in City,” New York Times, March 15, 1970, 40.
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successful prosecution… of guilty parties.”13
The townhouse explosion and the March 12th bombings prompted the Nixon
administration to put pressure on the FBI. President Nixon conveyed his concern over
the violence to Attorney General John N. Mitchell. Through his three Assistant Attorney
Generals, Mitchell recommended to Hoover that the FBI, rather than local police, lead
investigations of all future political bombings.14 The Weather Underground
investigation took on further urgency after April 1, when police discovered a large
cache of dynamite and guns in a Chicago apartment. Again, the FBI suspected the
Weather Underground as the culprits.15
Hoover felt certain that the Weather Underground was stockpiling explosives
and firearms for imminent use. He therefore commanded his agents to “intensify” their
investigation of the organization, capture its members, and preempt their plans for
revolutionary violence.16 Hoover directed agents to “identify Weatherman members,
ascertain their whereabouts and determine their plans to direct ‘strategic sabotage’
against the ‘establishment.’”17 More specifically, he called on investigators to locate
Weather militants in local “communes,” in which collectives of young radicals lived
together with shared food and living expenses, and to infiltrate such groups with
informants. He also instructed agents to work with local police to locate Weather
Underground fugitives, using photo albums containing detailed descriptions of the
group’s members.18 In order to coordinate the FBI’s stepped-up pursuit of the
Director to SAC Boston, March 24, 1970.
FBI memo, C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, April 1, 1970, FBI WUO, Roll 6, Section 60.
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guerrillas, the Director ordered Special Agents In Charge of sixteen major Field Offices
to form “special squads,” dedicated to investigating the Weather Underground and
other violent leftist groups, comprised of agents with experience apprehending
fugitives.19 Under heavy pressure from Director Hoover, special agents investigating the
Weather Underground worked tirelessly to find the group’s clandestine members. In
some cases, they resorted to lies and emotional manipulation. After the townhouse
bombing, FBI agents visited the parents of several Weather Underground members and,
in an effort to secure interviews leading to information on wanted radicals’
whereabouts, told some of them erroneously that their child had died in the
explosion.20
Now that the Weather Underground had gone underground, the FBI determined
that counterintelligence programs were no longer effective means by which to combat
the organization. Because they had only one informant within the group, the FBI was
unable to sow internal conflict. And because the townhouse blast had already
diminished the organization’s little remaining public support, it was hardly necessary
for the Bureau to expend energy discrediting the Weather Underground. Instead, the
Bureau focused on destroying the Weather Underground through traditional criminal
investigations of its members. Throughout March 1970, Hoover urged the Department
of Justice to promptly indict Weather Underground members on charges of violating the
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Smith Act of 1940 or other federal laws.21 FBI agents in Chicago worked tirelessly to
provide the Department with evidence to support indictments, believing that capturing
fugitives was “the most effective method to disrupt the activities of this dangerous
group.”22 Attorney General Mitchell followed through on April 2, announcing a 15-count
indictment charging twelve Weatherman leaders with conspiracy and interstate travel
to incite a riot during Chicago’s October 1969 “Days of Rage.” The indictment also
named twenty-eight other Weather militants as co-conspirators. Now that a large
number of the Weather Underground’s members were federal fugitives, the FBI had
jurisdiction to apprehend them.23
Weather Underground fugitives, however, were nowhere to be found. By
attracting unexpected police attention, the townhouse bombing forced Weather
militants to either leave the organization or go underground immediately.24 As Bill
Ayers recalled the days following the deadly blast, “We took new names and fashioned
clumsy disguises and kept our living spaces hidden even from each other. We met up
mostly at night in elaborately guarded ways, and then usually only briefly.”25 Similarly,
David Gilbert remembered rapidly altering his personal appearance:
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I’d gone from clean-shaven to a bushy beard, from short dark hair to long and
light, from horn rimmed to rimless glasses, from an informal version of collegiate
dress to tie-dyed shirts and bell-bottoms. One day I walked right past an old
college friend, who didn’t recognize me… We learned to play close attention to
gait, carriage, and style, which could be more revealing than glasses and hair,
especially for women, who didn’t have the advantage of beards.26
The FBI had no way of knowing it, but the loss of three comrades in the townhouse blast
had also dealt a severe emotional blow to the Weather Underground’s membership, and
prompted the group to forgo violent attacks, such as the planned Fort Dix action, that
would physically harm human beings. At a secret May meeting in northern California,
Weather leaders Bernadine Dohrn, Jeff Jones, and Bill Ayers renounced murder as a
revolutionary tactic, and formulated a new policy of consciously avoiding casualties in
future actions.27
As far as Hoover and his men were concerned, however, the Weather
Underground remained a deadly and imminent threat to American lives. Moreover, the
FBI had no idea when or where the Weather Underground would strike next. This
reality troubled Hoover deeply. Would the next Weather Underground attack result in
casualties? Would it take President Nixon by surprise and diminish the Executive
Branch’s faith in his competency as FBI Director? A desire to demonstrate the FBI’s
thoroughness likely informed Hoover’s decision in late March to write Nixon’s assistant
John D. Ehrlichman and other officials, citing information from an unnamed source who
claimed that his daughter, a supposed Weather Underground member, had disclosed
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the group’s plans to bomb U.S. passenger airliners.28 White House pressure to
demonstrate progress in the investigation also prompted Hoover to expose the FBI’s
lone informant in the Weather Underground. In mid April, agents blew Larry
Grathwohl’s cover by arresting Weather militants Linda Evans and Dianne Donghi in
New York City. In his 1976 memoir, Grathwohl claimed that he had urged his FBI
handlers to hold off on the arrest until they could also nab Weather leaders Bill Ayers,
Mark Rudd, Bernadine Dohrn, or Jeff Jones. According to Grathwohl, New York Special
Agent Terry Roberts stated, “we need an arrest,” and acknowledged, “You may be right,
Larry, but … this decision came from the man in Washington.”29
As agents hunted for fugitives, Bureau officials concluded that the Weather
Underground, along with other, autonomous guerrilla cells, presented a new kind of
challenge to law enforcement, one that compelled reevaluation of FBI investigative
procedures. On March 31, leaders of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence, General
Investigative, and Special Investigative Divisions held a conference to “coordinate
guidelines for recommendations concerning bombing matters and extremist terroristic
activities.”30 The FBI’s Assistant Directors held a separate meeting on the topic the
following day.31 The meetings were the first time in the Bureau’s history when
administrators officially acknowledged the new, unique problem of domestic urban
guerrilla insurgency. Moreover, it was the first time that FBI officials formally defined
guerrilla warfare as “terrorism” and devised specific suggestions for combatting this
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particular form of political violence.
Reporting on the conference, Internal Security Chief Charles D. Brennan
conveyed to Assistant Director Sullivan his perception that leftist guerrilla violence had
arisen in the U.S. rather suddenly, catching the FBI off-guard. In reference to the
Weather Underground, he explained, “a group which emerged only as an ideology in
June, 1969, which we obtained authority to conduct individual investigations on in late
November, 1969, has erupted into a menace of national proportions in March 1970.”32
Admitting to the Weather Underground’s success in concealing its specific plans for
guerrilla warfare from the state, he noted, “our current investigations connected with
the New York bombings have shown how little we have seen of the iceberg – just the
exposed tip at Chicago in October and at Flint in December.” Brennan identified
Weatherman violence as new type of threat, one that the FBI was not fully prepared to
confront. “It has become increasingly clear,” he warned, “we are attempting to cope
with a large-scale shift to terrorism by New Left extremists.”33
During their conference, Brennan and his colleagues determined that the FBI
lacked sufficient resources to pursue the Weather Underground and other leftist
guerrilla groups. “Despite our voluminous instructions to the field to cope with the
emerging Weatherman terrorism,” he explained, “the scope of the problem clearly
exceeds our existing manpower limitations.”34 Brennan also believed that
inconsistencies in Department of Justice policies were hindering the FBI’s “bombing
matters” investigations. According to Brennan, the Department had maintained a
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“palliative attitude” towards “extremists” prior to the bombings of March 1970, when
President Nixon expressed his alarm over the violence to Attorney General Mitchell.
Mitchell’s suggestion that the FBI lead investigations of all future political bombings
prompted frustration and resentment among FBI officials, including Hoover, who had
responded by noting the occurrence of multiple bomb threats in New York City on
March 13 following the previous day’s blasts. “Apparently,” the Director remarked in a
memo to his top administrators, “this trio of Asst. AGs would have us go into each.”35
Citing the Justice Department’s “procrastination” in indicting Weather Underground
leaders, Brennan sounded a similarly bitter note. He referred to the Attorney General’s
suggestion as a “cover-up attempt to obfuscate” earlier inaction regarding FBI warnings
of potential Weather Underground violence.36
Thus, Brennan sought new, explicit measures to address the guerrilla violence.
He recommended that FBI Headquarters implement a “special school for field
personnel handling these matters,” and issue a “letter to all Special Agents in Charge
defining our investigative responsibilities … in these matters.”37 Moreover, he advised
Headquarters to conduct a survey of all FBI Field Offices in order to establish the “cost
and manpower requirements expected to be incurred in these intensive intelligence
investigations.”38 Brennan asserted that by establishing “hard, specific cost factors,” the
results of such a survey would provide the Bureau with leverage to petition the
Department of Justice for the resources needed for their expanded investigations of
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leftist guerrilla violence.39 Hoover followed through with Brennan’s recommendations
two weeks later, issuing an airtel directing all SACs to “prepare a cost estimate survey of
known and anticipated costs” associated with his proposal for further intensified
investigations of “leftist terrorist activity.”40 The FBI’s extensive survey resulted in no
immediate new funding from the Justice Department, but facilitated the Bureau’s
internal reorganization, as officials transferred personnel from other areas into
domestic intelligence in order to expand their investigation of the Weather
Underground and other leftist groups deemed ideologically prone to violence.41 The
effort was also likely one of Hoover’s regular attempts to obtain increased
Congressional funding for the FBI’s portion of the Justice Department budget.
By the time of their “bombing matters and extremist terrorist activities”
conference, investigations of the Weather Underground and other leftist guerrilla
“terrorists” had become Hoover’s top priority. In May, a Bureau spokesperson
announced that the Weather Underground investigation amounted to “one of the most
intense manhunts in FBI history.”42 But despite their “intensified” investigation and
surveillance operations, the FBI enjoyed few successes in their hunt for Weather
Underground fugitives.
Indeed, both guerrilla resistance and youth protest more generally were rapidly
expanding. For example, after President Nixon announced that the U.S. Army was
launching a ground invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970, mass protests erupted on
college campuses across the country, and dozens of ROTC buildings went up in flames.
Ibid.
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The Governor of Ohio called in the National Guard after students from Kent State
University smashed downtown shop windows during a spontaneous late night street
gathering. Confrontation with student demonstrators at Kent State turned bloody when
Guard troops opened fire on a crowd of protesters on May 4, killing four, and sparking
more than 500 additional protests, walk-outs, and strikes on other American university
campuses, many of which shut down classes for the remainder of the semester.43 So
widespread was campus unrest, that Nixon canceled plans to attend his daughter Julie’s
commencement ceremonies at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, due to
Secret Service warnings of planned student protests and “the possibility of an ugly
incident that would mar the graduation.”44 The Cambodia invasion and campus
uprisings also forced Nixon to postpone his meeting on the problem of “revolutionary
terrorism” with U.S. intelligence officials, which he had originally scheduled for April.45
Meanwhile, in early May the FBI added two underground revolutionaries to its Ten
Most Wanted Fugitives list: White Panther Party co-founder Lawrence “Pun”
Plamondon, wanted for his alleged involvement in a September 1968 bombing of a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office in Ann Arbor, Michigan; and H. Rap Brown,
sought on interstate flight and riot conspiracy charges.46 Later that month, on May 21,
the Weather Underground flaunted their evasion of the FBI in front of the world. In a
tape-recorded communiqué issued on the third anniversary of Ché Guevara’s death,
Weatherleader Bernadine Dohrn announced a “Declaration of a State of War” against
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“Amerikan imperialism.” Within fourteen days, she warned, the Weather Underground
would “attack a symbol or institution of Amerikan (sic) injustice.”47 Twenty days later,
on June 10, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion at New York City’s Police
Headquarters.48
The Bureau’s inability to locate Weather Underground fugitives was not just, as
Internal Security Chief Brennan suggested, a result of limited manpower and
inconsistent support from the Justice Department. The FBI was also hampered by its
own inefficiency. An audit of FBI domestic security investigations published by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1976 determined that the FBI had wasted valuable
time and resources with its 1960s and early 1970s investigations of hundreds of groups
and individuals deemed, under unclear criteria, to be “subversive” or “extremist.”49
While the FBI added personnel to its Weather Underground investigation following its
April 1970 staff survey, it also maintained extensive surveillance on hundreds of leftist
groups and individuals unrelated to the urban guerrillas, including rival SDS factions
PLP and Revolutionary Youth Movement II, both of which had officially denounced the
Weather Underground.50 The GAO report concluded that “rather than concentrating on
the most violence-prone groups the FBI has diffused its domestic intelligence
investigative coverage to the point where many investigations do not lead to positive
results.”51 The study affirmed that “violent groups, such as the present-day
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Weatherman,” “warrant the FBI’s full attention.”52 The FBI’s widespread surveillance of
the U.S. left reflected officials’ ongoing concern with leftwing political dissent in general,
as well as Hoover’s inability to develop effective techniques for apprehending
clandestine guerrilla fugitives.
Internal bureaucratic conflicts also hindered the FBI’s Weatherman
investigation. M. Wesley Swearingen investigated the Weather Underground in Los
Angeles during the early 1970s following a transfer from New York two months after
the townhouse explosion. In his 1995 memoir FBI Secrets, he recalled that an
administrative power struggle in the L.A. Field Office had severely undermined his
work. According to Swearingen, Bill Nolan, Coordinator of LA’s Security Section,
rejected Hoover’s March 1970 instructions to establish a special Weather Underground
Squad, assuring the Director that the guerrilla organization was not active in Los
Angeles.53 This became a problem a few months later when Swearingen identified
Weatherman John Fuerst as his top suspect in a case involving the purchase of fifty
pounds of dynamite and blasting caps from a store in Tucson, Arizona. When
Swearingen informed his boss that Fuerst was living with other Weather Underground
fugitives in a communal house in L.A.’s Venice neighborhood, Nolan refused to support
the investigation, and Fuerst managed to slip out of Los Angeles with the explosives.
Swearingen asserted that Nolan did not want to believe him because he “had put his
career on the line when [Nolan] told Hoover there were no Weathermen in Los
Angeles.”54
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The FBI’s Weather Underground investigation also faced another problem, one
even more profound than inefficiency and corruption. The Bureau lacked informants
inside the Weather Underground. The FBI’s network of informants on college campuses
was useful for keeping tabs on the aboveground student left, but it was of no use in
tracking down Weather Underground guerrillas, who had gone underground to
deliberately avoid such surveillance. Hoover addressed this problem in an airtel he sent
to field offices in ten major cities on March 12, 1970, six days after the townhouse blast.
Because of the Weather Underground’s clandestine status and “use of drugs and
extremely immoral conduct,” he noted, “it will be extremely difficult to obtain security
informants of the type used in the past.” In order to infiltrate the underground
organization, Hoover proposed a new kind of informant. “The type of informant now
needed,” he continued, “may, of necessity, be the street-type, ghetto informant…
Accordingly, you should look to these groups for possible infiltration into the ranks of
the collectives, communes, units, or whatever name they might go by.”55 In other words,
because FBI intelligence informed him that Weather Underground guerrillas took
shelter within the counter-culture, spurned the student left, and romanticized illegal
behavior, Hoover deduced that the best source for informants capable of infiltrating the
organization was the criminal community.
Hoover was correct that student informants would be useless for infiltrating the
Weather Underground, but he still underestimated the clandestine organization’s
ability to evade state surveillance. The FBI could not gain access to the inner workings
of the Weather Underground by simply replacing its student informants with criminal
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ones. Experienced with police informants and increasingly versed in the techniques of
guerrilla warfare, Weather Underground militants had consciously adopted practices
designed to conceal their identities and prevent infiltration. Consequently, for the first
time in his forty-six year career as the Bureau’s Director, Hoover confronted a
revolutionary organization that the FBI was unable to infiltrate. This reality prompted
growing crises within both the FBI and the Nixon Administration.

The Huston Plan
Hoover was not the only U.S. official alarmed by leftist guerrilla violence. President
Nixon was deeply concerned as well. Nixon was also dissatisfied with Hoover’s job
performance. The President, goaded by FBI Assistant Director William Sullivan and
White House aide Tom Huston, believed that Hoover’s decision to cease Bureau
involvement in illegal break-ins and secret mail-opening in 1966 now impeded the FBI’s
investigations of the Weather Underground and other leftist guerrillas.56 In addition,
Huston’s reports and increasing bombings had convinced Nixon that domestic
revolutionary guerrillas now posed more of a threat to U.S. national security than
Communist “subversion” of American politics. Nonetheless, like Lyndon Johnson before
him, Nixon remained determined to find evidence that foreign Communist governments
directly supported the Black Panthers and the Weather Underground, evidence that FBI
reports had repeatedly indicated did not exist.57 Consequently, the President called an
Oval Office meeting on June 5, 1970 with the leaders of all of the United States’ federal
intelligence agencies. Hoover joined CIA Director Richard Helms, Admiral Noel Gayler of
56
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the National Security Agency, and Lieutenant General Donald Bennett of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, as well as Nixon Cabinet members H. R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman, Bob Finch, and, of course, Huston. Nixon defined the meeting’s topic:
“revolutionary terrorism.”58
Like Hoover and other FBI officials, Nixon identified leftist urban guerrilla
warfare as a new type of threat to U.S. national security. Reading from a “talking paper”
that Huston had drafted for him, Nixon declared that America’s “internal security
problem” had moved from the “student activism” and “protest movements” of the
1960s to “revolutionary terrorism being perpetrated today by determined
professionals.” He warned:
We are now confronted with a grave crisis in our country, one which we know
too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans—mostly
under 30—are determined to destroy our society ... They are reaching out for
the support—ideological or otherwise—of foreign powers, and they are
developing their own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as
dangerous as anything which they could import from Cuba, China, or the Soviet
Union.59
Reiterating what Hoover already knew, Nixon pointed out that the leftist guerrilla
groups were more difficult to thwart than the Bureau’s earlier arch-nemesis, the
Communist Party. “The new revolutionary groups,” he asserted, were “less susceptible
to penetration and surveillance” and geographically dispersed, requiring “far broader
coverage” than previous targets. Moreover, he stated, these organizations “place a high
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premium on violence.”60 The President ordered the country’s top intelligence officials to
“develop a plan” to thwart revolutionary guerrilla warfare. “Terrorism has replaced
subversion as the immediate threat,” he stated. “This must be halted before innocent
people are killed.”61
Just as President Johnson sought preventative intelligence to preempt urban
riots in 1967, Nixon now sought advance warning of leftist guerrilla violence. Instead of
leaving this task up to the FBI, however, for the first time in U.S. history, Nixon sought
direct White House control over America’s intelligence agencies, whose powers he
sought to consolidate under a single command. On several occasions over the following
two weeks, representatives of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force
intelligence divisions met to fulfill Nixon’s orders to “review the collection efforts of the
intelligence community in the area of internal security and to recommend … additional
steps which can be taken to strengthen our capabilities in this regard.”62 Under Nixon’s
orders, Huston oversaw the project, working closely with Sullivan and FBI Internal
Security Chief Charles Brennan. Together, this trio drafted the final “Interagency
Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)” report to the President.
The committee’s report provided an overview of state surveillance on the
student New Left, the Black Power movement, Marxist-Leninist parties, and the Puerto
Rican independence movement. According to the report, the greatest threats these
movements posed to U.S. internal security were violence and foreign espionage. In
terms of violence, the report identified the Weather Underground and other “New Left
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terrorist groups” as “a major threat to the internal security of the United States,” while
also noting an increase in political bombings carried out by Puerto Rican “extremist
groups,” and the “probability” of future “terrorist activities” carried out by “black
extremists” associated with the Black Panther Party.63 The report identified both the
student New Left and the Black Panther Party as potential recruits for foreign
intelligence agencies given members’ travels to Communist countries like Cuba, China,
North Vietnam, Algeria, and the Soviet Union, but admitted that U.S. intelligence
agencies possessed no current evidence of such activity.64 It also noted numerous
“gaps” in surveillance of radical leftist groups, attributing most of them to “restraints on
intelligence,” namely Hoover’s limits on FBI electronic wiretapping, and prohibition of
Bureau involvement in break-ins, mail-opening, trash covers, and use of informants
under age twenty-one.65 Though officially titled simply, “Special Report,” the document
established the foundation for the Huston Plan.66
The Huston Plan was a joint effort by the Nixon Administration, Sullivan and
Brennan, and the heads of the CIA, NSA, and DIA to bypass what they perceived as
Hoover’s stonewalling of effective initiatives to combat “terrorism.” The interagency
committee also prioritized preventing foreign espionage and infiltration of New Left
social movements, but the majority of the report addressed concerns of homegrown
revolutionary violence. The plan’s architects sought to coordinate the efforts of all U.S.
intelligence agencies under the direct supervision of the White House and expand
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federal surveillance capacities by eliminating FBI restrictions on break-ins, mailopening, electronic surveillance, and utilization of informants under the age of twentyone. Through careful bureaucratic maneuvering, Sullivan and Huston strategically
plotted to force Hoover’s compliance with the plan. For one, the pair convinced Nixon to
appoint Hoover as the ad hoc interagency committee’s chair. Sullivan believed that such
a gesture would demonstrate the President’s respect for the FBI’s jurisdiction over
internal security matters, but also accurately calculated that Hoover would not want the
responsibility, and would instead hand the project over to him.67 Sullivan also
concealed from Hoover his role in drafting the report, knowing that his boss would fire
him if he found out. Instead, he gave the impression that Huston was the primary
author. In addition, Sullivan strategically crafted the report in a manner designed to
secure Hoover’s signature. Instead of making direct policy recommendations, the report
offered a series of options, outlined next to boxes for the President to check off, which
ranged from making no changes to existing intelligence procedures to implementing the
various measures Sullivan, Huston, and others on the committee hoped to enact.
Therefore, by signing the document, Hoover would not have to explicitly endorse any
particular policies.68 Sullivan and Huston also gathered the CIA, NSA, and DIA directors’
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signatures on the report before soliciting Hoover’s, hoping that doing so would compel
the Director to sign as well.69
Sullivan and Huston’s scheme did not go as planned, however. Hoover was livid
after he read the report’s first draft. “That hippie is behind this,” he reportedly
exclaimed upon calling Sullivan into his office, refusing to call Huston by name, instead
using a pejorative inspired by the young White House aide’s two-inch sideburns.70
According to Sullivan, Hoover stated “I’ll only accept the recommendations outlined in
this draft if the president orders me to. And I’ll only carry them out if someone else—
the president, the attorney general, anyone else—takes the responsibility.”71 In a
bureaucratic power play, Hoover ordered Sullivan to draft footnotes into the report,
formally indicating the FBI Director’s opposition to a permanent interagency
intelligence committee and all efforts to relax the Bureau’s restrictions on illegal
domestic surveillance practices. Sullivan complied, and Hoover signed the final, revised
version of the report.72
Huston then responded with another attempt to override Hoover. In early July,
following the secret report’s finalization, Huston penned a memorandum to Nixon
entitled “Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection.” The memo reiterated the
“ad-hoc” report’s recommendations. Though he acknowledged that tactics such as
break-ins and mail-opening were “clearly illegal,” Huston emphasized that Hoover was
the only U.S. intelligence official who opposed the measures, objecting on the grounds

Theoharis, Spying on Americans, 26.
Sullivan, The Bureau, 211.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid, 213; Theoharis, Spying on Americans, 29.
69
70

153

that “the civil liberties people may become upset.”73 Moreover, Huston pointed out that
“surreptitious entries” and “mail covers” (FBI parlance for break-ins and surveillance of
mail correspondence) were not new tactics, but ones that “the FBI, in Hoover’s younger
years, used … with great success and with no exposure.”74 Huston urged Nixon’s
approval of the measures, asserting their necessity in order to combat “the
Weathermen and the Black Panthers” and “forestall widespread violence” on American
university campuses during the upcoming fall semester.75
Nixon approved Huston’s plan. But he did so indirectly, through White House
Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, who sent Huston a memo stating, “the recommendations
you have proposed as a result of the review have been approved by the President.”76
Nixon avoided approving the plan in writing because, like Hoover, he sought to avoid
responsibility for any political fallout that he believed would result should news of its
existence reach the American public. Nixon’s unwillingness to attach his name to the
plan ultimately resulted in its demise. Immediately after Huston issued a memorandum
instituting the plan, Hoover approached Attorney General Mitchell, who had no prior
knowledge of the secret interagency committee. In yet another strategic bureaucratic
maneuver, Hoover indicated in writing that he intended to seek written presidential
approval prior to directing his agents to engage in any of the illegal tactics authorized in
the plan.77 Conveying Hoover’s intentions, Mitchell convinced the President that “risk of
disclosure of the possible illegal actions … was greater than the possible benefit to be
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derived.”78 Nixon backed out of the Huston Plan on July 28, 1970, five days after Huston
instituted it. For now, bureaucratic conflict and fears of public disclosure trumped the
Nixon Administration’s efforts to combat domestic “terrorism” through interagency
coordination and the reinstatement of illegal surveillance measures.

Conclusion
The Huston Plan was the United States’ Executive Branch’s first attempt to confront a
problem it defined as “terrorism.” Sullivan, Brennan, Huston, and Nixon sought to
revive illegal surveillance tactics widely utilized in the Hoover FBI’s war on Communist
“subversives” during the 1950s and early 1960s, but in response to a new, distinct
threat. The Nixon administration proposed the Huston Plan in direct response to
increased revolutionary violence on America’s university campuses and city streets, in
the form of arsons, bombings, and the killings of police officers. White House and
intelligence officials were especially concerned with the unprecedented threat of
revolutionary urban guerrilla warfare, particularly as posed by the Black Panthers and
the clandestine Weather Underground. The Huston Plan’s architects sought to halt and
preempt this threat with the use of illegal surveillance tactics.
Nixon made this clear in his 1978 memoir. Reflecting on the Huston Plan, the
former President wrote, “in view of the crisis of terrorism and violence visited upon
countless innocent people, the recommendations made to me by the interagency
intelligence group in its 1970 report were justified and responsible.”79 According to
Nixon, extralegal state action was sometimes necessary to defend America’s citizens
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and national security from “terrorist” violence. He compared the Huston Plan to
President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-Americans during World War
II, other wartime Executive decisions he contended “will always be debated.”80 Nixon
asked, “did the threatened and actual bombings of the Weathermen, and the brutal
assaults of the Black Panthers, justify an intrusion of their liberties?”81 “When the issue
juxtaposes the lives of innocent citizens against the possible curtailment of personal
liberties we all cherish,” he continued, “the answers are never easy.”82 Ultimately,
however, Nixon believed that American Presidents were required to implement
“emergency measures to meet emergency situations” when needed “to defend the
nation and to protect innocent people.”83
Nixon’s reflections on the Huston Plan were, of course, part of the former
President’s efforts at self-redemption following Watergate. Nixon’s memoir
downplayed his use of domestic surveillance for personal political gain, and offered a
one-sided perspective on domestic revolutionary violence, one that ignored the reality
of police violence against the Black Panthers and other U.S. radicals as well as the
military violence he was personally responsible for inflicting upon the people of
Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, his account sheds light on the origins of a debate on
“revolutionary terrorism” that came to the forefront of American politics in the postWatergate era, as intelligence and White House officials grappled with both ongoing
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domestic guerrilla violence and public controversy over domestic surveillance and
intelligence agencies’ violations of Americans’ civil liberties. The Huston Plan did not
resolve the FBI’s terrorism dilemma. On the contrary, the plan’s failure deepened a
crisis within both the FBI and the Nixon administration, as leftist guerrilla violence in
America’s cities increased over the course of the next two years.
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CHAPTER 4
LOSING FACE: THE WAR AT HOME AND THE FBI’S PUBLIC IMAGE

On August 7, 1970, seventeen-year-old African American militant Jonathan Jackson
smuggled several guns into a courtroom in California’s Marin County Civic Center. The
young man sat quietly in the gallery for several minutes while the Black revolutionary
and prisoner James McClain stood trial for assaulting a white guard in San Quentin
Prison. Then Jackson rose to his feet brandishing an assault rifle. “All right, gentlemen,
I’m taking over now,” he proclaimed. Jackson then distributed firearms to McClain and
defense witnesses Ruchell Magee and William A. Christmas, also radical Black
prisoners. The four men seized Judge Harold Haley, District Attorney Gary Thomas, and
three female jurors as hostages, and then fled to a nearby getaway van. District
Attorney Thomas later stated that the men hoped to trade their captives for the release
of the “Soledad Brothers”—Fleeta Drumgo, John Clutchette, and Jonathan’s older
brother George Jackson—three radical Black prisoners indicted on capital charges for
killing another white prison guard amid escalating violence between guards and Black
revolutionary convicts inside California’s prisons. Jonathan Jackson, however, never had
an opportunity to explain his aims. He died alongside McClain, Christmas, and Judge
Haley after police and prison guards surrounded the van, a firefight erupted, and a
shooting melee broke out inside the vehicle.1
Accounts of the shoot-out vary, but most indicate that gunfire broke out between police and the
revolutionaries as the van approached a roadblock set up by police and San Quentin guards, and as
Thomas wrested a gun from one of his captors and began shooting at them inside the van. Those
sympathetic with the revolutionaries’ causes claimed that police and guards fired into the van
indiscriminately under the protocol of San Quentin’s “no hostage” policy. Police asserted that McClain
fired at the roadblock from the van’s passenger seat. Haley died of a blast from a shotgun that the
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Jonathan Jackson was a high school student from Pasadena tormented by the
incarceration of his beloved older brother. Through regular written correspondence
from prison, George had tutored his younger sibling in foco theory and political
economy, and like many other young radicals of his time, Jonathan came to believe that
revolutionary violence offered humanity’s best hope for overcoming the racist state
violence of U.S. imperialism.2 Jonathan Jackson died in an effort to advance socialist
revolution. He knew nothing about the Huston Plan, but his bloody attack prompted a
chain of unintended consequences.
Jackson carried out his raid two weeks after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
pressured President Richard Nixon to abandon the Huston Plan’s secret consolidation
of America’s intelligence agencies, and two days after Tupamaros guerrillas in
Montevideo, Uruguay executed American hostage Dan Mitrione, a former FBI operative
working in their country under the auspices of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). Jackson’s raid elicited shock and alarm among American political
leaders, who nervously viewed the attack as a portent of further political kidnappings
on United States soil. After the Marin County courthouse incident, President Nixon and
his aides, still frustrated by Hoover’s sabotage of the Huston Plan, ratcheted up their
insistence that the FBI expand its efforts to thwart leftist guerrilla violence and prevent
revolutionaries had taped to his head. Gunshot wounds permanently paralyzed Thomas; Magee also
endured critical wounds. One of the jurors was injured by gunfire as well. For accounts, see Berger,
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describing the “torturous prison conditions” endured by California prisoners.
2 For more on how George Jackson and his incarceration influenced Jonathan Jackson’s life and politics,
see the former’s letters to the latter in George Jackson, Blood in my Eye, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Black Classic
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further kidnappings. Dozens of bombings and other guerrilla attacks over the
remainder of 1970, several of them deadly, only increased the urgency of the Nixon
Administration’s demands. Consequently, Jackson’s raid was the first of several leftist
guerrilla actions that prompted Hoover to expand dramatically the FBI’s surveillance of
Black Power and New Left activists and secretly revive illegal surveillance techniques
outlined in the Huston Plan. The FBI fought what it increasingly referred to as
“terrorism” by seeking advanced, “preventative” knowledge of guerrilla attacks, and by
utilizing restricted tactics to search for leftist guerrilla fugitives. Hoover authorized FBI
use of informants under the age of twenty-one and the expansion of warrantless
wiretaps targeting the Black Panther Party and suspected Weather Underground
associates. Furthermore, in an effort to expand the FBI’s domestic surveillance
capabilities while avoiding liability for illegal spy tactics, Hoover used euphemistic
threats and suggestions to pressure local Field Offices to informally utilize mail tracking,
mail-opening, and break-ins in conjunction with the Bureau’s Weather Underground
investigation.
Leftist guerrilla violence, and the specter of political kidnapping, also drove
Hoover to inadvertently provoke intense public criticism of the FBI. On November 27,
1970, while requesting funds from the Senate Appropriations Committee for the FBI’s
war on domestic leftist guerrillas, Hoover claimed to have intelligence that suggested a
group of activists associated with the Catholic pacifist organization East Coast
Conspiracy to Save Lives planned to blow up underground electrical conduits and
steam pipes in Washington D.C. and kidnap a top U.S. official, later revealed to be
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Hoover’s far-fetched accusations backfired,
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prompting unprecedented criticism of the FBI and its Director in Congress and the
press. In addition, a federal grand jury’s indictment of the “Harrisburg Eight” the
following month turned the antiwar activists accused of the Washington bombing and
Kissinger kidnapping plot into cause célèbres, and prompted renewed concern within
the U.S. Left of an escalating government conspiracy to repress political dissent. The
charges also motivated one of the indicted, Philadelphia physics professor and peace
activist William Davidon, to lead a group of pacifist radicals in a burglary of a local FBI
office with the goal of acquiring documentary evidence of political repression. On March
8, 1971, Davidon and his secret group, the Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI,
followed through on his plans, stealing thousands of classified FBI documents from a
Resident Agency in Media, Pennsylvania.
The Media burglary was disastrous for the FBI because it undermined that which
Hoover had sought to preserve when he blocked the Huston Plan in July 1970: the FBI’s
longstanding public image as trusted crime-fighters and defenders of national security.
In her 2014 book The Burglary, journalist Betty Medsger described in detail how the
Media burglars carried out their heist and uncovered documents revealing the FBI’s
involvement in widespread domestic surveillance. Medsger, who reported on the stolen
documents in the Washington Post in 1971 after receiving anonymously-sent copies in
the mail, also explained in her book how news coverage of the disclosures elicited
unprecedented calls in Congress and the press for Hoover’s dismissal and for official
investigations of FBI practices. Medsger’s book also illustrates how the heist uncovered
the first documentary evidence of the Bureau’s COINTELPROs against dissident social
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movements, operations the Church Committee would later document in its 1976 report
on FBI activities.3
However, despite casting new, important light on the Media burglary and
publicly revealing the burglars’ identities for the first time, Medsger’s book suffers from
a key omission. Like other literature on the history of FBI operations against political
dissidents, Medsger’s book does not provide a sufficient explanation for why the Bureau
instituted the mass domestic surveillance uncovered by the Media burglars. Instead, she
falls back on a conspiratorial explanation for the Bureau’s motivations, asserting that
the FBI carried out its secret surveillance and counterintelligence operations against
American dissidents merely to “silence people whose political opinions the director
[Hoover] opposed.”4 Medsger’s book makes virtually no mention of leftist guerrilla
violence.
In contrast, this chapter illustrates for the first time that in the fall of 1970 the
FBI introduced most of its surveillance of New Left and African American campus
activists uncovered through the Media burglary, as well as the illegal spy tactics later
exposed after the Watergate Scandal, in a desperate and ineffective attempt to thwart
leftist guerrilla violence. In analyzing the unintended consequences of Hoover’s false
accusation that the “Harrisburg Eight” were plotting to kidnap Henry Kissinger, this
chapter also reveals that the Media burglary was itself an indirect product of the FBI’s
war with domestic leftist guerrillas.

Medsger, The Burglary. For a documentary film account of the stories in Medsger’s book, see 1971,
directed by Johanna Hamilton, Maximum Pictures and Fork Films, 2014.
4 Medsger, The Burglary, 7.
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August 1970
Approximately one week after the Marin County courthouse attack, FBI Director Hoover
spoke on the phone with President Nixon. The details of their conversation are
unknown, but a pair of letters Hoover wrote on August 17, 1970 shed light on the topics
discussed. The letters—one issued to the FBI’s fifty-nine Field Offices and twenty
overseas Legal Attaches, and the second to Nixon—indicate that the President
instructed Hoover to intensify Bureau investigations of leftist guerrillas in the
aftermath of Jonathan Jackson’s August 7 raid. Nixon was already furious with Hoover
over the collapse of the Huston Plan. The Marin County courthouse incident had only
increased the President’s frustration with Hoover, as the FBI remained unable to thwart
leftist guerrilla attacks.
Nixon’s concerns over revolutionary violence had been further amplified by
recent events in South America. In an incident reported throughout the world,
Uruguay’s Tupamaros guerrillas kidnapped USAID advisor and former FBI agent Dan
Mitrione on July 31, and executed him on August 6 after the Uruguayan government
refused the revolutionaries’ demands for the release of 150 leftist political prisoners.5
Nixon feared that revolutionary guerrillas inspired by the Tupamaros would attempt
additional political kidnappings in the United States.6 Consequently, not only did the

Churchill, Becoming the Tupamaros, 50. The Tupamaros accused Mitrione of covertly training
Uruguayan police in the use of torture techniques. See page 56 for Churchill’s summary of the debate over
the validity of these claims. The Mitrione kidnapping became the inspiration for Costa-Gavras’ 1973 film,
State of Siege, which later helped inspire the Symbionese Liberation Army’s 1974 kidnapping of
newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst.
6 No documentary evidence proves that the Tupamaros directly influenced Jonathan Jackson’s raid, but
circumstantial evidence, such as the timing of his raid, romanticization of the Tupamaros by many in the
militant U.S. left, and Jackson’s extensive readings on guerrilla warfare, suggest that such influence was
likely. For more on the Tupamaros’ influence on the U.S. left, see ibid. For Jonathan Jackson’s thoughts on
revolution and guerrilla violence, see Jackson, Blood in my Eye, 11-25.
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President want domestic leftist guerrillas apprehended and prosecuted, but he also
wanted Hoover to obtain advance warning of revolutionaries’ violent plans.
The urgency of Nixon’s demands came across in Hoover’s letter to his Special
Agents in Charge and Legal Attaches. “Recent activities in Latin America as well as in
California on the part of revolutionary extremists in the kidnapping of public officials
and diplomats for hostage purposes,” he wrote, “dictate the need for intensification of
investigation of such extremist organizations as the Black Panther Party and the
Students for a Democratic Society including the Weatherman faction, and similar
violence-prone groups.”7 Hoover passed the pressure from Nixon down the FBI
hierarchy. Referring to leftist guerrilla investigations as a “matter of greatest
importance,” Hoover warned the supervisors of regional FBI offices that he would hold
them “personally responsible for the development of informant coverage in these
organizations whereby the Bureau is in a position to ascertain the plans of extremist
elements.”8 Referring to the periodic reviews of Field Office investigations carried out
by the FBI’s Chief Inspector W. Mark Felt, Hoover emphasized to field supervisors,
“Your efforts in this regard will be the subject of close scrutiny during future
inspections.”9
In his second letter, Hoover informed President Nixon of these initiatives. “In
line with our conversation the other evening,” the Director wrote, “I have had
instructions issued to every one of our field offices and to our Legal Attaches abroad to
intensify investigation of such extremist organizations … whose members may make an
J. Edgar Hoover to all SACs, August 17, 1970, in L. Patrick Gray Director’s File (hereafter LPG FBI),
acquired by the author through a Freedom of Information Act request.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
7
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effort to kidnap high-ranking government officials, members of the diplomatic corps
and members of their families.”10
Hoover’s latest order for the “intensification” of FBI leftist guerrilla
investigations was different from others he had issued since late 1969. Not only did
Hoover seek advance knowledge of violent leftist attacks, a nearly impossible task given
the guerrillas’ deliberate use of secrecy and clandestinity, but he also shifted the onus of
responsibility for this effort from himself to the Special Agents in Charge of local field
offices, a move likely motivated by both his and the Nixon administration’s
unwillingness to shoulder the burden of any future exposure of FBI impropriety. While
providing no specific instructions on how to obtain preventative intelligence, Hoover
strongly implied that a field office’s success or failure in preempting revolutionary
violence would prove pivotal in determining the career prospects of its Special Agent in
Charge. Consequently, the order placed tremendous pressure upon local FBI officials.
Was the Director expecting field offices to reinstitute break-ins and other illegal
surveillance tactics he had discontinued in the mid-1960s? Should their involvement in
such activities become known, would local supervisors and field agents face sanctions?
In such a scenario, would Hoover support local FBI personnel, or disavow responsibility
and blame illegal surveillance techniques on a lone rogue field office?
The FBI’s lack of rules or regulations for bombing investigations troubled field
agents. Special Agent William Dyson, who investigated SDS and the Weather
Underground in Chicago, later recalled his frustration: “Obviously if there’s a bombing, I
can do a crime scene. But what else can I do? Can I infiltrate a college classroom? Can I

10
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go and listen to a professor? Can I talk to a professor in a college classroom? Can I go to
his office? Can I put an informant in the college classroom? Or even on the campus. Can
I penetrate any college organization? What can I do?”11 The answers were uncertain,
and clarification from Headquarters was not forthcoming.
Meanwhile, the FBI investigated the Marin County courthouse attack.
Investigators quickly traced Jonathan Jackson’s guns to their owner, Angela Davis, a
prominent African American Communist and doctoral student who worked as a lecturer
in philosophy at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). During the previous
year, Davis had been the target of an anticommunist smear campaign led by Governor
Ronald Reagan, who tried to force UCLA to fire her.12 Davis had purchased the guns
after receiving multiple death threats, and stored them at the San Francisco Soledad
House commune, where she lived for several months while working on a campaign to
exonerate the Soledad Brothers. Jackson worked as Davis’s bodyguard, and had access
to the guns, but Davis had no prior knowledge of his plans for the courthouse attack.
Nonetheless, fearing an indictment, she went into hiding two days after the raid. Hoover
put Davis on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitive list on August 18 as agents searched
for her throughout the country.13
Six days later, on August 24, a fatal guerrilla attack in Madison, Wisconsin drew
additional FBI attention to leftist violence. At 3:42 in the morning, a group calling itself
the New Years Gang detonated a massive car bomb next to the University of Wisconsin’s

Dyson oral history, 25-26.
The controversy surrounding Davis at UCLA began in July 1969 after FBI informant William Divale
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108.
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Sterling Hall, home to the Army Math Research Center, a facility involved in research
related to the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. The blast, produced from ammonium nitrate
fertilizer and fuel oil packed into a stolen van, sent flames and a mushroom cloud
hundreds of feet into the air, and startled people awake throughout the sleeping city.
The bombers carried out their attack before dawn in an attempt to avoid casualties but
their precautions were inadequate. The explosion killed Robert Fassnacht, a postdoctoral physicist who was conducting research in the basement.
A few hours after the bombing, police in Sauk County, forty miles north of
Madison, pulled over a car that matched the description of a vehicle seen fleeing the
scene of the attack. Inside were four young white radicals involved in the Madison-area
antiwar movement: Dwight Armstrong, his older brother Karleton Armstrong, Leo Burt,
and David Fine. After a couple hours of detainment, however, the police released the
men because they lacked evidence permitting them to hold the suspects under state
law. The four men seized the opportunity to flee the area and disappear into the
revolutionary underground. The FBI identified them as the bombers a few days later.
After initiating yet another nationwide manhunt for revolutionary fugitives, Hoover
added all four suspects to the FBI’s Most Wanted list on September 4, 1970.14
The Sterling Hall bombing, coming on the heels of the Marin Country courthouse
attack, prompted the FBI to reinstitute banned surveillance practices outlined in the
Huston Plan. On September 2, FBI Chief Inspector W. Mark Felt urged Headquarters to
Tom Bates, RADS (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 8-10, 26, 36. Also see Scott Bauer, “FBI Releases
1970 UW Bombing Documents,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 6, 2011. Dwight Armstrong was
eighteen, Karlton was twenty-three, Fine was eighteen, and Burt was twenty-two. After the bombing, the
four fled north, and lived in Canada under assumed identities for several years before FBI agents caught
up with Fine and the Armstrong brothers. Burt remains at large today. He is rumored to have fought in
Latin American guerrilla movements during the 1970s.
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lower its minimum age limit for university student informants from twenty-one to
eighteen. “Never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for
informant coverage,” he explained in a memo to Associate Director Clyde Tolson, the
FBI’s long-time number two official under J. Edgar Hoover. Reinstituting the FBI’s pre1967 standard of eighteen as the minimum informant age was necessary, Felt argued, in
order to prevent “terrorist violence,” including “bombings, assassination of police
officers, kidnapping and torture murder” by “Weatherman fanatics” and other
“violence-oriented black and white savages … at war with the Government and
American people.”15 In his memo, Felt indicated that he based his recommendations on
feedback from special agents throughout the country whom he spoke with while
inspecting their investigations of the Weather Underground and other violent leftist
groups.16
Felt’s recommendation received a key endorsement. In a brief addendum typed
onto the bottom of the memo, Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan affirmed his
support. Sullivan was the third most powerful man in the FBI. He was also the architect
of the recently aborted Huston Plan. “No one can predict with accuracy the outcome of
the revolutionary struggle going on in this country at this time,” he cautioned. “Those
under 20 years of age are playing a predominant role in campus violence,” Sullivan
affirmed, noting, “two of the subjects in the University of Wisconsin case are under
20.”17

FBI memo, W. M. Felt to Tolson, September 2, 1970, Huston Plan, 328.
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In their joint plea to Hoover, Felt and Sullivan forged an unlikely alliance. Felt
had detested Sullivan since the mid 1960s. After his promotion to Chief Inspector in
1965, Felt clashed repeatedly with Sullivan over Hoover’s new restrictions on
warrantless wiretaps, break-ins, use of informants under age twenty-one, and other
illegal and controversial FBI surveillance practices. Like many others in the FBI, Felt
shared Sullivan’s disagreement with Hoover’s new policies, viewing the restricted
techniques as essential tools in the Bureau’s fight against Communist subversion. Felt,
however, was also an ardent Hoover loyalist who believed that backing the Director’s
orders took precedent over such disagreement. This is where he differed from Sullivan,
who had spent much of 1969 and 1970 secretly plotting to undermine Hoover and
reinstate the Bureau’s old investigative tactics, efforts that eventually culminated in the
Huston Plan. In his 1979 memoir, Felt asserted that Sullivan tried many times to
convince him to collaborate in disregarding Hoover’s orders. Felt claimed to have
responded to one of Sullivan’s entreaties by replying, “Bill, we’ve talked about this
before. I understand your problems but we are going to get the job done in spite of the
restrictions—not in spite of the Boss. I am not against you—I am for you but I am also
for the Director.” 18
The fact that Felt would ally with Sullivan in an attempt to reverse Hoover’s
restrictions on teenaged informants points to the tremendous frustration these top FBI
officials experienced as they worked, under enormous pressure but with little success,
to prevent revolutionary violence and apprehend leftist guerrilla fugitives. Felt and
Sullivan sought to lower the minimum age for campus informants, in part, because they
Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 112. Felt’s quote may be fictional, but it nonetheless testifies to
his differences with Sullivan.
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believed that doing so would improve their chances of preventing guerrilla attacks.
However, this was not the only driving force behind the memo; it is likely that an
internal bureaucratic struggle influenced Felt and Sullivan as well. Both men were
probably partially driven by their long-time rivalry and their separate, individual
desires to manipulate the FBI bureaucracy according to their personal ambitions and
ideals.
For Sullivan, Felt’s memo was yet another opportunity to press Hoover for the
reinstatement of FBI surveillance tactics he had unsuccessfully sought to implement
through the Huston Plan. Sullivan had managed to shield his involvement in the Huston
Plan from Hoover, projecting the appearance that Huston was the driving force behind
the initiative. Indeed, Sullivan was so successful in maintaining the facade of loyalty to
his boss that Hoover promoted him to Assistant to the Director on June 10, 1970, and
promoted Charles Brennan to his former post as Assistant Director for Domestic
Security.19 Sullivan remained convinced of the need to expand the FBI’s surveillance
capacities in order to combat leftist guerrilla violence, however, and seized Felt’s memo
as an opportunity to advance this agenda.
Sullivan’s efforts paralleled those of White House officials. A month earlier, Tom
Huston had urged H. R. Haldeman to convince Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell to
reinstate his eponymous Plan. “At some point,” Huston insisted with disdain for the FBI

J. Edgar Hoover letter to all Special Agents in Charge, “Assistant to the Director—Investigative,” June
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available online in the Internet Archive’s Ernie Lazar FOIA Collection,
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Director’s power and autonomy, “Hoover needs to be told who is President.”20 On
September 18, 1970, John Dean—who had taken over Huston’s role as the primary
Nixon administration official in charge of “internal security” matters following his July
1970 promotion to White House Council—offered a modified version of Huston’s
suggestion. Dean issued a memo to Mitchell recommending the formation of an
interagency domestic intelligence unit, but without a “blanket removal of restrictions.”
21

Instead, Dean proposed entrusting the unit to determine “the type of intelligence we

need … and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such
intelligence.”22
It is uncertain whether or not Felt knew about the Huston Plan, but if he did, it is
highly unlikely that he would have worked to reinstate the program behind Hoover’s
back. Instead, Felt probably wrote the memo in an effort to obtain Hoover’s written
approval for lifting restrictions on student informants following the Director’s
ambiguous August 17 memo instructing all field offices to “intensify” leftist guerrilla
investigations. As the FBI’s Chief Inspector, Felt was the administrator tasked with
holding local Special Agents in Charge “personally responsible” for obtaining advance
notice of revolutionary violence. Felt, who regularly travelled around the country to
inspect field offices, indicated in his memo that many local FBI officials “informally
indicated … that their productivity would be greatly enhanced by a lowering of the age
requirements” for informants.23 Felt’s request revealed the stress and uncertainty FBI
Tom Charles Huston memo to H. R. Haldeman, “Domestic Intelligence,” August 5, 1970, Huston Plan,
249.
21 John Dean memo to John Mitchell, September 18, 1970, Huston Plan, 249.
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22 Ibid.
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agents in the field experienced in the face of increased pressure to combat guerrilla
violence and unclear guidelines for how to do so. In partnering with Sullivan to petition
Hoover for a lowering of the informant age limit, Felt forged a convenient temporary
alliance in order to bolster his own efforts. His endeavor ultimately panned out, as
Hoover approved the measure.24 Six weeks after Hoover compelled Nixon to abandon
the Huston Plan, Felt and Sullivan convinced Hoover to implement one of the Plan’s key
elements.

“Fall Offensive”
While Sullivan and White House staff worked to revive the Huston Plan, and Felt sought
clarification on Hoover’s guidelines for domestic security investigations, leftist
guerrillas carried out more attacks. On September 15, 1970, the Weather Underground
executed its next major operation, helping Dr. Timothy Leary escape from California’s
minimum security San Luis Obispo Prison, where the counter-culture icon and LSD
advocate was serving a ten-year sentence for marijuana possession. In a communiqué
released to the media, the Weather Underground referred to Leary as a “prisoner of
war” and pledged to continue their efforts to destroy U.S. imperialism.25 In an
accompanying letter, Leary thanked the Weather Underground for helping him escape,
and vowed to “stay high and wage the revolutionary war.” Leary also warned
authorities that he was armed and “should be considered dangerous to anyone who
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threatens my life or freedom.”26 Robert L. Shackelford, the new head of the FBI’s
Internal Security Division, duly noted Leary’s statement in his September 22, 1970
report on the escape.27
A week after Leary’s escape, guerrillas in Massachusetts killed a police officer.
The group of white revolutionaries consisted of ex-convicts Stanley Bond, William
Gilday, and Robert Valeri, and student radicals Katherine Power and Susan Saxe. On
September 23, Gilday fired fatal submachine rounds at Walter Schroeder, the first cop
to arrive on the scene as the group held up a bank in the Boston suburb of Brighton. The
group then escaped with $26,000 they hoped to give to the Black Panthers. Three days
earlier, the group raided a National Guard Armory in nearby Newburyport, where they
stole a truck, military files, and 400 rounds of ammunition, and then firebombed the
facility, causing over $120,000 in damage. Working on a tip from an FBI informant,
police caught up with Bond, Gilday, and Valeri a few days after the bank robbery. Saxe
and Power, however, vanished into the revolutionary underground.28
Another leftist guerrilla attack occurred on October 6, when the Weather
Underground blew up Chicago’s Haymarket police statue for the second time (the city
had rebuilt it after the group’s first bombing a year earlier). Later that day in New York
City, Jerry Ruben, “Chicago 8” defendant and leader of the Youth International Party
Timothy Leary letter quoted in FBI memo, R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan, September 22, 1970, FBI
WUO File, Roll 6, Section 63.
27 Ibid.
28 Andrew F. Blake, “4 Campus ‘Radicals’ Hunted in Boston Police Slaying,” Washington Post, September
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October 6, 1970, 1; Boston Globe, “Ex-Brandeis Coeds Added to FBI Most Wanted List,” October 18, 1970,
1; Pam Lambert, “Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore,” People 40, No. 14 (April 1993), 61-62. Daniel BurtonRose, “Amazon Underground? Female Antiwar Fugitives and Fissures of Solidarity in the Women’s
Community” (unpublished paper, May 2009). The informant was an acquaintance of some of the groups’
members who voluntarily approached the FBI to warn them that members of the group planned to kill
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(otherwise known as the Yippies) held a press conference along with Jennifer Dohrn,
fellow Yippie and younger sister of Bernadine Dohrn, the notorious Weather
Underground fugitive. The pair played a tape recording of Bernadine Dohrn announcing
the start of “a fall offensive of youth resistance that will spread from Santa Barbara to
Boston, back to Kent and Kansas.”29 Bernadine flaunted the Weather Underground’s
evasion of the FBI, boasting, “J. Edgar himself admitted that ‘underground radicals’ were
the hardest group to infiltrate.” Furthermore, she warned, “next week families and tribes
will attack the enemy around the country.”30 The Weather Underground followed-up two
days later with a bomb that destroyed a courtroom and restroom in the Marin County
Civic Center, where Jonathan Jackson and three others had died two months previously.
A pair of additional bombings by separate, unaffiliated groups also took place on
October 8, one inside the University of Washington’s ROTC building, and another
outside a National Guard Armory in Santa Barbara.31 The Weather Underground carried
out another bombing the next day, blasting a hole in a Long Island City courthouse in
solidarity with a prisoner revolt in the Queens House of Detention recently quashed by
New York police.32 On October 12, five unclaimed bombings took place in Rochester,
along with two in New York City and one in Orlando.33
The FBI scored a brief public relations victory in the midst of the bombings. On
October 13 agents captured Angela Davis in a New York motel room.34 Two days later,
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President Nixon congratulated the FBI for capturing “the dangerous terrorist, Angela
Davis,” as he signed the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1970, which expanded the Bureau’s
jurisdiction over bombings on college campuses.35 But the bombs kept exploding. On
October 14, the Weather Underground’s all female “Proud Eagle Tribe” bombed the
Harvard Center for International Affairs to protest the institution’s complicity in the
Vietnam War, claiming their attack in solidarity with Davis, whom leftists throughout
the world viewed as the target of a government frame-up.36 Two days later, fake bomb
threats, some of them attributed to the Weather Underground, forced “the evacuation of
hospitals in Boston, of airports in New York and St. Louis, and of a subway station in
Harvard Square in Cambridge, Mass.”37
According to Los Angeles Special Agent Cril Payne, Director Hoover “was in a
rage” after the Weather Underground’s “Fall Offensive” communiqué and subsequent
bombings. Payne recalled that FBI agents around the country “were aware of [Hoover’s]
displeasure,” as Field Office phones rang “off the wall with calls from Washington
demanding a thorough and aggressive investigation with plenty of manpower.”38 “It
was bad enough for these ‘revolutionary-guerrillas,’ as the Director called them, to set
off a few bombs,” Payne wrote in his 1979 memoir, “but to announce their intentions to
the American people in advance, and then fulfill them, was unthinkable to Mr. Hoover.”
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The Director, Payne attested, worried dearly that “the public might decide the FBI had
lost control of the situation.”39
Hoover’s actions seem to corroborate Payne’s statements. Immediately following
Dohrn’s “Fall Offensive” communiqué, Hoover sent urgent teletypes warning the
President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Army, the
Air Force, the Secret Service, the Directors of the CIA, DIA, and the Naval Intelligence
Agency, and all FBI Field Offices of impending revolutionary “terrorism.”40 On October
14, the day of the Proud Eagle Tribe’s Harvard bombing, Hoover placed Bernadine
Dohrn on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. He added Power and Saxe a few days later, on
October 17.41 The total new additions to the Most Wanted list for 1970 now numbered
twelve, ten of them leftist revolutionaries, seven of whom remained on the lam.42 In
addition, Hoover circulated a notice warning U.S. government officials to take
precautions against potential political kidnapping and assassination by the Weather
Underground, “black extremists,” and other guerrillas. Among other things, the October
23 bulletin cautioned officials to travel only on main thoroughfares during daylight
hours, to speak only before friendly audiences, to keep their home office notified of
their whereabouts at all times, and to “vary the pattern of living” in respect to business
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and social activities in order to make it difficult for potential kidnappers or assassins to
predict their daily routine.43
Increasing leftist violence, and officials’ incessant desire for preventative
intelligence, also prompted the FBI to dramatically expand its surveillance of the
aboveground student antiwar and Black Power movements. On November 5, Acting
upon recommendations from the FBI’s Executive Council (which included Felt and
Sullivan), Hoover ordered his Field Offices to open files on “all members of Students for
a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist, militant New Left-type
campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.”44 Hoover’s
order covered autonomous, unaffiliated campus activist groups as well as SDS factions
opposed to the Weather Underground, including Revolutionary Youth Movement II
(RYM II), which split from Weatherman shortly after the June 1969 SDS National
Convention, and the Boston-based Progressive Labor Party-affiliated Worker-Student
Alliance (WSA) faction, which claimed the mantle of SDS after the Weatherman faction
disbanded the organization following the December 1969 Flint War Council. Despite
their fervent ideological differences, and the fact that both the WSA and RYM II opposed
urban guerrilla warfare, Hoover warned that these groups collectively constituted “a
breeding ground for revolutionaries, extremists, and terrorists.”45 Hoover also
mandated surveillance of all members of “Black Student Unions” and other African
American campus groups, as well as members of pro-Independence Puerto Rican
FBI bulletin, “Kidnapping and Assaults of United States Government Officials,” October 23, 1970, Gale
Cengage Learning Declassified Documents Reference System online database (hereafter DDRS database).
44 FBI airtel, Director to SAC Albany, “Security Investigations of Individuals who are Members of the
Students for a Democratic Society and Militant New Left Campus Organizations,” November 5, 1970, FBI
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student groups. Viewing right-wing nationalist bombers as an additional threat to
internal security, Hoover also order surveillance of the anticommunist Jewish Defense
League, whom the FBI suspected of involvement in a series of attacks on Soviet
embassies and consulates.46
Expanding domestic surveillance was no easy task. Hoover’s measures required
field agents to reopen over 10,000 files on student activists that had been frozen since a
February 1969 moratorium.47 Agents were to do so incrementally, completing the task
by June 1971.48 The efforts were Hoover’s latest to obtain preventative intelligence, or
advanced knowledge of revolutionary violence. The goal, he explained, was to “identify
potential and actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to assess their threat
to the internal security of the Government.”49
Leftist guerrilla violence also encouraged the FBI to reinstate mail-covers—
illegal and previously restricted surveillance of addresses and return addresses on
individuals’ mail. Like the use of teenaged informants, mail-covers had been a critical
tactic outline in the Huston Plan. In October 1970, Hoover approved a recommendation
from Internal Security Division Chief Robert L. Shackelford to his supervisor Charles
Brennan, granting permission to initiate mail covers in the FBI’s Weather Underground
investigation. The FBI targeted Yippie leaders Jerry Rubin and Jennifer Dohrn, who had
exposed themselves as potential aboveground contacts for the Weather Underground
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with their October 6 press release publicizing Bernadine Dohrn’s “Fall Offensive”
statement. In an October 16 memo, Shackelford expressed his view that the FBI “should
undertake every investigative technique possible to locate … Weatherman fugitives
[emphasis added].”50 Shackelford’s colleagues would have clearly understood this
statement as a reference to mail-covers and other restricted tactics. Specifically, in
response to Rubin and Dohrn’s public acknowledgement of having received the
Weather Underground’s tape-recorded communiqué in the mail at the New York’s
Yippie headquarters, Shackelford suggested the FBI “make confidential arrangements
through the Old Chelsea Station Post Office to get the lists of postmarks and return
addresses on mail sent to individuals at YIP headquarters as well as to the organization
itself.”51 Hoover approved the recommendation with his characteristic handwritten
initials and a scribbled “OK.”52
The FBI began expanding its warrantless electronic surveillance of the
aboveground left in its efforts to thwart guerrilla violence as well, though it did so with
Attorney General Mitchell’s approval. In late October, for example, the FBI began to
wiretap the telephone in the Boston WSA-affiliated SDS Headquarters, and the phones
of suspected aboveground Weather Underground contacts Nancy Kurshan in Cleveland
and Nancy Frappier in San Francisco.53 The FBI directed the greatest share of its
electronic surveillance towards the Black Panther Party. The FBI suspected that
members of the Party planned to carry out guerrilla violence due to the frequent
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glorification of killing police officers in their newspaper, and based on information they
received from informants.54 Moreover, because the Black Panther Party remained an
aboveground organization, they were an easier surveillance target than the clandestine
Weather Underground. By March 29, 1971, the FBI maintained telephone surveillance
on BPP offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, New Haven, and the
Bronx, and microphone surveillance inside the San Francisco penthouse suite of the
organization’s leader, Huey Newton.55 The FBI now maintained the most extensive
electronic surveillance of the U.S. Left since Hoover limited the practice in 1965.56
Ironically, the FBI’s surveillance of the U.S. Left expanded just as mass radical
protest declined. Antiwar demonstrations continued on university campuses during the
fall 1970 semester, but not on the scale of the previous spring, when students shut
down campuses across the country in the wake of Nixon’s Cambodia invasion and the
Kent State killings. The disintegration of SDS after June 1969 had left the movement
without a national organization capable of maintaining such momentum. The FBI’s
annual report for fiscal year 1971 nonetheless emphasized that “New Left extremism
posed a serious danger to the Nation’s internal security,” and that “one of the key
extremist groups was the Weatherman, the violence-prone wing of the pre-June 1969
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recent issue of “The Black Panther” newspaper included a cartoon “showing a Panther leaving a police
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Students for a Democratic Society.57 The Black Panther Party was also in disarray. In
January and February 1971, Huey Newton expelled Geronimo Pratt and most members
of New York’s Panther Twenty-One from the Party after members aligned with exiled
Minister of Communication Eldridge Cleaver publicly criticized their leader for moving
away from guerrilla warfare as a revolutionary strategy.58 The FBI noted in their annual
report that the Black Panther Party’s membership had “dwindled” during the first half
of 1971 amid the Newton-Cleaver split, which the Bureau had actively encouraged
through its counterintelligence program against the organization. Nonetheless, the
Bureau maintained that “black extremists groups,” particularly the BPP’s Cleaver
faction, “continue as dangers to national security.”59
The FBI expanded its surveillance of the U.S. left in the fall of 1970 not in
response to mass protest or fears of Communist subversion, but in a desperate attempt
to thwart leftist guerrilla violence.60 As in the past, however, mass surveillance would
not help the FBI reach its intended objectives. Instead, it damaged the FBI, as Hoover’s
zealous efforts to combat revolutionary guerrillas led him to overstate the threat posed
by leftist violence. In doing so, the Director set off a series of events that would
irreparably tarnish the Bureau’s public image and popular legitimacy.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1971,
October 26, 1971, 21.
58 Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 358-362.
59 FBI, Annual Report for 1971, 24-25.
60 Revolutionary violence also largely alienated the guerrillas from the increasingly fractured
aboveground left.
57

181

Overreach
The FBI’s expanding war on domestic leftist guerrillas was expensive. On November 27,
1970, Hoover appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee to request over
fourteen million dollars in supplemental funding for its operations against organized
crime, airplane hijackers, and “black militants and New Left extremists” involved in
“violent and terroristic tactics, including bombings.”61 Citing a twenty-five percent
increase in the FBI’s workload over the past year due to the expansion of such illegal
activity, Hoover sought the funds to employ 1,000 new agents and 702 new clerks, and
to purchase 500 new automobiles.62 Hoover provided a detailed account of recent
domestic leftist guerrilla violence in his testimony, referencing Weather Underground
assaults, the Marin County courthouse raid, and the Sterling Hall bombing as prominent
examples of the thousands of politically motivated attacks, most of them bombings and
arsons, that had occurred over the past year, and which he imagined would continue
into the next.63 As usual, the Director succeeded in acquiring his requested funds.64 But
a portion of Hoover’s testimony provoked a firestorm of controversy.
In an effort to underscore the danger leftist violence posed to national security,
Hoover alleged that the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, a direct action-oriented
pacifist group led by Catholic priests and nuns, “planned to blow up underground
conduits and steam pipes serving the Washington D.C. area” and “kidnap a highly placed
Government official.”65 Leaks to the press following the testimony named Secretary of
J. Edgar Hoover testimony, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, “Supplemental
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971,” November 27, 1970, 1079.
62 Ibid.
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State Henry Kissinger as the official slated for kidnapping. The leaders of this plot,
Hoover claimed, were Philip and Daniel Berrigan, a pair of brothers and pacifist Roman
Catholic priests then serving federal prison sentences in Danbury, Connecticut for
helping destroy Selective Services records in Maryland in a nonviolent act of resistance
to the Vietnam War in 1968.66 Hoover’s accusations were not completely unfounded.
Pakistani-American scholar Eqbal Ahmad had indeed floated the idea of a “citizens’
arrest” of Kissinger over dinner with some of his Catholic pacifist comrades in late
1970, but the “conspiracy” ended that night after the activists determined that the
action posed too much risk of bloodshed. The FBI learned of this “plot” after Danbury
prison officials intercepted a letter from Sister Elizabeth McAlister to her husband
Philip Berrigan that described the dinner conversation.67
Hoover’s accusation prompted what he feared most: negative media attention
and charges of FBI wrongdoing. The Berrigan brothers and members of the East Coast
Conspiracy to Save Lives publicly denied the charges, while prominent leftist attorney
William Kuntsler warned that Hoover’s testimony was part of an effort to scare the
American people into accepting increased FBI repression of the American Left.68 In a
reference to the Grand Inquisitor of late fifteenth century Spain, Kunstler referred to
Hoover as “America’s Torquemada.”69 Kunstler made the statement during a speech at
Yale University, where leftist students were then hosting thousands of activists from
around the country who had come to New Haven to protest the trial of Black Panthers
Ibid, 1101; Justin Jackson, “Kissinger’s Kidnapper: Eqbal Ahmad, the U.S. New Left, and the
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Bobby Seale and Erika Huggins. The pair faced charges connected to the murder of
nineteen-year-old Party-member and accused informant Alex Rackley, whom local
Panthers had shot to death after torturing him for several days with a coat hanger and
boiling water in a supposed effort to uncover evidence of police infiltration of the
organization. Coming on the heels of charges against the Chicago Eight, the Panther
Twenty-One, Huey Newton, Angela Davis, and other prominent radicals, many in the
U.S. Left viewed the charges against Seale and Huggins as the latest round of the
government’s efforts to crush the antiwar and Black Power movements.70 In the minds
of Kunstler and other leftists, Hoover’s accusations against the East Coast Conspiracy to
Save Lives demonstrated that the Nixon administration’s efforts to repress domestic
political dissent were not limited to Black Panther and SDS militants. “If Catholic priests
and nuns, sensitive religious people, can be indicted for crimes punishable by the death
penalty,” he asked, “who is safe?”71
Hoover’s allegations also turned members of Congress against him, particularly
those in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Representative William R. Anderson
(D-TN), an esteemed World War II Navy veteran and self-described “lifelong admirer of
Mr. Hoover,” responded to the charges with what one reporter referred to as “the
sharpest criticism of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ever heard” in the House of
Representatives. Accusing Hoover of being “involved in a process destructive of the
institution he has loved and served with such dedication,” Anderson accused the
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Director of utilizing “tactics reminiscent of McCarthyism.”72 The controversy erupted
only days after former Attorney General Ramsey Clark publicly criticized the FBI for
wiretapping Senators and lobbyists during the mid-1960s. Hoover responded by calling
his former superior a “jellyfish” who was “soft” on criminals.73 In a television
appearance, Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN) described Hoover’s comments as “very
unbecoming,” remarking, “this type of response would lead me to believe he’s forgotten
what his job is and perhaps we should find someone who has a better memory.”74
The Berrigan conspiracy blowout may have been a product of the ongoing
bureaucratic struggle at the top of the FBI hierarchy. In his 1979 memoir, Mark Felt
insinuated that William C. Sullivan fed information about the Berrigan conspiracy to
Hoover in an attempt to undermine him, knowing that the Director would provoke
damaging public backlash if the media picked up his testimony.75 Sullivan, however,
insisted that he had explicitly warned Hoover not to discuss the case.76 Whichever the
case, the result was increased strain on the FBI’s public image. Under pressure to justify
his public statement, Hoover convinced the Department of Justice to convene a grand
jury, which indicted Philip Berrigan and seven others on conspiracy charges in early
January 1971. On January 12, FBI agents arrested the seven non-incarcerated activists.
Along with Philip Berrigan, they became known as the “Harrisburg Eight,” after the
Pennsylvania city that hosted the grand jury. But the indictment backfired. Hundreds of
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protesters demonstrated at the defendants’ court hearings, and the Harrisburg Eight
became leftist causes célèbres with Ramsey Clark serving as their head attorney.77
Outcry over the Harrisburg Eight indictment erupted at the same time that other
controversies stained the FBI’s image. On January 31, 1971, Senator George McGovern
charged Hoover with “vindictiveness” for firing Jack Shaw, an FBI special agent who had
privately critiqued the Director in a paper written for a college criminal justice course.
Days after Shaw filed a lawsuit against the FBI, McGovern called for a Senate
investigation of the matter.78 Citing Hoover’s age of seventy-six, his career spanning
over half a decade, and growing controversy surrounding his leadership and allegations
of illegal surveillance, prominent newspaper editors now called upon the Director to
resign.79
President Nixon privately considered firing Hoover during this period as well,
but not because of the Director’s alleged civil rights violations. Nixon remained
frustrated with the powerful bureaucrat’s refusal to follow his orders. On February 3,
1971, Hoover once again blocked the Nixon administration’s attempt to revive a version
of the Huston Plan. In a memo to the Justice Department, he indicated that the FBI
would “not provide personnel” for the Nixon administration’s proposed inter-agency
Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) on internal security headed by White House
Council John Dean and Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian.80 The Director failed
to mention, however, that the FBI had already begun to institute many of the Huston
Jackson, “Kissinger’s Kidnapper,” 98-102. A jury eventually acquitted the defendants of most charges
on April 2, 1972.
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Plans provisions on its own. Hoover’s snub compelled the IEC to move forward without
the FBI’s involvement, a move that prefigured Nixon’s formation of the “Plumbers”
several months later.81 The day after Hoover issued his memo to the Justice
Department, President Nixon, Attorney General Mitchel, and Chief of Staff H.R.
Haldeman held a two-hour meeting to discuss Hoover’s fate as FBI Director. According
to Haldeman, the President “made it clear that Hoover has got to be replaced before the
end of Nixon’s first term.”82
Though he managed to stay in office and safeguard the FBI’s institutional
autonomy, Hoover’s problems continued to mount. Americans’ views on the FBI grew
increasingly polarized, as leftists and liberals decried Hoover’s repression of leftwing
activists, while growing numbers of other Americans demanded stepped-up efforts to
capture leftist guerrillas. At the same time that prominent Democratic lawmakers such
as Edward Kennedy and Hale Boggs called for Hoover’s dismissal, for example, the FBI
endured criticism from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and others who
questioned why leftist bomber fugitives continued to elude the FBI despite the Bureau
receiving “bigger and bigger” appropriations every year.83
Ongoing leftist violence, meanwhile, lent credence to Hoover’s warnings that
revolutionary guerrillas posed a serious danger to public safety and national security.
On March 1, 1971, in their most brazen attack to date, the Weather Underground
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bombed the U.S. Capitol Building, causing $300,000 in damage.84 The bombing followed
Weather’s December 1970 “New Morning, Changing Weather” communiqué, in which
Bernadine Dohrn toned down her violent rhetoric, renounced the organization’s
previous rejection of grassroots movement-building, and pledged that the Weather
Underground would consciously avoid casualties in future bombings carried out to
draw public attention to U.S. injustice.85 The FBI took note of the Weather
Underground’s newly articulated policy, but continued to view the organization as a
dangerous threat.86 Hundreds of FBI agents throughout the country continued their
search for the organization’s fugitives after the Capitol bombing, as Congressional
leaders offered a $100,000 award for information leading to their capture.87
While the Capitol bombing caused great frustration for the FBI, a nonviolent
burglary a week later caused far more damage to the Bureau. Late at night on March 8,
1971, while much of the country watched Joe Frazier’s televised championship boxing
bout with Muhammad Ali, the Citizens’ Committee to Investigate the FBI carried out
their heist of thousands of classified documents from a Resident Agency in Media,
Pennsylvania. The FBI did not know it at the time, but the burglars were a group of
eight local peace activists led by William C. Davidon, a physics professor and member of
the Harrisburg Eight indicted for the Kissinger kidnapping conspiracy. Infuriated by the
Harrisburg indictments, the Citizens’ Committee carried out their burglary in an
attempt to find documentary evidence that the FBI was engaged in covert disruption of
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the U.S. Left. They were successful beyond their greatest expectations. The burglars
uncovered documents demonstrating the FBI’s extensive surveillance of student and
Black activist organizations; their use of local police, postal workers, telephone
operators, and campus security officers in surveillance operations; and their attempts
to instill in activists the paranoid sense that they were being constantly watched by “an
FBI agent behind every mailbox.”88 The group secretly sent the documents to
journalists and members of Congress. Despite FBI and Justice Department orders not to
publish, the Washington Post and New York Times began running articles on the
revelations just over two weeks later.89
According to Mark Felt, Hoover was “enraged” when he learned of the document
heist; another source described the Director as “apoplectic.”90 Hoover immediately
launched an enormous investigation, codenamed MEDBURG, which rivaled the Weather
Underground investigation in size and scope. MEDBURG consumed vast Bureau
resources, as Hoover dispatched over 200 agents to the work on the case in the
Philadelphia area, where they set up around-the-clock physical surveillance of
Philadelphia peace activists, and pored over mountains of evidence, including, among
other things, over a decade’s worth of surveillance photos of antiwar activists. On more
than one occasion, FBI agents broke into the homes of Philadelphia peace activists
whom they suspected of involvement in the Media burglary. Other investigators
followed leads throughout the country, from Los Angeles to North Carolina to Boston.
Still more agents drew massive overtime pay for security duty after Hoover, fearful of
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additional burglaries, closed 103 of the FBI’s remote Resident Agencies and required
agents to maintain twenty-four hour guard at the Bureau’s more than 400 other small
offices.91 The FBI, however, was unable to find the culprits. After mailing off the
documents, members of the Citizen’s Commission to Investigate the FBI parted ways,
agreeing to never speak to one another again out of fear that doing so would aid the
Bureau’s investigation. One member of the group, Judi Feingold, moved to the west
coast and went underground. The rest remained aboveground in the Philadelphia area,
hiding in plain sight.92
The Media burglary prompted an important change in FBI practices. On April 28,
1971, Hoover quietly discontinued all FBI COINTELPROs, though he reserved the
prerogative to carry out similar programs in the future on an “ad-hoc basis.”93 The
public had not yet learned of the FBI’s counterintelligence programs, but Hoover knew
it was only a matter of time before activists and journalists began to inquire about the
“COINTELPRO” code word typed in the heading of a document stolen from Media. By
this point, however, the FBI’s counterintelligence programs were of little use.
COINTELPRO-New Left had never been very effective, and was of even lesser value now
that SDS had disintegrated and mass antiwar protest had significantly declined.
COINTELPRO-BNHG had successfully exploited the Black Panther Party’s internal
divisions and violent tendencies, but by April 1971 the Party was essentially defunct
outside of Oakland.94 Moreover, as FBI officials had acknowledged for the past year,
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counterintelligence was not an effective tactic for fighting clandestine revolutionary
guerrillas.
For the FBI, however, the most damaging outcome of the Media burglary was the
damage it inflicted upon the Bureau’s public image. Immediately following the news
stories on the stolen documents, public criticism of the FBI surged, particularly among
American liberals. Editors of the Washington Post, New York Times, Philadelphia
Inquirer, and other major papers blasted the FBI’s tactics and notion of internal
security.95 The Post called the FBI’s tactics “appropriate, perhaps for the secret police of
the Soviet Union but wholly inconsonant with the idea of a Federal Bureau of
Investigation.”96 Democratic Senators Edmund Muskie of Maine, Gaylord Nelson of
Wisconsin, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and John V. Tunney of California joined
newspaper editors in calls for Congressional investigations of FBI practices.97
William Sullivan and J. Edgar Hoover discussed public criticism of the FBI in an
exchange of letters in April 1971. Sullivan sought to console his boss through a
sycophantic letter. “It would be misleading to say that the attacks made on you, the FBI,
and the rest of us are not damaging,” he conceeded. But Sullivan assured Hoover that
the controversy would pass. “You not only have the support and backing of FBI
employees but of far greater significance the backing of people throughout the country
on a grass-roots level,” he wrote. “Even the critics admit this and point out that your
strength is too great for anyone to replace you.”98 In his reply, Hoover acknowledged
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that the public criticism was great, and that he was taking it personally. It was also clear
that Hoover did not suspect Sullivan’s duplicity:
Dear Bill,
It was indeed most thoughtful for you to write your most encouraging
letter of April 5 commenting on the series of attacks on me and the Bureau. I do
not think it is possible to always completely ignore or be able to not let such
things get under one’s skin, but when one stops to analyze it, the true character
of the sources, which is nothing but a pack of jackals, surfaces. I have always
been able to count on your staunch support, loyalty, and assistance, not only
when things are blackest, but day in and day out, and I did want to thank you and
express my deep appreciation to you. I feel certain that by each of us carrying on
and doing the job to the best of our ability and adhering to the right principles,
our record will speak for itself.
Thank you for writing as you did.
Sincerely,
J.E.H.99
The damage inflicted on the FBI, however, was irreparable. After the Media
burglary revelations, the FBI’s image, along with Hoover’s, entered a downward spiral
from which it would never fully recover. Growing numbers of Americans expressed
their distrust of the Bureau and its leaders, viewing the FBI’s politically-motivated
policing as a far greater threat to their freedom than the violent antics of a handful of
guerrilla revolutionaries. Consequently, FBI agents now pursued leftist guerrillas amid
intense public scrutiny of Bureau investigative tactics.

Conclusion
When journalists and newspaper editors wrote about revelations uncovered in the
Media burglary, they emphasized the negative ramifications of the FBI’s intrusion into
the lives of law-abiding activists. For instance, the New York Times charged the Bureau
with engaging in “political surveillance which far exceed[ed] legitimate efforts to
99
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protect the national interest,” while the Washington Post condemned “the poisonous
effect which [FBI] surveillance … has upon the democratic process and upon the
practice of free speech.100 They had a point. Most of the FBI’s surveillance targeted
individuals who had no involvement in revolutionary violence, and were engaged in
legal, constitutionally protected activities, such as organizing antiwar demonstrations
and black student activist groups. The revelations were particularly shocking given the
fact that U.S. officials had repeatedly denied the existence of such mass surveillance.
The day after the Media burglary, for example, Assistant Attorney General William H.
Rehnquist swore to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that U.S.
intelligence agencies engaged in virtually no surveillance of Americans. A couple weeks
later, when the new FBI revelations made headlines, reporters made a point of
highlighting the falsehood of Rehnquist’s testimony.101
Missing from journalistic accounts, however, was an explanation for why the FBI
engaged in mass surveillance. Some journalists reported on the FBI’s responses to the
information disclosed in the stolen documents. Betty Medsger and Ken Clawson, for
example, noted in the Washington Post that Attorney General Mitchell accused the
burglars of taking the documents out of context, and selectively mailing to Congressmen
and journalists only those that “seem to discredit the FBI.”102 As an example, Mitchell
argued that a memo revealing the FBI’s use of local police, a neighbor, a postmaster,
campus security, and a campus switchboard operator to keep tabs on a Philadelphia
professor agents described as a “hippie” and a “radical” gave the impression that the
“Policies of Paranoia,” New York Times, March 29, 1971; “What is the FBI Up To?,” Washington Post,
March 25, 1971; Medsger, The Burglary, 184-186.
101 Medsger, The Burglary, 141-143, 186.
102 Betty Medsger and Ken Clawson, “Thieves Got Over 1,000 Papers,” Washington Post, March 25, 1971.
100

193

FBI was watching the man solely because of his political views. In reality, Mitchell
claimed, the document was part of a packet on the September 1970 killing of
Massachusetts police officer Walter Schroeder, and the FBI suspected that Ten Most
Wanted guerrilla fugitives Katherine Power and Susan Saxe might attempt to contact
the professor.103 Medsger and Clawson also noted that Mitchell would not comment on
the release of the FBI’s September 1970 memo authorizing employment of campus
informants aged eighteen to twenty-one.104 But this order, as well as Hoover’s
November 1970 directives massively expanding campus surveillance, was undertaken
as part of the FBI’s desperate hunt for leftist guerrillas. In the media and in Congress,
condemnation of FBI misdeeds and shock at the Bureau’s duplicity overshadowed
discussion of leftist guerrillas’ influence upon the Bureau’s tactics.
An understanding of the FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas, however, is
crucial to comprehending the Bureau’s late-1970 expansion of domestic surveillance,
the Media burglary, and ensuing controversy over FBI operations. Under intense
pressure from the Nixon Administration after the collapse of the Huston Plan, the FBI
lifted previous restraints on domestic surveillance in late 1970 in an unsuccessful effort
to thwart leftist guerrilla violence. Hoover’s massive expansion of surveillance on the
student antiwar and Black Power movements, reauthorization of teenaged informants,
and pressuring of field offices to informally partake in mail-covers, mail-opening,
warrantless wiretaps, and break-ins was a direct response to Jonathan Jackson’s bloody
Marin County courthouse attack, the New Years Gang’s deadly University of Wisconsin
bombing, the killing of Officer William Schroeder, and the Weather Underground’s
103
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October 1970 “Fall Offensive.” Hoover’s loathing of leftists undoubtedly influenced the
measures as well, but this alone does not explain the Director’s actions. Hoover would
not have lifted his restrictions on domestic surveillance, and risked the possibility of
public exposure tainting the FBI’s image, if it were not for ongoing leftist guerrilla
attacks and the Bureau’s inability to prevent them.
Ultimately, Hoover’s worst fear materialized. The American public did end up
learning about FBI domestic surveillance, and the Bureau’s image suffered as a result.
This too, however, was partially an outcome of guerrilla violence. In his zealous attempt
to secure funding and support for the FBI’s war on violent revolutionaries, Hoover
made a calamitous miscalculation when he accused the Berrigan brothers and the East
Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives of conspiring to kidnap Kissinger and launch an attack
on Washington D.C.’s municipal infrastructure. In the wake of government efforts to
convict several other prominent radicals, and amid continuous police infiltration and
attacks on activists, American leftists—including those who went on to carry out the
Media burglary—understandably interpreted the Harrisburg Eight indictment as part of
an FBI-led assault on the U.S. Left. When he lodged his false allegations against the
Harrisburg Eight, Hoover inadvertently provoked the Media burglary.
Hoover’s expansion of domestic surveillance did not improve the FBI’s success in
preventing leftist guerrilla violence. Instead, his announcement of the far-fetched
Kissinger kidnap conspiracy backfired against the FBI. In his zeal to combat
revolutionary violence, Hoover badly undermined the public’s trust. A growing number
of Americans now saw the FBI’s politically-motivated policing as a far greater threat to
their freedom than a handful of revolutionary guerrillas. As a consequence, the FBI’s
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pursuit of clandestine revolutionaries became significantly more difficult, and Hoover’s
conflict with Nixon grew even more contentious.
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CHAPTER 5
MOUNTING CRISES: THE BLACK LIBERATION ARMY, THE PENTAGON PAPERS,
AND ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE

Waverly Jones and Joseph Piagentini were walking their beat outside a Harlem public
housing complex when they became the latest casualties in America’s domestic
guerrilla war. On the evening of May 21, 1971, two gunmen ambushed the pair of New
York City police officers from behind, riddling the unsuspecting patrolmen with bullets.
Jones, a thirty-two-year-old African American father of two, died instantly when the
first of nine rounds entered his body. Piagentini was still alive when the assassins fled
on foot, leaving the twenty-eight-year-old Italian American bleeding on the sidewalk,
dying slowly from twelve bullet wounds.1 Two days later, the Black Liberation Army
(BLA) took credit for the attack. In a communiqué issued to the New York Times, the
BLA declared, “Revolutionary justice has been meted out again by righteous brothers of
the Black Liberation Army with the death of two Gestapo pigs gunned down as so many
of our brothers have been gunned down in the past. But this time no racist class jury
will acquite [sic] them.”2
The Jones-Piagentini killings inflamed tension between the FBI and the Nixon
administration amid their ongoing institutional conflict over how to respond to
revolutionary violence. The FBI-White House feud had surfaced a year earlier when J.
Edgar Hoover sabotaged the Huston Plan, the Nixon administration’s effort to combat
“revolutionary terrorism” by consolidating the nation’s intelligence agencies and
1
2
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overriding the Director’s ban on break-ins, mail-opening, warrantless wiretapping, and
other illegal domestic surveillance practices. Hoover and President Nixon shared the
view that the state needed to combat leftist violence with punitive policing and
“preventative” surveillance measures designed to obtain advanced warning of guerrilla
attacks. They fiercely disagreed, however, over what federal office should lead the war
on leftist guerrillas and what tactics should be used to destroy the revolutionary
underground. While Nixon sought to exercise direct White House control over federal
intelligence agencies and bring back illegal surveillance techniques, Hoover opposed
reauthorizing such tactics in order to safeguard the FBI’s institutional autonomy amid
growing public criticism. In May 1971, two months after documents stolen from the FBI
office in Media, Pennsylvania sparked a national controversy over the Bureau’s
domestic surveillance practices, a poll revealed that forty-three percent of Americans
believed Hoover should resign as FBI Director.3 In this political climate, Hoover
remained unwilling to risk approving illegal operations that would undermine the FBI’s
popular legitimacy if ever revealed to the American people. Nixon was reticent to
provide written authorization for illegal surveillance tactics for similar reasons. Seeking
reelection in 1972, the President also wished to avoid authorizing measures that could
result in a scandal. Nixon and Hoover both wanted to expand the state’s “preventative”
surveillance capacities, but neither was willing to take the political risks such efforts
entailed.
During the yearlong period from the emergence of the BLA in May 1971 to
Hoover’s death from a heart attack on May 2, 1972, three important developments
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escalated the FBI’s war on domestic leftist guerrillas and the Director’s conflict with
Nixon. First, the BLA’s lethal attacks on police officers raised alarms in both the White
House and FBI Headquarters, prompting Hoover to initiate a new round of “intensified”
investigations of leftist guerrillas. Under Hoover’s orders, the FBI launched a massive
nationwide investigation into the Jones-Piagentini assassinations codenamed
NEWKILL, for “New York killings.” The FBI’s New York field office established a special
squad of more than eighty agents assigned to NEWKILL and several other cases
involving “terrorist acts” carried out by suspected black “extremists,” and developed
close liaison with the New York Police Department and other local police agencies.4
Secondly, a few weeks after the Jones-Piagentini killings a leak of classified
documents on the U.S war in Vietnam precipitated the worst fallout between the
President and the FBI Director since the Huston Plan. On June 13, 1971, the New York
Times published excerpts of the Pentagon Papers, a collection of secret government
documents that revealed a pattern of federal officials lying to the American people
about the war in Vietnam throughout the administrations of Presidents Harry S.
Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. When Hoover
refused to launch an aggressive investigation of the Pentagon Papers leak and the
government’s prime suspect, Daniel Ellsberg, a forty-year-old former RAND policy
analyst and Defense Department aide who had turned against the U.S. war effort, Nixon
and his staff formed their own covert intelligence unit. Nixon charged his new secret
Special Investigations Unit, better known as the “Plumbers,” with stopping leaks of
FBI NITEL, Director to New York, May 25, 1971, and FBI airtel, Director to SAC Newark, August 12,
1971, Dhoruba Moore FBI File (hereafter Moore FBI File), FBI Investigation and Surveillance Records
Series 90, Kenneth O’Reilly Research Materials, Box 19, Folder 4, Special Collections and University
Archives, Raynor Memorial Libraries, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

4

199

declassified state secrets that he viewed as a threat to his political power and war
efforts in Southeast Asia.
Heightened fear of leftist guerrilla violence, coupled with increased tensions
between Hoover and Nixon, led to the third development. After the Pentagon Papers
leak, both Nixon’s Plumbers and the FBI engaged in break-ins and other illegal
surveillance techniques recommended in the Huston Plan. On September 3, 1971, the
Plumbers broke in to the Los Angeles office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J.
Fielding, in hopes of finding information they could use to discredit or convict the
Pentagon Papers whistleblower. Meanwhile, the FBI continued targeting suspected
supporters of the Weather Underground with break-ins, mail-opening, and warrantless
electronic wiretapping. Local FBI field offices had informally revived such illegal
surveillance techniques after August 1970, when Hoover ordered “intensified” guerrilla
investigations following the Marin County courthouse attack and the University of
Wisconsin bombing. Nixon’s formation of the Plumbers and Hoover’s continued wink
and nod authorization of FBI break-ins set the stage for the scandals that would later
upend the presidency and the Bureau.
Mounting surveillance crises within the Nixon administration and the FBI sprung
from officials’ unwillingness to address the root causes of violent social conflict. As
longstanding anticommunist conservatives, Nixon and Hoover both opposed left-liberal
convictions—such as those promoted in the 1968 Kerner Report—that the best way to
reduce violent civil disorder was through ceasing overseas military intervention and
launching ambitious state initiatives to eliminate poverty and racial inequality. Instead,
the President and FBI Director debated illegal “preventative” surveillance tactics: When
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were such tactics appropriate? Who should conduct them? Under whose authority?
After the Pentagon Papers leak, Nixon sought to covertly undermine all of his perceived
political opponents, whether antiwar activists, government whistleblowers, or his
Democratic Party rivals. Hoover encouraged his agents to utilize illegal surveillance
techniques with the more limited objective of preempting guerrilla violence, though he
did so informally so as to avoid liability for his agents’ unlawful actions.
However, the FBI’s “preventative” surveillance efforts did not preempt guerrilla
attacks or help investigators locate clandestine revolutionary fugitives. Instead, BLA
and Weather Underground members redoubled their commitment to urban guerrilla
warfare in the face of police violence against African Americans and what they viewed
as a government conspiracy to destroy the Black Power movement. For example, the
August 21, 1971 killing of Black revolutionary prisoner George Jackson by guards in
California’s San Quentin Prison and the slaughter of twenty-nine striking prisoners in
Attica State Penitentiary three weeks later motivated both groups to launch retaliatory
guerrilla attacks. By condoning and even applauding such instances of state violence,
President Nixon and the FBI remained partially responsible for BLA and Weather
Underground violence. Deadly BLA attacks continued over the course of 1971 and early
1972, though the police managed to capture members of the group on the scenes of
police ambushes, robberies, and other high-risk actions. The Weather Underground,
meanwhile, remained at large after carrying out four bombings during the fall of 1971.
Instead of preventing guerrilla violence, illegal surveillance tactics generated
simmering crises within both the Nixon White House and Hoover’s FBI. The Nixon
administration’s turn to break-ins after Hoover refused to aggressively investigate the
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Pentagon Papers leak is well documented. Historians have widely acknowledged that
the the formation of the Plumbers “synthesized the concern of the White House for
controlling and disciplining the bureaucracy, as well as its willingness to utilize illegal
methods and abuses of power for doing so.”5 Until now, however, scholars have not
sufficiently analyzed the FBI’s informal resumption of illegal surveillance tactics or how
this development influenced the Bureau. As the public turned against the FBI in late
1971 and early 1972, agents’ morale plummeted. Investigators in leftist guerrilla
squads sought to prevent clandestine revolutionary violence with illegal surveillance
techniques. They did so anxiously, however, worried about the future of their careers,
and unsure if Hoover would support them if they ever got caught breaking the law in
the name of national security. Guerrilla violence and illegal surveillance tactics
established the conditions for the fully-fledged crisis of legitimacy that would envelop
the FBI after Hoover’s death.

Police Killings and Institutional Conflict
A year after Hoover sabotaged the Huston Plan, the Jones-Piagentini killings renewed
tensions between Nixon’s White House and the FBI over the problem of leftist guerrilla
violence. President Nixon convened a private meeting on the killings on May 26, 1971,
the same day that thousands of uniformed police and supporters gathered in New York
for the slain officers’ funerals. The President met in Washington’s Executive Office
Building with J. Edgar Hoover, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Chief Domestic
Advisor John D. Ehrlichman, and Ehrlichman’s deputy, Egil “Bud” Krogh Jr. Nixon
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commenced the meeting by emphasizing his desire for a strong federal response to the
police murders. “Goddamn it,” he declared, “we’ve got to do something… other than just
talk about these police killings.”6
Jones and Piagentini were not the first police victims of a guerrilla ambush. The
Black Liberation Army carried out its first publicized attack two days before the JonesPiagentini slaying when members of the group unloaded a .45 caliber machine gun into
a squad car occupied by New York police officers Thomas Curry and Nicholas Binetti.7
The ambush occurred as the officers stood guard outside the apartment of District
Attorney Frank S. Hogan, head prosecutor of the Panther 21, whose home the Weather
Underground had firebombed a year earlier. Though critically wounded, both
patrolmen survived the attack. A BLA communiqué took credit, announcing, “The armed
goons of this racist government will again meet the guns of oppressed Third World
peoples as long as they occupy our community and murder our brothers and sisters in
the name of American law and order. Just as the fascist marines and army [who] occupy
Vietnam in the name of democracy and murder Vietnamese people in the name of
American imperialism are confronted with the guns of the Vietnamese Liberation Army,
the domestic armed forces of racism and oppression will be confronted with the guns of

Nixon White House Tapes, conversation 253-23, May 26, 1971, 4:11-5:20pm, Executive Office Building.
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7 The BLA carried out four earlier, unclaimed attacks in California: an October 1970 bombing of a slain
police officer’s funeral, two January 1971 police shootings, and an attempted bombing in March 1971.
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the Black Liberation Army”8 The BLA’s two police ambushes occurred amid a growing
number of assaults on New York police officers. Twenty-eight other New York
policemen had been wounded in the line of duty since the start of 1971, a significant
increase in the rate of forty-five wounded the entire previous year. Five officers had
died. Edward J. Kiernan, president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Society, summed up
the feelings of many New York police officers following the Jones-Piagentini killings
when he declared, “We’re in a war… It’s open season on cops in this city.”9
Nixon convened his May 26 Executive Office Building meeting to press his
administration, the Justice Department, and the FBI to tackle the problem of police
assassinations. In a memo typed immediately after the meeting, Hoover informed the
FBI’s top seven domestic security officials that the President was “very concerned about
police officers killed, particularly the two in New York and in other parts of the country
and we are developing a kind of program to focus attention on that.”10 The FBI had been
tracking the Black Panther Party’s violent rhetoric and advocacy of guerrilla warfare for
nearly three years, but neither the Bureau nor anyone else outside of the militant left
had heard of the Black Liberation Army prior to the recent New York police ambushes.
After the attacks, Hoover ordered the FBI’s New York field office to determine if the
perpetrators were Black radicals, and to “maintain close liaison” with the New York City
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Police Department.11 Specifically, the Director instructed New York field agents “to
determine complete intelligence data and to identify black extremist influence or
participation” in the assaults by reviewing “appropriate files of black extremist
organizations, including those of so-called Third World groups.” He also asked agents to
consider the possibility that the attacks were acts of “revenge taken against NYC police
by the Black Panther Party” for the arrest of the Panther 21 in April 1969.12 Despite
Hoover’s quick response, the President stressed his concern about the FBI’s
investigation of the police killings in two follow-up phone calls to the Director after the
May 26 meeting, the first less than two hours later, and the second on May 28.13
In general philosophical terms, Nixon and Hoover agreed on how the state
should respond to leftist guerrillas. They shared the belief that the best way to combat
revolutionary violence was not by addressing the sources of radicalism through policy
initiatives aimed at reducing socio-economic inequality and state violence, but through
punitive policing. During their May 26 phone conversation, the pair mocked liberals
whom they speculated would attribute the BLA’s police ambushes to environmental
conditions. Nixon made no efforts to conceal his resentment when he sarcastically
quipped, “the New York Times will probably write an article saying the man who shot
[New York police officer Waverly Jones] was raised in a bad neighborhood.” “It’ll be
poverty, yes,” Hoover bitterly replied, “the slums of New York, and housing, and all that

FBI NITEL, Director to New York, May 25, 1971, Moore FBI File.
Ibid.
13 Nixon White House Tapes, Conversation 003-145, May 26, 1971, and Conversation 003-196a, May 28,
1971.
11
12

205

sort of thing.” “But that’s not the reason,” Nixon said, “These people are bad people.”
Hoover concurred.14
The president and the FBI Director disagreed, however, over tactics. Indeed,
despite affirming their shared conservative law-and-order ideologies, Nixon and
Hoover’s telephone conversations after the Jones-Piagentini killings revealed the limits
of the President’s ability to influence the FBI’s surveillance operations. In their May 26
telephone conversation, Nixon seemed to convey his desire for the FBI to engage in
illegal surveillance practices that the White House had sought to revive through the
Huston Plan. Referring to the Jones-Piagentini killings, Nixon stressed “since the people
have not been apprehended, the national security information we seek is unlimited …
And you tell the Attorney General that’s what I suggested—well ordered—and you do it,
okay?”15 Hoover agreed. “We’ll go all out on the intelligence on this thing,” he
affirmed.16
Given that Nixon had pressed Hoover to reinstate illegal surveillance practices at
least twice during the previous year—in his June 1970 attempt to institute the Huston
Plan and after the deadly guerrilla attacks of August 1970—Hoover surely must have
understood Nixon’s request for “unlimited” intelligence as yet another such order.
Nixon, however, was also well aware of Hoover’s reticence to utilize illegal surveillance
tactics without written authorization from the President or Attorney General. Nixon
implicitly acknowledged this in his May 28 telephone conversation with Hoover.
Speaking again in vague euphemisms, the President questioned the Director about
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possibilities for authorizing restricted surveillance practices. Nixon asked Hoover if he
would be willing to order the FBI to “go in with everything you’ve got, in other words
surveillance, electronic and everything” in cases involving “attacks on law enforcement
officials” when “there is evidence or suspicion” that the perpetrators were “Panthers” or
other ideologically motivated assailants.17
Hoover’s answer demonstrated his upper hand in the FBI’s institutional conflict
with the White House. The Director confidently informed the President of what the FBI
was already doing to investigate the New York police killings and prevent similar
attacks in the future. He described the FBI’s New York field office’s formation of a
special squad assigned to the case, the Bureau’s cautions to avoid a jurisdictional
dispute with the NYPD, and his plans to meet with police chiefs from around the
country during the following week in order to announce the creation of new FBI
training programs to help local police departments investigate police killings. Hoover
assured Nixon that the FBI had the investigation under control, and that he would
inform the President if he needed further assistance from the White House. He also
promised to prepare a memo that Attorney John Mitchell could use to explain the FBI’s
handling of the case to the press.18 Hoover avoided Nixon’s vague requests for the
reinstatement of illegal surveillance tactics while neglecting to mention that the FBI was
already using such techniques on an unofficial basis. As was the case when Nixon tried

Nixon started the call by validated Hoover’s reluctance to involve the FBI in most police murder
investigations, affirming his opposition to a bill Senator Richard Schweiker (R, PA) proposed after the
New York police ambushes that would have mandated FBI involvement in all police killings. Hoover
agreed that the FBI should not participate in this form of what he called “national policing,” noting that in
over ninety-six percent of police murder cases, local law enforcement agencies successfully apprehended
suspects within thirty days. Nixon White House Tapes, Conversation 003-196b, May 28, 1971.
18 Ibid.
17

207

to instate the Huston Plan, the Director maintained firm control over the FBI and its
leftist guerrilla investigations.

The BLA and the FBI
Though members of the Black Panther Party had begun to form an underground
infrastructure and prepare for urban guerrilla warfare as early as 1968, the BLA did not
begin to carry out publicized armed actions until early 1971.19 During this period,
approximately fifty Panthers loyal to Eldridge Cleaver formed BLA cells in several cities
after Huey Newton expelled Cleaver and the Panther 21 from the Party.20 Amid the
BPP’s implosion, and ongoing police attacks on the group, New York’s Cleaver-aligned
Panthers determined that the time for urban guerrilla war had come. In an April 1971
interview with a leftist reporter, exiled Panther Kathleen Cleaver conveyed the Cleaverfaction’s perspective: “What is necessary now is a party to advance and expedite the
armed struggle… There’s a revolutionary war going on. The people are ready for a real
vanguard, for military action… We need a people’s army and the Black Panther party
vanguard will bring that about.”21 There was little evidence, however, that “the people”
of America were prepared for a mass revolutionary uprising. Fortunately for Hoover,
the BLA’s involvement in high-risk actions enabled police to capture its members
relatively quickly, though the guerrillas managed to inflict several more casualties along
the way.
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While Weather Underground’s preferred activity remained planting bombs in
empty buildings, New York City BLA members carried out a series armed robberies (or
as they called them, “expropriations”) of banks and alleged drug dealers in order to
fund their underground infrastructure.22 The BLA viewed their attacks on drug dealers
not only as a fundraising effort, but as part of a strategy to fight back against a recent
flood of heroin into black communities, which they viewed as part of a government
conspiracy to undermine African Americans’ potential for collective resistance to
racism and oppressive living conditions.23 Racially biased police neglect seemed to
confirm the BLA’s theory. Former BLA member Jamal Joseph later recalled observing a
Harlem drug den “where fifty, maybe a hundred, junkies flitted about buying drugs and
running into the shooting galleries in full view of the community, with cops avoiding the
area or ignoring it as they rode by in squad cars.”24 As far as Joseph and other Panthers
who joined the BLA were concerned, the drug epidemic had been “brought on” with the
“assistance and encouragement” of the same government forces that had indicted the
Chicago 8, the Panther 21, and various other leftists; waged imperialist war in Vietnam;
and killed Fred Hampton and countless African American activists and community
members.25
Ironically, BLA members justified their actions along similar lines as those Hoover
and Nixon used to rationalize punitive policing: aggressive tactics, they reasoned, were
necessary to fight a ruthlessly violent enemy. The emergence of the BLA marked the
“Spring Came Early This Year (A Message to the Third World from the Black Liberation Army),”
undated BLA paper, ca. January 1972, in The Black Liberation Party and the Program of Armed Struggle,
1970-1983 (hereafter BLA FBI File), Section 1.3, Gale Cengage Learning Archives Unbound digital
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realization of a guerrilla foco strategy that Cleaver and other Panthers had been
promoting for the past three years. The turn to guerrilla warfare also reflected the
Cleaver-faction Panthers’ conspiratorial view of state violence and the drug scourge,
which saw armed struggle as the only way to maintain revolutionary resistance in a
time of escalating repression. The main motivation uniting the group, however, was a
visceral determination to retaliate for police violence against black activists and
communities. As former BLA member Assata Shakur later recalled, “I understood some
of my more impatient sisters and brothers. I knew that it was tempting to substitute
military for political struggle, especially since all of our aboveground organizations
were under vicious attack by the FBI, the CIA, and the local police agencies. All of us
who saw our leaders murdered, our people shot down in cold blood, felt a need, a desire
to fight back.”26 Accordingly, the BLA adopted “revolutionary executions” of police
officers as their second major tactic.27 Just as leftist guerrilla violence provoked heavyhanded responses from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, police violence
radicalized the Black revolutionary underground.
Unlike the rigidly hierarchical Weather Underground, the BLA was organized in
autonomous cells whose members decided on their own what actions to carry out. This
structure was a result of Cleaver’s belief that independent cells of six to twelve
guerrillas could evade police surveillance more successfully than a centralized
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organization that could be neutralized through the arrest of its leader.28 Cleaver’s
decision also sprung from his personal desire to publicly distance himself from guerrilla
activity amid his deteriorating relationship with the Algerian government, whose
officials had forbid him using their country as a base to organize acts of violence abroad.
Moreover, as the Algerian government sought to improve its relations with the United
States in hopes of increasing oil exports, Cleaver worried that his hosts would close the
Panther embassy.29
The BLA’s involvement in high-risk guerrilla actions reflected its members’ social
positions as working-class African Americans as well as the group’s ad-hoc strategy.
Unlike the white and largely middle-class Weather Underground (with some members
from very wealthy families), the BLA did not have access to inherited money. They were
constantly short on funds. Nor could the BLA’s members easily get away with
shoplifting and check-fraud—as did their white Weather Underground counterparts—
in a society that tended to view all blacks as potential criminals. The Weather
Underground’s preferred tactic of planting homemade bombs equipped with timing
devices in government buildings and corporate offices was also largely off-limits to the
BLA, whose black members had few hopes of entering such establishments without
being subjected to racial profiling.
Instead of sparking a guerrilla uprising, the BLA’s police ambushes provoked
new police mobilization. Nixon held a White House meeting with police officials on the
Jones-Piagentini killings on June 3, 1971, and four days later, the FBI hosted a
conference on the matter “attended by one hundred top law enforcement officials from
28
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Burrough, Days of Rage, 193-194.
Ibid.

211

throughout the country.”30 With BLA members in hiding, the FBI and other police
agencies directed much of their investigation at the dwindling aboveground Black
Panther Party. The BLA’s limited aboveground support dried up as a result. The FBI and
NYPD maintained intensive surveillance of Harlem’s small Cleaver-aligned Black
Panther office, where members distributed Right On!, a newspaper published with the
assistance of white Weather Underground supporters that promoted violent attacks on
police officers.31 The FBI also monitored office staffers’ international phone calls with
Cleaver’s Panther Embassy in Algeria. In an FBI-monitored call to Algiers after the May
attacks, Panther Lumumba Shakur, who was also a secret BLA member, lamented that
police harassment was scaring away the New York BPP chapter’s remaining members.
“They all running and hiding in fear,” he complained.32
As was the case in most of their leads in the BLA investigation, New York police
made their first break by chance, on June 5, after officers in the Bronx responded to the
sound of gunfire inside the Triple O nightclub. Inside the after-hours establishment,
police arrested BLA guerrillas and former Panther 21 defendants Moore and Joseph,
who had been holding-up patrons at gunpoint along with two accomplices.33 Police
soon identified a .45 caliber machine-gun seized during the Triple O arrests as the one
used to ambush officers Curry and Binetti. In July, New York officials indicted Moore
and Joseph with a slew of charges related to skipping bond in the Panther 21 case, the

“Proposed Release by the White House,” attachment to FBI memo, E. S. Miller to A. Rosen, November
23, 1971, in FBI NEWKILL documents, downloaded from the website of currently incarcerated former
BLA member Jalil Muntaqim (formerly Anthony Bottom):
http://www.freejalil.com/newkilldocuments.html (hereafter FBI NEWKILL documents).
31 Burrough, Days of Rage, 197; Bloom and Martin, Black Against Empire, 369.
32 Shakur quoted in Burrough, Days of Rage, 196.
33 Burrough, Days of Rage, 197-198; Joseph, Panther Baby, 210-212.
30

212

Triple O hold-up, the Curry-Binnetti ambush, and the March 1971 murder of Newtonfaction Black Panther Sam Napier.34
The FBI’s leads in the NEWKILL investigation temporarily relieved tensions
between Hoover and the Nixon’s White House. Nixon and Hoover had discussed the
FBI’s investigation of the New York police killings in a telephone conversation four days
prior to Moore’s arrest. Hoover informed the president that the FBI laboratory had
identified fingerprints from the BLA communiqués sent to the New York Times
following the Curry-Binetti and Jones-Piagentini police ambushes. “Good!” Nixon
exclaimed in approval of the FBI’s apparent lead in its high-profile investigation.35 One
set of fingerprints, it later turned out, belonged to Moore. It appeared as though the FBI
was making satisfactory progress in its BLA investigation, a perception echoed in the
press, and seemingly corroborated by the fact that the BLA had not carried out further
known attacks on police since the Jones-Piagentini killings. Hoover and Nixon’s
relationship, however, was about to take another turn for the worse.

Bureaucratic Conflict and Nixon’s Break-In
Though the FBI’s leads in the BLA investigation temporarily averted an escalation in
Hoover’s institutional conflict with the White House, the New York Times’ publication of
excerpts from the Pentagon Papers—eight days after police arrested Dhoruba Moore
and Jamal Jacob—renewed the Nixon-Hoover feud with a vengeance. In a July 1, 1971
telephone conversation, Hoover advised Nixon not to make a public statement about
the previous day’s Supreme Court’s ruling, which permitted the New York Times and
34
35
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Washington Post to continue publishing excerpts of the Pentagon Papers.36 Hoover also
cautioned against an aggressive investigation of Daniel Ellsberg. “We oughta be awful
careful about what we do in the case of this man Ellsberg,” Hoover said. The press
would “make a martyr” out of Ellsberg, the Director warned, if it seemed that the
government was persecuting the whistleblower. Always sensitive to public perceptions,
Hoover knew that such a scenario would undermine the credibility of both the FBI and
the Nixon administration. “I doubt whether we’re going to be able to get a conviction of
him,” Hoover asserted, referring to the Justice Department’s indictment of Ellsberg
under the Espionage Act of 1917. “I hope so, but I doubt it.”37
Nixon was not satisfied with Hoover’s statements on Ellsberg. “Well I’d like to
check some of the other people around him. I think there’s a conspiracy involved,” he
said.38
Hoover dodged Nixon’s comment. The Director launched into a rant complaining
about journalists at the Times and Post before returning the conversation to the
President’s press strategy.39 As he had done a month earlier in response to Nixon’s
suggestion that the FBI utilize illegal surveillance techniques in its BLA investigation,
Hoover resisted Nixon’s efforts to influence the FBI’s investigation of the Pentagon
Papers.
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37 Ibid.
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Nixon flew into a rage after the call, interpreting Hoover’s evasiveness as a
refusal to investigate the Pentagon Papers leak beyond Ellsberg. Nixon complained to
Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman the next day: “I talked to Hoover last night and Hoover is
not going after this case as strong as I would like. There’s something dragging him.”40
Again, Nixon brought up his suspicion of a conspiracy. “I want to go after everyone. I’m
not so interested in Ellsberg,” Nixon said, “but we have to go after everybody who’s a
member of this conspiracy.”41 To make matters worse, Nixon had learned from William
Sullivan that Hoover did not want his agents to interview Ellsberg’s father-in-law Louis
Marx, a wealthy toy manufacturer who contributed annually to a Christmas charity run
by the Director.42
The Pentagon Papers leak sent Nixon’s paranoia through the roof. Though the
Papers dealt only with the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and previous presidents,
Nixon and some of this staff—particularly National Security advisor Henry Kissinger—
believed the leaks undermined the federal government’s authority and threatened their
administration’s efforts to achieve a military victory in Vietnam.43 Daniel Ellsberg’s
explanation for why he decided to leak the Pentagon Papers stoked Nixon and
Kissinger’s fears. In a secretly recorded television interview with news anchor Walter
Cronkite aired on June 23, Ellsberg announced that he had chosen to leak the Papers
after learning from colleagues close to the White House that Nixon planned to escalate
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U.S. aerial bombing of North Vietnam, just as Johnson had done in 1964 and 1965 with
disastrous consequences.44
Nixon began discussing covert operations in response to the Pentagon Papers
leak even before speaking with Hoover. Not long before his phone conversation with
the Director on July 1, Nixon spoke with Haldeman about his belief that the Brooking
Institution, a liberal Washington think tank, might have files linking Ellsberg to a wider
conspiracy to leak classified state secrets.45 “We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy…
We’re going to use any means!” he exclaimed. The President knocked on his desk with
each word for emphasis. “I want the Brookings Institute safe cleaned out!”46
Ultimately, Nixon formed the Plumbers because of Hoover’s unwillingness to
aggressively investigate the Pentagon Papers case. As Nixon recalled in his memoir, “If
the FBI was not going to pursue the case, then we would have to do it ourselves.”47 The
President put Ehrlichman in charge of establishing the unit. On July 17, 1971,
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Ehrlichman assigned Krogh and Kissinger’s former National Security Council staffer
David Young to take direct charge. Lacking intelligence training, Krogh and Young hired
former CIA investigator E. Howard Hunt and FBI veteran G. Gordon Libby to assist
them.48 In late August, Ehrlichman approved the unit’s plans to break into Ellsberg’s
psychiatrist’s office on one stipulation: “that it is not traceable.”49 Hunt and Libby
traveled to Los Angeles and carried out the break-in on September 3, 1971 with the
assistance of anti-Castro Cuban operatives Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, and
Felipe DeDiego.50 Inside Dr. Fielding’s office, the Plumbers used a crow bar to open a
locked metal filing cabinet, leaving it visibly dented.51 In their search for information
that could damage or discredit Ellsberg, however, the operatives came up emptyhanded.52
While Nixon’s staff formed the Plumbers, conflict over the Pentagon Papers
prompted Hoover to reshuffle the FBI hierarchy. On July 1, 1971, the same day that
Hoover spoke with Nixon about the Pentagon Papers investigation, the Director
promoted W. Mark Felt to the newly created position of Deputy Associate Director,
making him the Bureau’s new number three official beneath aging Associate Director
Clyde Tolson. According to Felt, Hoover informed him that a key requirement of his new
job was to “control Sullivan,” who had undergone a de facto demotion as a result of the
former Inspector’s new appointment.53
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Hoover had begun to question Sullivan’s loyalty in October 1970, when the
Associate Director publicly emphasized guerrilla violence as a greater threat to
America’s domestic security than Communist subversion. After the FBI’s capture of
Angela Davis, Sullivan stated at a press conference that the United States would be
dealing with revolutionary violence from radical students and Black militants “to a
greater or lesser extent if the Communist Party in this country didn’t exist at all.”54
Hoover sternly rebuked Sullivan in a handwritten note, emphasizing “We must be most
careful not to downgrade the activities of the C.P.,” which the Director inaccurately
described as “a real continuing factor to our unrest.”55 Since the Pentagon Papers leak,
Hoover had learned that Sullivan and Brennan were undermining his authority, telling
Nixon officials that their boss was stalling the Ellsberg investigation. Hoover also
suspected Sullivan of leaking information that Washington Post journalists Robert
Novak and Roland Evans used to publish a series of articles asserting that in his old age,
the Director was no longer fit to run the FBI.56 More than two years after Sullivan and
Brennan first went behind his back to collaborate with Tom Huston, the Director had
finally come to believe that his top Domestic Security officials were disloyal.
In early September 1971, Hoover demoted Brennan.57 At Felt’s suggestion, the
Director promoted Edward Miller—a seasoned operative who had participated in black
bag jobs against alleged Communists in the 1950s and worked as a bureaucrat under
UPI newswire, October 1970, attached to FBI memo, Sullivan to Tolson, October 13, 1970, WCS FBI,
Section 7.
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Felt in the Inspection division—to fill the role of Assistant Director of Domestic
Security.58 On September 30, Hoover fired Sullivan, who had given copies of the FBI’s
top secret 1969 “Kissinger Wiretaps” to Assistant Attorney General and Watergate
conspirator Robert Mardian, in hopes of using the tapes to blackmail the FBI Director.59
When Felt confronted Sullivan over the matter, the pair nearly got into a fistfight.60
While Hoover fired disloyal FBI officials, Nixon attempted to fire Hoover.
Sullivan instigated the President, possibly in a last ditch effort to win a position as
Hoover’s successor. According to Nixon, Sullivan told him that Hoover “was trapped in
outdated notions of the communist threat and was not moving with flexibility against
the new violence-prone radicals.”61 On September 20, 1971, Nixon invited Hoover to a
private breakfast in which he almost asked the Director for his resignation. The
President tried “as gently and subtly” as he could to convince Hoover to resign on his
own accord. Nixon later recalled telling Hoover “it would be a tragedy if he ended his
career while under a sustained attack from his long-time critics instead of in the glow of
national respect that he so rightly deserved.”62 But the President backed down after
Hoover pulled a classic bureaucratic power maneuver, informing his superior that he
would resign only under direct orders. “More than anything else, I want to see you reelected in 1972,” Hoover replied. “If you feel that my staying on as head of the Bureau
hurts your chances for re-election, just let me know.”63 Afraid of alienating the
Director’s large base of conservative supporters ahead of the 1972 election, Nixon
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ultimately decided that firing Hoover “would raise more political problems than it
would solve.”64 Just as he had maintained control over the FBI in the aftermath of
Huston Plan, the New York police shootings, and the Pentagon Papers leak, Hoover once
again blocked Nixon’s effort to control the FBI.

Leftist Guerrillas and Hoover’s Break-Ins
Nixon’s conflict with Hoover heated up as the Bureau made modest progress in the BLA
investigation but remaining stymied in its hunt for Weather Underground fugitives. The
FBI’s relative success in its BLA investigation had little to do with its preventative
intelligence efforts. Indeed, the FBI had been steadily increasing its surveillance of Black
Power activists since 1967, but did not learn of the Black Liberation Army’s existence
until the group took credit for the May 1971 New York police ambushes. BLA and
Weather Underground attacks continued during the fall of 1971 following two major
incidents of state violence: the August 21, 1971 killing of black revolutionary prisoner
George Jackson and the massacre of forty-two prisoners and guards in New York’s
Attica prison three weeks later. The FBI remained unable to infiltrate the BLA’s
clandestine revolutionary underground or obtain advanced warning of guerrilla attacks.
However, with millions of dollars in resources and man-hours poured into anti-guerrilla
investigations, FBI agents did manage to identify BLA suspects and to distribute
photographs and other information to police agencies around the country. Accordingly,
the FBI, NYPD, and other police agencies were well prepared to capture or kill BLA

64

Ibid, 599.

220

members when the guerrillas made tactical mistakes—including botched robberies and
assassination attempts—that attracted the attention of local police.
The FBI’s differing fortunes in its respective leftist guerrilla investigations were
largely a result of the two organizations’ disparate structures and tactical repertoires.
While the BLA’s involvement in deadly shooting attacks, robberies, and other higherrisk actions exposed its members to police capture, the Weather Underground’s
sophisticated clandestine infrastructure and engagement in periodic nighttime
bombings enabled its members to maintain evasion of the FBI’s surveillance network.
Between the New York police ambushes of May 1971 and Hoover’s death on May 2,
1972, the FBI and other police agencies captured sixteen BLA members and killed four
during shoot-outs that occurred in the midst of police efforts to conduct arrests. Along
the way, the BLA killed two more cops and a taxi driver, and seriously wounded two
other police officers. The FBI’s break-ins, however, did not result in the capture of
Weather Underground guerrillas or the prevention of bombings. The Weather
Underground pulled off four bombings during the fall of 1971. The main reason they did
not carry out more was because internal differences were tearing the group apart from
the inside, as members continued to grapple with an existential crisis amid their failure
to revive a declining U.S. left. The FBI faced a mounting internal crisis as well, as
Headquarters continued pressuring field agents to carry out break-ins without the
Director’s formal approval.
A pair of botched BLA guerrilla actions in August 1971 resulted in a second
round of breakthroughs in the FBI’s investigation of the group. On August 4, police
surrounded a taxi that BLA guerrillas had commandeered after holding up Thelma’s
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Lounge in Harlem. Teenaged BLA member Twymon Meyers temporarily held off the
police with machine gun fire and managed to escape back to a BLA safe house, but the
clash resulted in the arrest of his three accomplices and the death of the taxi driver.65 In
the second incident, on August 27, San Francisco police officer George Kowalski led the
arrest of nineteen-year-old Anthony Bottom and thirty-year-old Albert “Nuh”
Washington after the pair attempted to assassinate him with a machine gun. At the
police station, Bottom bragged to a cellmate—who was working secretly as a police
informant—that he and other Bay Area Panthers were responsible for a string of
unclaimed local bombings and other attacks over the previous year, including an
ambush on a police station in San Francisco’s Ingleside neighborhood two days after
Bottom and Washington’s arrest that resulted in the death of Sergeant John Young
(Bottom had cased the station five days earlier while filing a phony stolen bicycle
report). Bottom also indicated that he had participated in the killing of New York police
officers Jones and Piagentini. Police officers’ discovery of Waverly Jones’s service
revolver in Bottom and Washington’s car seemed to verify this claim.66 Bottom’s loose
talk provided police with information that enabled them to identify other suspects in
the Jones-Pagentini case, including Herman Bell, who had gone into hiding in New
Orleans.67
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As always, the leftist guerrillas had carried out their attacks in response to state
violence. Police arrested Bottom and Washington six days after guards in San Quentin
Prison shot and killed black revolutionary icon George Jackson, theorist of urban
guerrilla warfare and older brother of the deceased Jonathan Jackson. Guards shot
Jackson in the middle of the prison yard, after he and other convicts used a handgun to
stage a rebellion in which they took five other correctional officers hostage—the latest
episode in a two-year cycle of deadly violence between guards and revolutionary
prisoners in California’s prison system. San Quentin officials later claimed that Jackson’s
attorney Steven Bingham had smuggled the gun into the prison during a visit, and that
Jackson had hid it under a wig covering his Afro.68 With the assassinations of Medgar
Evers, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., and Fred Hampton fresh in their memories,
however, many questioned the official San Quentin story. For many on the left, Jackson’s
death was the latest example of a state conspiracy to violently repress dissent in
America. Literary icon James Baldwin expressed such sentiment when he quipped, “no
black person will ever believe George Jackson died the way they say he did.”69 Over two
thousand supporters gathered for Jackson’s funeral on August 28, 1971, spilling onto
the sidewalk outside the overcrowded St. Augustine’s episcopal Church in Oakland,
where Huey Newton and other Black Power leaders gave eulogies.70
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Leftist guerrillas swiftly retaliated for the state’s killing of a revolutionary leader.
A few hours before Jackson’s funeral, a pair of Weather Underground bombs exploded
in Sacramento and San Francisco, each damaging buildings housing offices of the
California Department of Corrections. In a communiqué issued to the San Francisco
Examiner, the Weather Underground explained their attack as retaliation for Jackson’s
“assassination.”71 Once again, the Weather Underground articulated a conspiratorial
analysis of American state violence, one that generalized state actors and their motives,
conceiving every act of violence inflicted upon a leftist as part of a conscious plan to
crush dissent. According to the Weather Underground, Jackson’s death was part of a
broader “pattern” in America’s “attempts to control colonial peoples” through the
“periodic assassination of major leaders” such as Patrice Lumumba—the socialist
Congolese President killed by domestic rivals in 1961 with CIA backing, and Malcolm X,
whom NOI gunmen murdered in 1965.72 The Weather Underground downplayed
Jackson’s violent role in the conflict at San Quentin, asserting that his “execution
represents a major attempt at mass propaganda—to convince the youth who are now
entering the Folsoms and the Quentins that rebellion is hopeless, that those who inspire
and lead will pay the price of death.”73 The BLA promoted a similar view. In a
communiqué taking credit for the August 29 Ingleside police station attack, the BLA’s
“George L. Jackson Assault Squad” announced that it had killed Sergeant Young to
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avenge the “intolerable political assassination of Comrade George Jackson, in particular,
and the inhumane torture of P.O.W. (Prisoner of War) Camps in general.”74
George Jackson’s killing unleashed another round of bloodshed: more political
rebellion, another major incident of state violence against prisoners, and further leftist
guerrilla retaliation. On September 9, in New York’s Attica State Prison, a silent protest
mourning Jackson’s death escalated into a full-blown four-day uprising as prisoners—
black, Puerto Rican, and white—overtook the institution’s D yard. Holding forty-two
guards hostage, Attica’s prisoners igniting a 24-hour television news drama viewed
throughout the world as they issued a list of demands for basic reforms in the
institution’s policies. “We are men, we are not beasts, and we do not intend to be beaten
or driven as such,” the prisoners declared, explaining their rebellion as a response to
the “unmitigated oppression wrought by the racist administration network of this
prison.” Governor Nelson Rockefeller, however, refused to negotiate. Instead, he called
in the New York State Police, who stormed the prison in hail of teargas and bullets,
killing twenty-nine prisoners and ten hostages.75
Four days later, a Weather Underground bomb exploded in a ninth-floor
women’s bathroom next to the offices of the New York State Commissioner of
Corrections in Albany. “We must continue to make the Rockefellers, Oswalds, Reagans,
and Nixons pay for their crimes,” the group stated in their subsequent communiqué.
“We only wish we could do more to show the courageous prisoners at Attica, San
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Quentin, and the other 20th century slave ships that they are not alone in the fight for
the right to live.”76
The George Jackson killing and Attica massacre were not products of a
coordinated state conspiracy, as the Weather Underground, BLA, and others on the
militant left insinuated. Rather, these incidents were part of a longstanding pattern of
federal officials looking the other way, or offering encouragement, while local police
and prison guards inflicted violence against political dissidents and racialized
minorities. In some instances in the American past—such as when international outcry
over the 1964 murder of Mississippi civil rights workers James Chaney, Andrew
Goodman, and Michael Schwerner compelled President Johnson to demand that
Hoover’s FBI crack down on the Klan and its collusion with Southern police forces—
organized leftist social movements managed to pressure the federal government to take
action against local repressive police violence. Such federal intervention was not
forthcoming, however, amid the disintegration of the U.S. left and the Nixon
administration’s law-and-order response to civil disorder, national security leaks, and
leftist guerrilla violence.
After the George Jackson killing and Attica massacre, Nixon and Hoover
condemned leftist violence while condoning police violence. In a phone call after the
Attica slaughter, Nixon reassured Governor Rockefeller. “You did the right thing,” the
President said. “It’s a tragedy those poor [hostages] were shot, but I just want you to
know that’s my view, and I’ve told the troops around here they’re to back that to the
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hilt.”77 Instead of mandating an FBI investigation of laws broken by New York State
officials in the Attica massacre, the President praised Rockefeller’s mass killing of
prisoners and hostages to suppress the prisoner rebellion. Nixon affirmed his belief that
if Rockefeller had granted the prisoners’ request for immunity from prosecution for
their actions, “it would have meant that you would have prisoners in an uproar all over
the country.” “The courage you showed… it was right,” Nixon told Rockefeller, “and I
don’t care what the hell the papers or anybody else says.”78
Meanwhile, Hoover’s FBI responded to a request from the Justice Department’s
Civil Rights Division, who faced pressure from liberals in Congress to oversee San
Quentin guards’ handling of the incidents that led to George Jackson’s death. In a
memorandum to the San Francisco field office, Hoover revealed his clear sympathies
with the prison authorities. The Director explicitly instructing his agents to inform San
Quentin officials and staff that the FBI was conducting the investigation at the “specific
request” of David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice
Department’s Civil Rights division.79 By relaying such information to San Quentin
officials, FBI agents signaled that their investigation was a mere formality undertaken
begrudgingly on behalf of the Justice Department. After conducing a “limited” three-day
investigation of George Jackson’s death in October 1971, FBI agents determined that
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prison staff had committed no wrongdoing.80 Meanwhile, California Governor Ronald
Reagan wrote an op-ed on George Jackson for the New York Times that sounded as if it
could have been written by Hoover or Nixon. Defending San Quentin and Attica officials’
use of deadly force against prisoner rebellions, Reagan insisted that all Americans
would “become prisoners” of deadly chaos if they accepted “the falsehood that violence,
terror and contempt for the moral values of our society are acceptable methods of
seeking redress of grievances.”81
Federal authorities did not unanimously side with Rockefeller and Reagan in
promoting repressive state violence as a solution to social conflict. After the Attica
uprising, the U.S. Congress Select Committee on Crime spent two years investigating
prison rebellions, and determined that such outbreaks were a product of a failed prison
system that reinforced social inequities. In its 1973 report, the Committee called for
sweeping changes in America’s criminal justice practices, including increased public
oversight of state and federal correctional institutions; federally-mandated training of
correctional staff; increased parole opportunities, half-way houses, and work and
educational furloughs; monetary compensation for prisoners’ work; and the
substitution of enormous, rural prisons like Attica with smaller institutions located
within urban centers where the families of most prisoners resided.82 “The painful
lessons of the recurrent waves of prison riots,” the report concluded, “is that the
present system has created and nurtures even more serious threats to security and
public safety caused by the frustration and desperation that drives men to rebellion.
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Only through a drastic restructuring can we hope to correct our correctional system.”83
To Nixon and Hoover, however, the views of the Congressional Select Committee on
Crime were as irrelevant as the findings laid out in the Kerner Report published five
years earlier.
While local state officials and police engaged in violence with impunity, Hoover
assured Nixon and his staff that the FBI was making significant progress in its BLA
investigation. After the arrests of Bottom and Washington, the Director sent John
Ehrlichman several memos outlining the Bureau’s progress during the fall of 1971.84 In
a phone call on November 22, Nixon informed the Director that he was “just delighted”
over the FBI’s success tracking down the five “terrorists” responsible for the JonesPiagentini killings. “Be sure you let the boys over there [in the FBI] know I think it’s just
great,” said the President.85 The next day, Assistant Director Edward Miller sent the
White House a prepared statement for Nixon’s Press Secretary Ron Zeigler that
celebrated the FBI’s achievements combating “urban guerrilla warfare which involves
attacks on police and other terrorist actions against citizens of this country.”86
Despite the FBI’s breakthroughs in the NEWKILL investigation, Hoover worried
that the BLA had more violence in store. Accordingly, in October 1971 the Director
provided FBI field offices with a new round of ambiguous orders that some agents may
have interpreted as the latest wink and nod encouragement to carry out illegal
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surveillance practices. “During the past several months,” Hoover wrote, “the Cleaver
faction of the Black Panther Party has moved on a course of increased violence,
lawlessness, and terror … Although many of these criminals have been arrested for
extremist-related activity, a substantial hardcore of fanatics remains highly active and I
consider their potential for violence and disruption greater today than ever before.”87
Conveying information gleaned from paid informants, Hoover warned his agents that
Cleaver-faction Panthers were considering kidnapping businessmen or police officers in
efforts to bargain for the release of “jailed extremists.”88 In order to prevent such
attacks, Hoover instructed his men to pursue the BLA “with renewed vigor and
imagination.” “I consider no extremist investigation to be routine,” he emphasized.
“Investigations must be of the highest degree of thoroughness and informant coverage
must never be considered adequate.”89 In an exception to his April 1971 ban on such
activities, Hoover also encouraged his agents to propose counterintelligence operations
against aboveground supporters of guerrilla violence, including “disruptive efforts to be
aimed at the Cleaver Faction and similar groups” and “use of news and publicity media
to counter frequent proextremist programs.”90 The Director stressed that the aim of FBI
operations was to prevent leftist guerrilla attacks. Surveillance of suspected black
“extremists,” he explained, “must have preventative capabilities, that is, we must know
in advance, wherever possible, of plans and propensities for violence.”91

FBI airtel, Director to SACs Charlotte, Cincinnati, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San
Francisco, “Black Panther Party—Clever Faction, Extremist Matters,” September 24, 1971, FBI Moore File.
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Hoover issued this directive as agents in the FBI’s Weather Underground squads
engaged in break-ins and other illegal surveillance tactics intended to help them locate
clandestine guerrillas. Such operations had been ongoing for fourteen months, since
Hoover’s August 1970 orders for “intensified” guerrilla investigations following the
Marin County courthouse attack and the University of Wisconsin bombing. Sources
documenting the FBI’s use of illegal surveillance practices are scarce. Since the practices
were illegal and unauthorized, agents intentionally kept written records minimal so as
to avoid self-incrimination. FBI agents also destroyed many sources documenting illegal
surveillance tactics in 1976 as rumors gathered that the Justice Department planned to
indict Bureau personnel involved in illegal surveillance operations. However,
documents from the legal proceedings of John Kearny, L. Patrick Gray, Edward Miller,
and W. Mark Felt—FBI officials who faced criminal charges in the late 1970s for their
involvement in such activities—offer a glimpse into the FBI’s use of illegal surveillance
measures in its Weather Underground investigation.
Most of the FBI’s surveillance targeted aboveground activists and family
members of Weather Underground guerrillas whom agents hoped would lead them to
the revolutionary underground. For example, the New York Field Office’s Weather
Underground squad, known simply as “Squad 47,” made widespread use of illegal mail
surveillance. Between August 1970 and June 1972, under the leadership of Special
Agent John J. Kearney, Squad 47 agents acquired keys to New York mailboxes belonging
to suspected aboveground supporters of the Weather Underground. In a practice they
informally referred to as “mail runs,” agents would remove mail from their targets’
boxes, bring it back to the FBI office on 201 East 69th Street, and open the envelopes
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using a special “steamer” that enabled them avoid noticeable evidence of tampering.
After photocopying all of their targets’ mail, agents would reseal the envelopes and
return them to the mailboxes.92
Squad 47 agents also carried out illegal, warrantless electronic wiretaps of
suspected Weather Underground supporters, as well as individuals suspected of
sheltering Ten Most Wanted leftist fugitive Cameron Bishop. Kearney held regular
meetings with Squad 47 about wiretapping, and maintained a schedule of agents’ shifts
monitoring suspects’ phone conversations with the Bureau’s eavesdropping equipment.
Kearney also kept files of notes his agents compiled describing monitored phone calls.
Squad 47 maintained at least eleven illegal wiretaps in New York City between August
1970 and June 1972, though there may have been more.93 Weather Underground
squads in other cities also utilized illegal wiretaps. Los Angeles agent Wesley
Swearingen, for example, claimed to have installed over two hundred unauthorized
wiretaps as part of the Weather Underground investigation.94
Weather Underground squads throughout the country also carried out
unauthorized illegal break-ins. In some cases, FBI agents may have conducted
“surreptitious entries” with the verbal permission of Justice Department officials.
Special Agent in Charge Robert Kunkel, who supervised the FBI Washington Field Office
recalled that his agents broke-in to the residence of a “member of the so-called New Left
element” in order to investigate allegations that the individual possessed dynamite that

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, U.S. v. John J. Kearny, grand jury indictment,
April 7, 1977, Freedom Archives Online Database, COINTELPRO Collection,
http://search.freedomarchives.org/search.php?view_collection=150.
93 Ibid.
94 Swearingen, FBI Secrets, 72-73.
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he planned to use in a bombing. According to Kunkel, his agents carried out their black
bag job with permission from Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, who
verbally authorized a request from the FBI’s then Assistant Director William Sullivan.
Kunkel recalled that his office kept no written record of the break-in.95
For the most part, however, local FBI Field Offices approved break-ins without
authorization from the Justice Department or FBI Headquarters. In early 1972, for
example, agents from the FBI’s Phoenix Weather Underground squad carried out two
black bag jobs in Tucson, Arizona. On March 28, 1972, a Phoenix agent took
approximately twenty photographs of documents inside the Tucson apartment of a
suspected Weather Underground supporter. Two weeks later, an FBI agent stole a small
piece of yellow paper that appeared to contain a handwritten key to a secret
communications code from a Tucson apartment.96 In their paperwork, Phoenix agents
referred to the break-in as an “anonymous source,” using language similar to the
terminology W. Mark Felt and Edward Miller would later adopt in their memos
authorizing break-ins in the year following Hoover’s death.97 After forging a duplicate
version of the paper and returning it to a “small box containing several old letters and
other items” located in the apartment, Phoenix agents forwarded the original paper to
the FBI Headquarters in Washington for fingerprint identification and cryptanalysis.98
Former FBI agent M. Wesley Swearingen also recalled conducting break-ins
without approval from Headquarters. In his memoir, Swearingen wrote that he and
FBI memo, Lee Colwell to Director, “U.S. v. W. Mark Felt, et al; Discovery Procedures,” September 5,
1979, LPG FBI, 1222537-0 - 62-118045 - Section 8 Serial 1.
96 Francis J. Martin to Paul V. Daly, “[Redacted] Bag Job,” November 3, 1978, LPG FBI, 1222537-0 - 62118045 - Section 8 Serial 1.
97 FBI report, “Phoenix Review,” September 10, 1976, LPG FBI, 1222537-0 - 62-118045 - Section 8 Serial
1.
98 FBI airtel, SAC Phoenix to Director (Attn: FBI Laboratory), “WEATHFUG,” April 24, 1972.
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other members of the Los Angeles Weather Underground squad (Squad 19) carried out
at least seven black bag jobs. Among the targets were two leftist attorneys who had
defended SDS activists.99 New York’s Squad 47 agents also carried out unauthorized
black bag jobs and provided intelligence gathered from their actions to FBI
Headquarters. Presumably, like their Phoenix counterparts, Squad 47 agents disguised
their sources in their memoranda as “anonymous,” though none of these documents
survived the Bureau’s purging of such sources in 1976.100 According to Swearingen,
none of the FBI’s illegal break-ins helped prevent violence or capture Weather
Underground fugitives.101
It is unknown whether or not FBI agents acted on Hoover’s October 1971 call for
“imaginative” and “intensified” investigations of Cleaver-faction Black Panthers by
incorporating illegal counterintelligence operations or surveillance tactics into their
BLA investigation. However, police managed to capture or kill many BLA members in
late 1971 and early 1972, as the BLA unleashed a haphazard crescendo of bloody
violence. In October, New York police captured H. Rap Brown after wounding him in a
gun battle in a black social club that fugitive on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list had been
trying to rob.102 On November 3, Twymon Meyers and Freddie Hilton assassinated
police officer James Greene in Atlanta, where New York BLA guerrillas had gone to
escape the NYPD’s manhunt. Five days later, Atlanta police arrested BLA members
Andrew Jackson, Samuel Cooper, and Ronald Anderson outside a convenience store
Swearingen, FBI Secrets, 77-78.
FBI, 8/24/1976, untitled summary of interview with Detroit special agent.
101 Swearingen, FBI Secrets, 78.
102 It is unclear if Brown was part of the BLA, but the word on the street was that the robbery for which
he was arrested was one of several BLA-style robberies targeting drug dealers that he had participated in
while underground. Thelwell, “H. Rap Brown/Jamil Al-Amin,” xxiv-xxv.
99
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after noticing that the men were carrying firearms (they were on their way to carry out
another police ambush). On November 11, a firefight broke out as police attempted to
pull over a carload of BLA members in Catawba County, North Carolina, resulting in the
arrest of four guerrillas and the paralyzing of sheriff’s deputy Ted Elmore.103 On
December 21, BLA members rolled an M-26 fragmentation grenade under an NYPD
squad car to prevent police from chasing them after a bank robbery; the two officers
inside miraculously survived the explosion unscathed (the BLA’s “Attica Brigade” later
took credit for the assault, warning, “We have more grenades, and we will be back”).104
FBI agents arrested BLA member John Thomas and shot dead fellow guerrilla Frank
Fields ten days later outside a hotel in Odessa, Florida after an employee phoned the
police to report suspicious activity.105 On January 19, 1972, police arrested Mark Holder
and one other BLA member in Philadelphia with a suitcase full of guns.106 The BLA
assassinated two more New York policemen on January 27, gunning down officers
Gregory Foster and Rocco Laurie as they walked their beat in the East Village.107 BLA
guerrillas involved in the Foster and Laurie killings fled to St. Louis, where police pulled
them over on the evening of February 16 as they drove in a green 1967 Oldsmobile with
cardboard Michigan license plates. A firefight erupted, followed by a high-speed chase,
then a second gun battle. When it was offer, a police officer was critically wounded, BLA
member Ronnie Carter was dead, and guerrillas Thomas “Blood” McCreary and Henry
“Sha Sha” Brown were in police custody. One BLA guerrilla, Twymon Meyers, managed
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to flee on foot. St. Louis police uncovered New York Officer Rocco Laurie’s pistol in the
Oldsmobile.108 The FBI, NYPD, and other police agencies continued their investigations
of the BLA after the St. Louis arrests, but for the time being, the group had been severely
damaged. The BLA would not launch another attack until nearly a year later.
Amid the spike in BLA violence, the Weather Underground’s guerrilla offensive
began to recede. After a bombing at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology on
October 15, 1971 targeting the offices of former CIA analyst and Vietnam War advisor
William Bundy, it would be another eight months before the Weather Underground
launched another attack.109 The FBI did not realize it, but the Weather Underground
was shrinking as its members concluded that their bombings had done little to reverse
the U.S. left’s steady decline. During 1971, the Weather Underground’s leadership
ordered several of its lesser-known members to surface and rejoin society with the
same aim of reestablishing leftist contacts and building an aboveground revolutionary
socialist organization. Other members drifted away from the radical politics all
together, including Mark Rudd, who left the organization and took refuge in Santa Fe
with his girlfriend. By the middle of 1971, the Weather Underground only had about
fifteen active clandestine members.110

Ibid, 215-217.
The Weather Underground’s MIT bomb exploded behind a ceiling panel in a women’s bathroom,
causing minor damage to Bundy’s adjacent office. The group explained their attack as retaliation for
Bundy’s role in the Vietnam War. Ibid, 224.
110 Ibid, 218-219. Although agents did not know it, the FBI’s massive investigation had played a role in
weakening the group. The FBI made a break in its Weather Underground investigation in late 1970 and
early 1971. On December 16, 1970, FBI agents arrested Weather guerrilla Judy Clark at a Manhattan
movie theater after recognizing her by chance from a wanted poster. Clark’s fake id, forged with the
identity of an infant named Yvette Kirby who had died in the 1940s, helped agents figure out the Weather
Underground’s methods for developing false identification. Within six weeks, agents in San Francisco had
determined that the local Department of Motor Vehicles had recently issued eighteen licenses to
individuals using the names of long-deceased infants, all of whom they suspected to be Weather
Underground fugitives, including Kathy Boudin, Mark Rudd, Jeff Jones, and Bernadine Dohrn. A short time
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While the slowed pace of the Weather Underground’s bombings reduced public
concern over the group, the FBI’s investigation was contributing to a mounting crisis
within the Bureau. By 1972, members of Squad 47 and other Weather Underground
units began to question whether the group continued to warrant a large share of the
FBI’s resources. Squad 47 agents jokingly referred to the Weather Underground as “the
terrible toilet bombers,” since the group’s main activity consisted of periodically
planting bombs in restrooms. Moreover, agents grew increasingly anxious as Hoover
pressured them to win the war against leftist guerrillas, using unsanctioned illegal
surveillance tactics as necessary. Agents conveyed their anxiety in the term they coined
for unauthorized warrantless wiretaps: “suicide bugs.” According to a Detroit
investigator, agents used this term because “if you got caught” utilizing illegal wiretaps,
“you were on your own.”111 In other words, agents were uncertain whether or not
Headquarters would support them, or protect them from a felony indictment, if they
ever got caught installing illegal wiretaps. Burdened with the dual responsibility of
preventing leftist guerrilla violence and avoiding prosecution for their use of illegal
surveillance techniques, agents worried about their professional vulnerability.

later, in March 1971, San Francisco FBI agents narrowly missed an opportunity to apprehend Jones and
Dohrn. The pair escaped an FBI dragnet after Jones picked up a Western Union money transfer from an
aboveground supporter in Chicago whom the Bureau had placed under surveillance. In the San Francisco
Western Union office, Jones correctly suspected that a group of men hanging out in the lobby were
undercover FBI agents; the agents did not arrest Jones on the spot because they were unsure whether or
not they had found their suspect. After departing the office, Jones hopped into a car driven by Dohrn, who
made a series of quick turns and managed to shake off the agents who followed her in a black sedan. The
Weather Underground’s San Francisco cell immediately fled the city, worried that their local safehouse
could be compromised. The FBI found the group’s abandoned apartment a week later after receiving a
call from the landlord. Inside, agents discovered piles of leftist literature, disguises, and bomb-making
equipment. The Weather Underground’s New York cell also abandoned their safehouse after the close call
in San Francisco. By forcing the Weather Underground to establish new safe houses and IDs, this
disruption contributed to the group’s shrinking size and reduced pace of bombings. See ibid, 162-168.
111 FBI, 8/24/1976, untitled summary of interview with anonymous (name redacted) Detroit special
agent, LPG FBI, File Number 1222537-0-62-118045, Section 8, Serial 1
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Conclusion
If anyone at FBI Headquarters understood field agents’ anxieties around leftist guerrilla
investigations and illegal surveillance tactics, it was W. Mark Felt. Before Hoover
promoted him to Deputy Associate Director in June 1971, Felt had worked for nearly six
years as the FBI’s Chief Inspector, visiting field offices throughout the country for
annual inspections of agents’ investigative work, including that carried out by the
Domestic Security Division. Years later, while facing federal indictments for approving
break-ins against Weather Underground supporters after Hoover’s death, Felt would
publicly claim that he had no knowledge of agents’ involvement in black bag jobs prior
to his reauthorizing the practice in September 1972. During his 1979 trial, however,
Felt’s defense team introduced Hoover’s August 17, 1970 memo calling for
“intensification” of leftist guerrilla investigations as evidence that his 1972 decision to
officially reauthorize break-ins merely formalized a practice that agents had begun
practicing two years earlier at the late Director’s request. Moreover, Felt was aware of
agents’ anxieties over restricted surveillance practices in September 1970, when he
successfully convinced Hoover to lower the FBI’s minimum informant age from twentyone to eighteen in order to help agents prevent leftist “terrorist violence.”112 Edward
Miller was also likely aware of the crisis brewing within the FBI during the last year of
Hoover’s life. As Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Security Division following
William Sullivan’s ouster in October 1970, Miller received reports from Weather
Underground squads in New York, Phoenix, and other major cities that relayed
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information gleaned from so-called “anonymous sources,” a euphemism for illegal
break-ins that he and Felt would adopt in their memos after reauthorizing the practice.
Though Hoover had no way of realizing it at the time, his decision to promote
Felt and Miller amid the FBI’s institutional conflict with the Nixon administration was a
fateful one. After Hoover’s death, Felt would further escalate both the hostilities with
Nixon and the FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas. In his role as “Deep Throat,”
Felt would secretly leak documents from the FBI’s Watergate investigation to the press
and help topple the Nixon presidency, while at the same time colluding with Miller to
officially reinstitute the FBI’s use of break-ins for “terrorism” investigations. In the
meantime, a final battle between Hoover’s FBI and the White House piqued Felt’s
resentment towards Nixon.
In March 1972, Nixon sought to enlist the FBI’s assistance in covering up a
controversy involving the ITT Corporation and its lobbyist, Dita Beard. Columnist Jack
Anderson had printed a story on February 19 on a leaked memo in which Beard
allegedly boasted to her employer that Attorney General Mitchell agreed to quash an
antitrust case against the company in exchange for a $400,000 contribution to the
Republican Party for the 1972 national convention. Beard claimed the memo was
forged, however, and Nixon’s staff sent the document to the FBI Laboratory to
corroborate the lobbyist’s claim.113 The Nixon administration’s request came directly to
Felt on March 10, 1972 from L. Patrick Gray, a former World War II Navy submarine
captain and longtime Nixon supporter who had assumed the position of Assistant
Attorney General a little more than a week earlier (Gray had taken the place of Richard
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Kleindienst, who had become Attorney General-designate after Mitchell stepped down
on March 1 to direct Nixon’s reelection campaign).114 According to Felt, Assistant
Attorney General Gray, Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, and White House
counsel John Dean repeatedly interfered with the FBI Lab’s analysis over the course of
the following week in an attempt to pressure the Bureau to find that the Beard
document was a forgery.115 The FBI Lab determined that Beard’s memo was authentic,
however, and Nixon was furious when he heard that Hoover and Felt stood behind the
analysis.116 As far as Felt was concerned, the Dita Beard incident was the latest example
of Nixon’s attempts to exert control over the FBI in order to advance a partisan political
agenda. “Looking back,” Felt later wrote, “I am glad that the FBI was able to resist White
House pressure to take part in a cover-up which in some ways was a prelude to
Watergate.”117
Less than six weeks later, Hoover died unexpectedly in his sleep. Felt fully
expected that Nixon would appoint him or another top FBI official to serve as the
longtime Director’s successor. Nixon had other plans, however. The President
appointed L. Patrick Gray to serve as the FBI’s Acting Director, promising to appoint a
fulltime Director after the November election. Gray was surprised as anyone by Nixon’s
choice. Indeed, when he received notice that the President wanted to speak with him,
Gray assumed that Nixon wanted to discuss a development in the ITT controversy. To

Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 167.
Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 167-174.
116 Powers, Secrecy and Power, 146.
117 Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 174.
114
115

240

Felt, the President’s choice for Hoover’s successor sent a clear signal: Nixon wanted “his
man” to control the FBI.118
Nixon conveyed his vision for the future of the FBI at Hoover’s funeral. In his
eulogy, delivered before a live national television broadcast, the President revealed
nothing of his conflict with the Director over the past three-and-a-half years. Instead, he
praised Hoover and his forty-eight year career as “the invincible and incorruptible
defender of every American’s precious right to be free from fear.”119 Moreover, amidst
increasing public controversy over FBI domestic surveillance, Nixon promised to
uphold rather than alter Hoover’s policing practices. “There is a belief that the changing
of the guard will also mean a changing of the rules,” Nixon declared. “With J. Edgar
Hoover this will not happen. The FBI will carry on in the future, true to its finest
traditions in the past.”120
Nixon fully supported the FBI’s mass surveillance of America’s antiwar and Black
Power movements, especially when carried out in an effort to prevent leftist guerrilla
attacks. Now, with Hoover gone at last, the President sought to exert direct White
House influence over the Bureau. Nixon’s institutional conflict with Hoover’s FBI had
entered its final phase.
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CHAPTER 6
DEEP THROAT’S SECRET WARS: BREAK-INS, ANTI-TERRORISM, AND THE ROAD
TO WATERGATE

Four months into L. Patrick Gray’s term as Acting Director of the FBI, a guerrilla attack
halfway around the globe prompted an urgent new round of Bureau and White House
efforts to combat “terrorism.” In the predawn hours of September 5, 1972, eight
commandos from the Palestinian nationalist Black September Organization stormed an
apartment unit on the site of the 20th Summer Olympic Games in Munich, West
Germany. Inside slept the Israeli Olympic team. After killing two team members who
resisted the siege, the heavily armed guerrillas held nine athletes and coaches hostage.
The militants sought to exchange their captives for the freedom of 234 Palestinian
prisoners held in Israeli prisons as well as two Red Army Faction guerrillas imprisoned
in West Germany. As television crews covering the Olympics shifted their focus to the
hostage crisis, the Munich siege became an international media sensation. For eighteen
hours, an estimated 900 million viewers throughout the world watched the unfolding
drama: as West German officials negotiated with the hostage-takers; as Israeli Prime
Minister Golda Meir announced her government’s refusal to meet the guerrillas’
demands; and as West German police bungled a rescue mission that resulted in the
deaths of a police officer, five Black September guerrillas, and all of the Israeli
hostages.1

The rescue attempt occurred at the Munich Airport, where West German police transported the Black
September militants and their hostages in a helicopter with a promise to deliver them by airliner to an
unspecified Arab country. West German police captured the three surviving Black September militants in
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A number of scholars have written about the Munich siege, explaining the bloody
incident as a watershed moment in the history of the Palestinian nationalist struggle,
anti-Arab racism, and state efforts to combat the problem of “international terrorism.”2
Some of these scholars also analyzed President Nixon’s response to the Munich attack,
focusing on his administration’s formation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism (CCCT), a group comprised of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, FBI Acting
Director Gray, and several other Executive Branch officials whom the President charged
with establishing means to prevent domestic and international terrorism.3 This chapter,
however, is the first academic work to explain how the Munich attack influenced the
FBI in the midst of the Watergate Scandal.4
The Munich attack was a turning point in the history of the FBI and its efforts to
combat insurgent violence. After Munich, the FBI officially reauthorized the use of
illegal break-ins, known in Bureau lingo as “surreptitious entries” or “black bag jobs,”
for the first time since Director J. Edgar Hoover banned the practice in 1966. On
September 7, two days after the Munich bloodbath, the FBI’s second and third-ranked
officials Associate Director W. Mark Felt and Assistant Director Edward Miller
authorized a request from the Bureau’s Dallas field office for a break-in to the office of

the siege, but released them on October 29, 1972, after Palestinian militants hijacked Lufthansa Flight
615 from Damascus to Frankfurt, and threatened to blow up the plane. Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The
Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Making of the PostCold War Order (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2012), 142-143, 161-167. Also see One Day in
September, directed by Kevin McDonald, Passion Pictures, 1999.
2 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive, 142-143, 161-174; Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media,
and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005),
178-181; Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 21-27; Naftali, Blind Spot, 54-55.
3 Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 27-28; Naftali, Blind Spot, 59-61. Also see the CCCT’s founding
document, White House memorandum, Nixon to Kissinger, “Action to Combat Terrorism,” September 25,
1972, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (hereafter DNSA).
4 For a brief, journalistic narrative that makes connections between leftist guerrillas and Watergate, see
Weiner, Enemies, 307-319.
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the Arab Information Center, a public relations outfit affiliated with the Arab League.5
FBI agents stole a briefcase from the office containing a list of ninety-four Arabs and
Arab Americans living in the United States. Alleging that the individuals on the list were
involved in a conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks, FBI agents throughout the country
visited, interrogated, and harassed all of them. Two weeks after the Dallas break-in,
Gray verbally informed top FBI officials that he had reinstituted the Bureau’s use of
black bag jobs, and charged Felt and Miller with authorizing all field office requests to
utilize the technique. Felt and Miller subsequently approved at least twelve more FBI
break-ins, two of them targeting Arabs and seven of them focused on suspected
associates of the Weather Underground.6
The FBI’s response to Munich helps answer a critical question that has eluded
Watergate scholars since 2005, when Mark Felt came forward as “Deep Throat,” the
confidential source whose disclosures enabled Washington Post journalists Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein to expose Nixon Cabinet members’ involvement in the
notorious June 17, 1972 break-in to headquarters of the Democratic National
Committee in Washington’s Watergate office complex. Felt’s activities as Deep Throat
helped spark the Watergate Scandal that culminated in President Richard Nixon’s
August 1974 resignation. Felt’s confession led several scholars to rebut the claims
Woodward and Bernstein made in their bestselling 1973 book All the Presidents’ Men—
that “Deep Throat” acted in a principled effort to defend the U.S. Constitution and the
Nicholas M. Horrock, “New Senate Panel May Study F.B.I. Drive on Arab Terrorism,” New York Times,
February 13, 1975; L. Patrick Gray III, In Nixon’s Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate, with Ed Gray
(New York: Times Books, 2008), 114; FBI memo, E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt, “Al Fatah; Internal Security—
Middle East,” September 7, 1972, LPG FBI, File No. 1222537-0-62-118045, Section 8, Serial 1.
6 Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 120-122; Felt, The FBI Pyramid from Inside, 326. Felt and Miller authorized the
remaining three break-ins as part foreign espionage investigations. The memos documenting these
break-ins are available in LPG FBI, File No. 1222537-0-62-118045, Section 8, Serial 1.
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American presidency from Nixon’s unlawful abuses of executive power.7 Historian
Beverly Gage demonstrated, for instance, that Felt acted not so much out of lofty ideals,
but in a calculated attempt to preserve the FBI’s institutional autonomy from what he
perceived as Nixon’s efforts to exert White House control over the Bureau.8 In addition,
journalist Max Holland has underscored Felt’s deep resentment over Nixon’s
appointment of Gray, a longtime campaign supporter and FBI outsider, as Acting
Director following the death of Director J. Edgar Hoover on May 2, 1972.9 Neither Gage
nor Holland, however, explain Felt’s authorization of the Weather Underground breakins, which brought the former Associate Director into the national spotlight during the
late 1970s, as he and Edward Miller faced federal indictments and eventual felony
convictions for their actions.10 These scholars leave a key question unanswered: why
did Felt leak information on the Nixon Administration’s use of illegal break-ins while at
the same time authorizing similar break-ins for the FBI’s Weather Underground
investigation?
Felt, Miller, and Gray’s post-Munich decisions to reauthorize illegal break-ins
were critical episodes in the FBI’s institutional conflict with the Nixon administration, a
Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, All the President’s Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 243.
Gage, “Deep Throat, Watergate, and the Bureaucratic Politics of the FBI,” 176. Also see Woodward, The
Secret Man, 104-105; and W. Mark Felt and John O’Connor, A G-Man’s Life: The FBI, Being ‘Deep Throat,’
and the Struggle for Honor in Washington (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).
9 Holland, Leak, 9-11. Holland argues that Felt’s disclosures to Woodward and other reporters were part
of a covert effort aimed not to take down Nixon, but to discredit Gray, so that the President would appoint
him to the position of FBI Director. Though his book is otherwise well researched, and provides
important new insights into Felt’s Deep Throat activity, Holland does not provide enough sources to
prove his theory that Felt’s aim was to undermine Gray as part of a “war of FBI succession.” Gage and
Holland both published their works around the same time; neither engages with one another’s
arguments.
10 The Carter Justice Department indicted both men, along with Gray, in April 1978. A judge soon threw
out charges against Gray, however, because prosecutors were unable to provide documentary proof that
the former Acting Director verbally instructed Felt and Miller to reauthorize break-ins for the Weather
Underground investigation. Felt and Miller were convicted in November 1979, but President Ronald
Reagan pardoned both men five months later, shortly after taking office.
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conflict triggered three years earlier by America’s domestic revolutionary insurgency.
After Hoover’s death and Nixon’s appointment of Gray, Felt emerged as a leading actor
in this conflict. Felt did not object to illegal break-ins per se. Rather, he opposed Nixon’s
use of the tactics for purely partisan objectives, as well as the president’s efforts to
impose White House control over the Bureau. Accordingly, Felt exploited the Watergate
break-in, and his role overseeing the FBI’s investigation of the burglary, in an effort to
undermine both Nixon and Gray.11 At the same time, Miller and Special Agents in
Charge throughout the country, with Felt’s support, urged Acting Director Gray to
reauthorize break-ins, warrantless wiretapping, and mail opening. These officials
believed such tactics were necessary to locate guerrilla fugitives and prevent future
attacks, and that official authorization would assure agents they would not be
sanctioned for their involvement in illegal operations. They petitioned Gray while
concealing the fact that FBI agents had been carrying out such illegal surveillance
tactics on an informal basis since August 1970 in response to Hoover’s instructions to
intensify leftist guerrilla investigations. Gray was reluctant to agree, but after the
September 1972 Munich attack prompted fears of a similar bloody incident inside the
United States, Felt and Miller authorized the Dallas break-in on their own, and
convinced their boss to officially reauthorize black bag jobs for “terrorism”
investigations.
The FBI and Nixon administration responded to the Munich attack in the context
of their ongoing institutional conflict and struggle to combat guerrilla violence in the
United States. Just as he exploited the Watergate burglary in order to undermine Gray
Some researchers have asserted that Felt did not act as Deep Throat alone. See Gray, In Nixon’s Web,
291-302; Holland, Leak, 40-41.
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and Nixon, Felt seized Munich as an opportunity to reinstate break-ins as a form of
surveillance that he and other FBI officials hoped could be used to both locate Weather
Underground fugitives and obtain advanced, preventative warning of guerrilla attacks.
Meanwhile, Nixon formed of the CCCT after four years of political debate and
institutional conflict over the problem of “revolutionary terrorism.” In the aftermath of
the aborted Huston Plan, and amid growing public scrutiny of his Cabinet’s involvement
in the Watergate break-in and cover-up, however, Nixon did not make another attempt
to consolidate America’s federal intelligence agencies. Instead, in a move that shielded
the White House and all other federal agencies from the liabilities of combating
clandestine political violence inside the United States, Nixon granted the FBI sole
jurisdiction over responding to “terrorist” attacks on American soil. Nixon’s formation
of the CCCT, coupled with growing calls for reform in the wake of Hoover’s death,
prompted Gray to reduce domestic surveillance of American leftists in order to redirect
the FBI’s resources towards combating “terrorism.”
The FBI’s post-Munich operations, however, did little, if anything, to prevent
guerrilla violence. Rather than preempting an identifiable Palestinian nationalist
guerrilla attack inside the United States, the FBI responded to Munich by frantically
chasing false leads and harassing innocent people, while the Weather Underground
remained on the lam. The Watergate Scandal also did not shield the Bureau from
government oversight. Instead, Felt’s secret war against Nixon and Gray backfired.
Watergate led to the downfall of Gray, Nixon, and Felt, and was a major impetus for the
Senate “Church Committee’s” massive 1975 investigations of FBI operations. Moreover,
by 1980 most Weather Underground members emerged from the revolutionary
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underground and reintegrated into American society with minimal legal consequences,
while Felt and Miller were convicted of felonies.

The Weather Underground and Watergate
L. Patrick Gray faced multiple challenges upon stepping into his role as the FBI’s Acting
Director. For one, Nixon demanded that Gray assure the FBI’s fidelity to the White
House. According to a memo penned by his aide, Nixon instructed Gray during their first
meeting, immediately after Hoover’s funeral on May 4, 1972, “to consolidate control of
the FBI, making such changes as are necessary to assure its complete loyalty to the
Administration.”12 As Gray recalled the Oval Office encounter, Nixon called for a
“housecleaning” of the FBI after the Bureau’s top officials had time to mourn Hoover’s
death.13 At the same time, Gray felt tremendous pressure from members of Congress,
the press, and the American public to reform the FBI’s administrative and domestic
surveillance practices, which had come under increasing scrutiny during Hoover’s final
year in office. These twin pressures grew increasingly difficult for Gray to manage after
the June 17, 1973 Watergate break-in, which put him in the awkward position of
overseeing the FBI’s investigation of Nixon’s Cabinet members. Was Gray supposed to
maintain loyalty to his superior or carry out an impartial investigation as the American
people expected? At the same time, Gray also inherited Hoover’s war on domestic leftist
guerrillas. While leftist attacks had decreased significantly over the past year, the
Weather Underground remained at large, and in one of their most brazen actions, the

Ehrlichman, Memorandum for the President, May 3, 1972, quoted in Gage, “Deep Throat, Watergate,
and the Bureaucratic Politics of the FBI,” 171.
13 Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 33.
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group bombed the Pentagon two weeks after Gray took office. Moreover, despite the
decline in domestic revolutionary violence, a series of deadly Palestinian nationalist
guerrilla attacks on commercial airliners flying over the Middle East and Europe roused
fears over the problem of international terrorism, and the potential threat it posed to
America’s national security.
Gray grappled with these challenges while naïve to the depths of the institutional
conflict between Hoover’s FBI and the Nixon White House that proceeded his entry into
the Bureau. The Acting Director was particularly unaware that his number two official
W. Mark Felt, who effectively ran the FBI on his own while Gray traveled the country
making speeches and visiting field offices, was actively working to undermine him. Felt
exploited the Watergate break-in, and his role overseeing the FBI’s investigation of the
burglary, to wage a “private counterintelligence program” against Gray and Nixon,
disclosing classified information to the press in an effort to undermine and discredit
both men.14 At the same time that he leaked information on Nixon Cabinet members’
utilization of illegal break-ins, he supported other FBI officials’ efforts to persuade Gray
to reauthorize the use of black bag jobs for the Bureau’s Weather Underground
investigation. Meanwhile, Gray provided the Nixon administration with political
intelligence linking the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), an antiwar
organization comprised of combat veterans, to the campaign of 1972 Democratic
presidential candidate George McGovern. The Acting Director also agreed to provide
White House Counsel John Dean with classified information from the Watergate
investigation and destroyed an envelope containing top secret documents from
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Watergate burglar Howard Hunt’s safe. These actions would later raise suspicions of
Gray’s complicity in the Nixon administration’s Watergate cover-up, and undermine his
chances of a permanent appointment as FBI Director.
Upon assuming his position as FBI’s Acting Director, Gray felt “appalled to learn”
that despite one of the most intense manhunts in its history, the Bureau had captured
only three Weather Underground fugitives.15 Indeed, in the approximately two years
since the March 6, 1970 Greenwich Village townhouse bombing, the FBI’s nationwide
Weather Underground investigation (“WEATHFUG”) had generated more than ninety
thousand pages of documents, focusing on 280 individuals throughout the country. This
included twenty-six fugitives and forty other individuals, whereabouts unknown, whom
the FBI suspected of Weather Underground membership. In a report on the WEATHFUG
investigation issued five days after Gray’s appointment, FBI Internal Security Chief R. L.
Shackelford noted, “only a few fugitives have been apprehended” while “the key
Weatherman leaders remain at large.”16 More than two years after Hoover initiated the
FBI’s Weather Underground investigation, the massive WEATHFUG operation remained
largely fruitless.
As if to taunt the FBI’s new Acting Director, the Weather Underground bombed
the Pentagon eleven days after Shackelford released his report—on May 19, 1972 , Ho
Chi Minh’s birthday. The guerrillas outlined the reasons for the bombing in an erudite,
six-page communiqué, explaining their attack as a means to protest President Nixon’s
Gray actually stated in his memoir that the FBI had not yet captured any Weather Underground
fugitives, but in reality, agents had captured Judith Clark in February 1970 and Linda Evans and Dianne
Dongi in April 1970. Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 120; W. Mark Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside (New York:
J.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979), 326.
16 Quoted in Ivan Greenberg, The Dangers of Dissent: The FBI and Civil Liberties since 1965 (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2010), 78.
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recent orders for the mining of North Vietnamese harbors and intensified aerial
bombardment of both North and South Vietnam. “It has become clear to everyone that
the [South Vietnamese] Thieu regime and the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam would
collapse within a matter of days without U.S. air and naval power,” the Weather
Underground wrote. “The risk taken by the Vietnamese at this time is to face that U.S.
military might in a fight to regain their homeland.”17 Viewing Nixon’s military escalation
as cruel and pointless, the Weather Underground urged Nixon to accept the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam’s recent peace proposal.18 The Weather
Underground’s bomb, detonated at 12:53 am in a fourth floor women’s restroom,
caused minor damage.19 However, the organization’s ability to strike the symbolic
center of American military power underscored its members’ continued evasion of FBI
surveillance. The headline of a Washington Post article on the bombing emphasized this
point: “Who Are Weather People—Ask FBI.”20
While the Weather Underground and other domestic guerrillas remained at
large, attacks by Palestinian militants and their allies in Western Europe and Israel
prompted growing concern throughout the world, including within the FBI, over the
problem of international terrorism. On February 22, 1971, Palestinian nationalist
guerrillas gained five million dollars in ransom after hijacking a Lufthansa airliner
departed from Delhi with the aim of freeing Palestinian captives held in West

Weather Underground, “The Bombing of the Pentagon,” May 19, 1972, in Dohrn, et al., Sing a Battle
Song, 181
18 Ibid. Nixon’s intensified bombings, calculated as a means to force the Vietnamese to accept U.S. terms
to a peace deal, included bombardment of Hanoi and critical civilian infrastructure including ports and
dikes.
19 Bart Barnes, “Bombing Fails to Disrupt Pentagon,” Washington Post, May 20, 1971, A1.
20 Betty Medsger and B. D. Coien, “Who are Weather People?—Ask FBI,” Washington Post, May 20, 1972,
A12. The article did not cite any recent FBI sources.
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Germany.21 On May 8, militants from the Black September Organization—a faction
within the larger Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—hijacked a Belgian Sabena
passenger jet en route from Vienna to Tel Aviv, seeking to swap the plane’s passengers
in exchange for the release of a hundred Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. After a
twenty-three hour standoff, Israeli commandos stormed the jet; two hijackers and a
passenger perished in the ensuing gun battle.22 An even bloodier incident occurred on
May 30, when three Japanese Red Army guerrillas working under the command of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist PLO faction,
fired machine guns and hurled hand grenades into a crowd at Tel Aviv’s Lod Airport,
killing twenty-six and injuring seventy-eight.23 According to historian Paul Thomas
Chamberlin, after this series of attacks “the Palestinian armed struggle… emerged as the
first global resistance movement, and the PLO would soon be labeled as the first group
to employ international terror tactics.”24 Acting Director Gray later recalled the period
after the Lod Airport massacre, which occurred less than a month after he took office, as
“a time of great unease among all the responsible agencies in the federal government,”
when “international terrorism was a new and fast-growing phenomenon.”25
In addition to the problem of guerrilla “terrorism,” L. Patrick Gray also faced
growing public concern over the FBI’s role in American society. The FBI’s public image
had taken a serious beating since journalists’ disclosure of declassified surveillance
documents from the March 1971 Media, Pennsylvania burglary. In the wake of J. Edgar
Chamberlin, The Global Offensive, 153.
Five other passengers were wounded and Israeli forces captured two guerrillas. Ibid.
23 Seventeen of the dead were Puerto Ricans on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Two of the Japanese Red
Army guerrillas also died in the attack, while the third, Kozo Okamoto, was badly wounded and arrested.
Ibid, 154-156.
24 Ibid, 153.
25 Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 116.
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Hoover’s death, Americans from across the political spectrum publicly questioned the
FBI’s integrity and competency, and called for major reforms, particularly in the area of
domestic surveillance. Determined to restore the FBI’s popular legitimacy, Gray
instituted historic reforms immediately after taking office. He signed an order allowing
women to become FBI agents for the first time in the Bureau’s history, formed an Equal
Opportunity board to explore avenues for recruiting more minority special agents, and
enacted a new dress-code policy permitting male agents to grow longer hair and
mustaches in keeping with early 1970s’ fashion trends.26 A May 15, 1972 Washington
Post editorial conveyed the pressure Gray faced as Hoover’s successor, as critics
demanded the Acting Director move quickly and decisively to demonstrate the FBI’s
commitment to safeguarding Americans’ civil liberties. While the editorial applauded
Gray’s hiring and dress code reforms, calling them “pleasantly surprising and
remarkably daring,” it also called upon Nixon to appoint a “Presidential Commission to
Study the FBI” to determine whether the FBI required oversight from Congress or
another arm of the Executive Branch.27
Gray responded to the FBI’s flagging image with a public relations campaign. The
Acting Director spent much of his one-year term on the road, visiting field offices and
giving public addresses throughout the country. Out in the field, many special agents
welcomed Gray’s reforms, especially those of the younger generation, who reportedly
received his visits to local field offices with standing ovations.28 Los Angeles-based

L. Patrick Gray, FBI Memorandum 4-27, “Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge,” June 7, 1972,
Gray FBI File, No. 1222537-0-62-118045, Section 1, Serial 1.
27 Washington Post, “The Governance of the FBI,” May 15, 1972.
28 Edward S. Miller, oral history interview by Stanley A. Pimentel on behalf of the Society of Former
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special agent Cril Payne, who was thirty-years-old at the time, later recalled thinking in
June 1972,
It was amazing how the entire tone of the organization had changed since Pat
Gray had become Acting Director. Agents were now allowed to sport mustaches,
sideburns, and longer hair. White shirts and conservative dark suits were no
longer de rigueur. Women were finally being accepted for Special Agent
positions. Virtually all the archaic rules and regulations were being reevaluated,
and long-overdue changes were being instituted daily.29
But not everyone welcomed Gray’s entrance into the FBI. Many senior FBI
officials viewed Gray as an interloper and Nixon lackey wholly unqualified for his
position. Indeed, a journalist close to the FBI reported, “so tenuous were the links
between some of the FBI’s key personnel and the Justice Department that in the 24
hours following the death of Hoover… several assistant directors of the bureau
seriously considered resigning.”30 Gray averted a mutiny by meeting with Hoover’s
fifteen top assistants less than two hours after his appointment, and ensuring them that
both he and Nixon intended to “maintain the FBI as an institution.”31 During this
meeting, Gray made a critical alliance with Felt, whom he promoted to Associate
Director and charged with the task of running the FBI’s “day-to-day” operations while
he travelled the country.32 After the meeting, Felt assured the press that Gray had
“made a deep impression on the men,” and that the officials had reconsidered their
plans to resign.33
Felt shouldered much of the Acting Directors’ responsibilities throughout Gray’s
one-year term. Though he treated his superior with courtesy and professionalism in
Payne, Deep Cover, 44.
Sanford J. Ungar, “Nixon Moves Quickly to Get Control of FBI,” Washington Post, May 5, 1972, A1.
31 Gray quoted in Ungar, “Nixon Moves Quickly to Get Control of FBI.”
32 Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 12.
33 Ungar, “Nixon Moves Quickly to Get Control of FBI.”
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person, Felt privately resented taking orders from someone widely perceived as “a
neophyte not only to the FBI, but to the profession of law enforcement.”34 Like many of
his colleagues, Felt also perceived Gray’s appointment as political, an attempt by Nixon
to exert an influence over the FBI that he could never yield over Hoover, despite his
many attempts. “Richard Nixon,” Felt asserted, “wanted someone from the outside who
would be his man, someone with no ties and no first loyalties to the FBI.”35 Moreover, as
the FBI’s number three official under Hoover and the aging, sickly Clyde Tolson, Felt
believed that he, rather than Gray, was Hoover’s logical successor. As Felt recalled, “I
was next in line, my FBI record was very good, and… I was both liked and respected by
the rank and file.”36
Felt seized the FBI’s Watergate investigation as an opportunity to undermine
both Gray and Nixon. Nixon’s “Plumbers” Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy broke into
the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington D.C.’s Watergate office
complex on May 28, 1972, successfully installing a hidden microphone in an effort to
find out whether DNC Chairman Larry O’Brien possessed information that could
damage Nixon’s reelection campaign.37 However, the microphone did not work, so on
June 17 James McCord, Frank Sturgis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, and Vergilio
Gonzalez made a second break-in. This time the operation went sour. Washington
police arrested the men inside the DNC headquarters and confiscated the operatives’
cameras, eavesdropping equipment, and large sum of cash, which included thirteen new
Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 12.
Ibid, 208.
36 Felt believed that the other logical candidate for the position was John P. Mohr, Assistant to the
Director in charge of administrative operations. Ibid, 208. Mohr also believed Nixon would choose him.
37 In particular, the Plumbers worried that O’Brien knew of a loan that business tycoon Howard Hughes
made to Nixon’s good friend Bebe Rebozo. Genovese, The Watergate Crisis, 27.
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one hundred dollar bills with their serial numbers in sequence. The Watergate break-in
did not initially make major news headlines, but the FBI immediately began to
investigate the matter.38 Upon hearing news of the break-in while in California, Gray
called Felt, who provided a summary of what the FBI then knew about the arrests. Gray,
unaware of the Nixon administration’s role in the operation, ordered his Associate
Director to investigate the Watergate break-in “to the hilt.”39
Felt began leaking classified information to the press two days after the
Watergate arrests. In mid-June, Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward phoned Felt
looking for information on Howard Hunt, whose name appeared on two address books
found on the Watergate burglars. Woodward figured out that Hunt was a former CIA
agent and worked at the White House with Special Council Charles W. Colson, but he
sought further confirmation before publishing a story connecting the Nixon staffer to
the break-in. Felt gave Woodward the confirmation he was looking for. The FBI had
found a check bearing Hunt’s name in the Watergate burglars’ hotel room, and Felt
informed Woodward that the FBI considered the former CIA operative a “prime
suspect” in its investigation. The tip enabled Woodward to publish his first major story
on the Watergate break-in on June 26, 1972.40 Circumstantial evidence also ties Felt to
two more June 1972 leaks pertaining to the Watergate investigation, one to Time
journalist Sandy Smith and the second to Washington Daily Post reporter Patrick
Collins.41

Ibid, 20-21, 26-27.
Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 60.
40 Holland, Leak, 29-30; Bob Woodward and E. J. Bachinski, “White House Consultant Tied to Bugging
Figure,” Washington Post, June 20, 1972, A1.
41 Holland, Leak, 32-35, 37-38.
38
39

256

While Felt simultaneously oversaw the FBI’s Watergate investigation and leaked
information to the press, Nixon officials quickly moved to stall the Bureau’s efforts. The
day after the Watergate break-in arrests, Nixon’s Chief Domestic Advisor John
Ehrlichman put White House Counsel John Dean in charge of handling the cover-up.
President Nixon directly involved himself in the cover-up on June 23, after learning that
FBI investigators were close to tracing the one hundred dollar bills discovered on the
Watergate burglars to funds from a Nixon reelection campaign donation laundered
through a Mexican bank. In a recorded conversation that would later become known as
the “smoking gun” tape that brought down his presidency, Nixon instructed his Chief of
Staff H. R. Haldeman to have CIA Director Richard Helms ask Gray to limit the FBI’s
Watergate investigation on the premise that following the Mexican lead would uncover
information on the CIA’s top secret covert role in the botched 1961 invasion of Cuba’s
Bay of Pigs. Haldeman and Ehrichman subsequently met with Helms and CIA Deputy
Director Vernon Walters, who thereafter called Gray.42
After meeting with Walters, the novice Acting Director agreed to limit the
investigation to the seven arrested men. Gray wavered several times over the next
week, however, under pressure to please the White House on one hand, and Felt and
other FBI officials on the other, while avoiding giving the impression to the press that
the Bureau was covering up the Watergate investigation. Gray first reversed his
decision at the request of Felt and Assistant Director Charles Bates, and then again
limited the investigation under orders from Dean, before deciding to move forward
with a full investigation on July 5 after the FBI’s Watergate case agent Angelo Lano
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wrote a teletype complaining that Headquarters was delaying his efforts.43 Gray also
agreed to provide Dean with documents pertaining to the FBI’s Watergate investigation,
and acquiesced to Dean’s request that he destroy an envelope of classified documents
removed from the safe of Watergate burglar and Committee to Reelect the President
(CREEP) member Howard Hunt.44
Felt’s personal motives can only be inferred. By the time he came forward as
Deep Throat in 2005, dementia had set in, forgoing any possibility that the former
professional expert in deception could provide an honest accounting of his motives. It is
clear, however, that Felt did not leak information from the FBI’s Watergate
investigation because he morally objected to illegal break-ins. It is also evident that Felt
carried out his actions in the context of the FBI’s ongoing institutional conflict with the
Nixon White House. As Woodward recalled in his 2005 account of his relationship with
the FBI’s former Associate Director, Felt “never really voiced pure, raw outrage to me
about Watergate.” “The crimes and abuses were background music,” Woodward wrote.
“Nixon was trying to subvert not only the law but the Bureau. Watergate became Felt’s
instrument to reassert the Bureau’s independence and thus its supremacy.”45 Felt’s
remarks on the television news program Face the Nation, spoken in 1976 amid rumors
of an impending federal indictment for his authorization of the Weather Underground
break-ins, confirm Woodward’s assertion regarding Felt’s beliefs. Felt denied that he
was Deep Throat, though he stated, “he wouldn’t be ashamed to be.” “I think that
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whoever helped Woodward helped the country,” he explained. Moreover, Felt professed
a belief similar to that held by Hoover, that the FBI functioned best when autonomous
from the influence of partisan politics. “I think that the Justice Department should be a
completely independent department, completely removed from politics,” he argued.
“The positions should all be career positions, then the FBI and the other Bureaus in the
Department of Justice would be under a career type individual and not under a
politician.”46
Whatever Felt’s personal motives, his leaks demonstrated to both Gray and the
Nixon administration that the Acting Director had little control over the FBI.
Throughout the summer John Dean repeatedly complained to both Gray and Felt about
information reported in the press that he believed came from the FBI. Meanwhile in the
White House, Nixon and his top aides questioned Gray’s ability to exert control over the
FBI. On August 1, in a conversation with Haldeman, Nixon expressed his doubts about
Gray’s ability to lead the FBI. At this point Nixon and his aides were confident that a
series of bribes and other obstructions had successfully limited the FBI’s investigation
to the Watergate burglars, and that their trial would not take place until after the
November election. However, the President worried that Gray was unable to control the
FBI. “I don’t believe that we oughta have Gray in that job,” he told his Chief of Staff.47
Gray struggled to manage the Watergate investigation while unaware of Felt’s
resentments and duplicitous activities. At the same time, top officials within the FBI
urged the Acting Director to reauthorize illegal surveillance tactics to combat leftist
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violence. During Gray’s first two weeks in office, for example, Assistant Director for
Domestic Security Edward S. Miller asked his superior to reinstitute wiretaps,
microphones, and mail covers. Miller, a Hoover loyalist who participated in black bag
jobs against Communist Party members during the 1950s, confirmed to Gray that the
FBI maintained eight warrantless wiretaps on individuals suspected of involvement in
revolutionary violence, all of them targeting either the Black Panther Party or alleged
Weather Underground associates. FBI agents in New York were also opening and
tracking the mail of individuals suspected of providing aboveground support to the
Weather Underground. According to Gray, Miller wanted to drastically expand the FBI’s
usage of restricted surveillance techniques. “I could use sixty-five taps, thirty-three
microphones, and seventy mail covers,” Miller supposedly said.48
Miller sought additional surveillance ahead of the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions, scheduled for June and August 1972, respectfully, both of them
booked to take place in Miami. After violence marred the 1968 Democratic National
Convention in Chicago, FBI officials were anxious to prevent a repeat scenario at either
party’s 1972 Convention, particularly the Republican’s, which Miller predicted would
draw more “power and fire” due to popular opposition to Nixon’s prolonging of the war
in Vietnam.49 Miller informed Gray that eight percent of the FBI’s 2,100 “domestic
security” informants would be attending the Republican Convention. In keeping with
longstanding practices, the FBI focused on preventing violence by protesters while
implicitly condoning police violence through their silence on the matter. Miller
especially wanted surveillance on VVAW, which over the past year had become a top
48
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target of the FBI’s domestic surveillance targets under the “Internal Security—
Revolutionary Activities” category, designated for groups the Bureau deemed prone to
violence.50
Gray declined to approve Miller’s request for electronic and mail surveillance
after speaking with Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson, who advised that such a
request would never hold up in court.51 Though he sought to prevent revolutionary
violence, Gray was also sensitive to popular scrutiny of FBI surveillance practices, and
reluctant to approve tactics that could damage the Bureau’s legitimacy if revealed to the
public. The Acting Director did, however, approve Miller’s request to order L.A.
undercover agents who had infiltrated VVAW to participate in a cross-country caravan
of activists heading to the summer 1972 Democratic and Republican Conventions.52
None of the longhaired, bearded agents whom the Los Angeles field office had
unofficially sent undercover approximately two years earlier had yet infiltrated an
underground guerrilla cell or prevented revolutionary violence. Nor had they
uncovered evidence of VVAW members plotting violent attacks. Nonetheless, Gray
viewed the use of undercover agents as promising, and lacked Hoover’s aversion to the
tactic on grounds that it violated the FBI’s traditional dress code and put agents in
harms way.
Ibid, 57. According to a 1975 FBI letter to the Church Committee, the FBI opened its investigation of
VVAW in August 1971 in order to “determine the extent of control over VVAW by subversive groups
and/or violence-prone elements in the antiwar movement.” Church Committee, Book III, 239, footnote
33.
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undercover special agent activity in the domestic terrorism arena.” Contemporary FBI documents,
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Gray’s authorization of the FBI’s surveillance of VVAW was not merely for the
purported aim of preventing violence. Evidence from oral histories, contemporary
newspaper articles, and sworn testimonies indicates that the Bureau thoroughly
infiltrated VVAW chapters throughout the country with paid informants, some of whom
acted—either independently or at the urging of their handlers—as agent provocateurs,
attempting to convince others in the group to partake in acts of revolutionary
violence.53 VVAW members throughout the country also endured regular surveillance
by plainclothes officers and arrests by local police on questionable pretexts.54 In
addition, VVAW was a target of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP), a
group whose members John Mitchell, Jeb Stuart Magruder, G. Gordon Libby, and E.
Howard Hunt later served prison sentences for their involvement in the Watergate
Scandal. Prior to the 1972 Republican Convention, Liddy and Magruder discussed ideas
for covertly disrupting VVAW or using the group to publicly embarrass the McGovern
campaign. Pablo Manuel Fernandez, a paid informant with links to Watergate burglary
mastermind Howard Hunt, also attempted to sell hand grenades, machine-guns, and
other weapons to VVAW members ahead of the Miami convention, though the antiwar
veterans turned him down.55
The fact that VVAW members declined Fernandez’s weapons offer seems to
confirm an account from Cril Payne, one of the Los Angeles “deep cover” agents who
infiltrated the group during its cross-country caravan to the Miami Republican
Convention. Payne contented that contrary to FBI officials’ claims, VVAW members
Andrew E. Hunt, The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (New York: New York
University Press, 1999), 149.
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were not violence prone. “After eating, sleeping, rapping, and traveling with these
veterans, what was my colleagues’ collective impression? It was not what I expected,”
Payne recalled. “According to the agents, whose opinions I highly respected, the VVAW
members they had traveled with had no intention of promoting violent confrontations.
My friends had reached the conclusion, based on their personal experiences, that the
Bureau was totally wrong in its assessment of this group.” 56
More research in the more than 20,000 pages of FBI files on VVAW is needed in
order to determine the motives and nature of the Bureau’s investigation of the group.57
It is clear, however, that Gray’s reasons for investigating VVAW went beyond supposed
violence prevention. On May 31, 1972, less than a month into his term, Gray provided
President Nixon with intelligence on links between VVAW and the McGovern campaign.
Gray wrote confidential memos to Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman and
Attorney General Mitchell stating that an unnamed representative of the McGovern
campaign had attended a VVAW meeting in Los Angeles and agreed to lend a station
wagon leased by McGovern’s campaign committee to VVAW members for the purpose
of “barnstorming” California college campuses to “voice opposition to the Vietnam
War.”58 Though the document did not explicitly say, this information likely came from
the Bureau’s undercover agents in VVAW.59 By providing the president with
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information that could be used to smear an election opponent, Gray demonstrated his
willingness to use FBI surveillance in the service of Nixon’s partisan political objectives.
Top FBI officials also urged Gray to reauthorize break-ins during his first four
months in office. In his memoir, Gray acknowledged, “people both inside the Bureau
and from other agencies… urged me to reinstate the capability for [the FBI’s black bag
job] use in nondomestic operations.”60 Miller later recalled that Gray also discussed the
option of using black bag jobs in domestic operations against the Weather Underground
and similar groups. Miller claimed to have informed Gray early on that break-ins, in
addition to undercover operations, were the best hope for locating and capturing
clandestine Weather Underground fugitives. In addition, Miller said that Special Agents
in Charge of the field offices around the country whom Gray visited during his first
months in office also implored the Acting Director to reauthorize surreptitious
entries.61 Neither Miller nor Felt, however, informed Gray that agents in New York, Los
Angeles, Seattle, San Francisco, Portland, and Phoenix had already been conducting
unauthorized break-ins in search of leads in the WEATHFUG investigation.62
Meanwhile, field agents investigating the Weather Underground and other leftist
guerrilla groups felt tremendous pressure to apprehend revolutionary fugitives using
Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 115.
Miller oral history, May 28, 2008, 159-160.
62 FBI, 8/24/1976, untitled summary of interview with anonymous (name redacted) Detroit special
agent, Gray FBI File, File Number 1222537-0-62-118045, Section 8, Serial 1; Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 114115; Miller oral history interview, 161. Associate Director W. Mark Felt claimed that Gray verbally
authorized break-ins prior to the September 1972 Munich massacre. In his 1979 memoir, Felt asserted
that on July 18, 1972, the Acting Director wrote him a note regarding the Weather Underground
investigation that stated, “Hunt to Exhaustion. No Holds Barred.” Felt also claimed that in a second note
written a short time later, Gray said “I want no holds barred and I want to hunt Weatherman and similar
groups to exhaustion.” Furthermore, Felt asserted that around this same time, Gray ordered top FBI
officials to “survey the feasibility of reinstituting FBI participation” in surreptitious entries. Felt
purported to believe that Gray made these orders under the direction of the Nixon White House, which he
claimed wanted the new Acting Director to “implement portions of the Huston Plan.” No other evidence
supports Felt’s claims, however. See Felt, The FBI Pyramid from the Inside, 324, 326.
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any means at their disposal. Miller recalled that many field officers and their agents
interpreted Gray’s repeated orders that agents hunt leftist guerrillas “to exhaustion” as
signals to continue use of such tactics.63 A special agent who headed the Weather
Underground investigation in the FBI’s Detroit office confirmed Miller’s assertion. In
August 1972, WEATHFUG agents from around the country met in Washington for a
“Weatherman In-Service” to discuss and coordinate their nationwide investigation.64 In
the FBI document describing the conference, the name of the Detroit agent is redacted,
but his testimony nonetheless attests to the climate of pressure and uncertainty that
pervaded the WEATHFUG investigation during Gray’s first four months in office.65
According to the Detroit agent, investigators at the conference discussed the fact that
agents from several field offices were engaging in break-ins, but disagreed over
whether or not the tactic should be used, and sought approval for the tactic from FBI
headquarters. The agent also recalled that some agents on leftist guerrilla assignments
resorted to using “suicide bugs”—warrantless electronic wiretaps or hidden
microphones applied without authorization, for which “if you got caught you were on
your own.”66 Under intense pressure from FBI headquarters to apprehend guerrilla
fugitives, but lacking clear guidelines on how to do so, local Special Agents in Charge
and their field agents weighed the advantages and drawbacks of utilizing illegal
surveillance practices in regard to efficacy, ethics, legality, and their future careers.
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Payne, Deep Cover, 138.
65 FBI, 8/24/1976, untitled summary of interview with Detroit special agent. FBI agents gathered this
individual’s testimony in 1976 as the Justice Department prepared indictments against Gray, Felt, Miller
and other Bureau officials and agents involved in break-ins and other illegal surveillance tactics during
the Weather Underground investigation.
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Gray avoided reauthorizing black bag jobs prior to the Munich attacks for the
same reason that Hoover refused to reinstitute the practice: he believed the potential
negative ramifications of the public learning about the FBI’s use of the illegal tactic
outweighed any investigative benefits to be gained through its use. The Supreme
Court’s June 19, 1972 decision in the Keith case—delivered two days after the second
Watergate break-in—played into Gray’s calculation. The case came from Eastern
Michigan, where federal district Judge Damon Keith ruled that Attorney General John
Mitchell could not withhold evidence of FBI warrantless wiretaps in the federal
government’s case against Lawrence “Pun” Plamondon, the former White Panther
leader and Ten Most Wanted fugitive charged with dynamiting an Ann Arbor CIA office
in 1968. In its first ever decision on warrantless wiretapping, the Supreme Court
unanimously rebuked Mitchell’s argument that his approval of warrantless FBI taps on
Plamondon’s phone were legal under the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1968 on the grounds
that the surveillance “gather[ed] intelligence information deemed necessary to protect
the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
form of Government.”67 Recent Nixon appointee Justice Lewis Powell delivered the
Court’s decision. “The issue before us in an important one for our people and their
Government,” he wrote. “It involves the delicate question of the President’s power,
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal
security measures without prior judicial approval.”68 Powell announced that such
authority, which Attorneys General had authorized without Congressional or judicial
oversight since the Roosevelt administration, was illegal under the Fourth Amendment
67
68
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of the Constitution, which outlawed warrantless searches and seizures.69 In his memoir,
Gray wrote that Attorney General Kleindeinst ordered the FBI to drop four warrantless
wiretaps and two microphones targeting the Black Panthers and suspected Weather
Underground associates three days after the Court’s decision.70 Why did Gray not seek a
warrant for the wiretaps? He did not say, but it could be that the FBI either lacked solid
evidence or had gained its evidence through break-ins or other illegal surveillance
tactics.
Prior to the Munich attack, Gray’s most significant new measure to combat
guerrilla violence was his authorization of undercover agents, a first in FBI history. On
July 24, 1972, in a coded teletype sent to seventeen field offices, Gray stressed the extra
secrecy and “extreme importance” of under cover operations aimed at leftist guerilla
groups:
I expect Weatherman and similar groups to be hunted to exhaustion. This can
only be done by utilization of sufficient manpower and penetration into the
underground by informants and agents where warranted. You are reminded of
the two objectives to be achieved in these cases: one, short-range, the immediate
apprehension of the fugitives and two, long-range, penetration and
neutralization of the underground apparatus.71
A couple weeks later, FBI Headquarters hosted a national conference for agents
working the WEATHFUG investigation (participants informally called the meeting the
“Weathermen In-Service”), in which the Domestic Security Division announced the
formation of the top secret Special Target Informant Development Program (SPECTAR)
dedicated to developing undercover agents and new informants capable of infiltrating
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the clandestine Weather Underground.72 SPECTAR formalized a practice that had been
going on since August 1970, including in Los Angeles, where “deep cover” agents had
infiltrated VVAW. In his memoir, Gray recalled that he authorized “carefully selected
young special agents” to go undercover on a fulltime basis, “to live with these people
[leftist guerrillas], to sleep with these people, to make love to women if necessary, to
smoke marijuana if necessary.”73 None of the FBI’s deep cover agents ever infiltrated a
leftist guerrilla cell, however, despite fully adopting the counterculture lifestyle and
affinity for marijuana and LSD.74
During Gray’s first four months in office, the Keith decision, along with
heightened public concerns over civil liberties and FBI surveillance practices prompted
the Acting Director to resist Miller and other Bureau officials’ calls to reinstitute illegal
surveillance techniques. Gray later acknowledged that his “preference for increased live
informant and undercover special agent activity in the domestic terrorism arena” was
based partially on concerns that the FBI’s use of warrantless wiretapping and other
illegal surveillance tactics would not stand in court.75 Gray’s position changed, however,
after Munich.

The Munich Siege and FBI Break-Ins
The Munich Olympics attack was a critical moment in FBI Associate Director W. Mark
Felt’s simultaneous war on leftist guerrillas and covert campaign to undermine L.
Patrick Gray and the Nixon administration. The atmosphere of panic wrought by Black
Payne, Deep Cover, 141.
Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 121.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, 57.
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September’s siege provided Felt and Miller with an opportunity to authorize the Dallas
Arab Information Center break-in on their own, without Gray’s knowledge. Two weeks
later, the Nixon administration formed the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
(CCCT), and designated the FBI as the sole federal agency responsible for responding to
terrorist attacks inside the United States. Under intense White House pressure to
prevent terrorism, Gray was forced to respond to Felt’s maneuver. Gray could have
chosen to sanction Felt and Miller for breaking the law without his approval. However,
such a move would have revealed his lack of control over the FBI’s daily operations, and
risked undermining his standing with both Nixon and his FBI agents. Instead, Gray
chose an option that allowed him to save face, maintaining a façade of leadership while
Felt effectively ran the Bureau. Immediately after his first meeting with the CCCT, Gray
retroactively reauthorized the FBI’s use of black bag jobs for “terrorism” investigations
and took full credit for the decision.
The FBI’s Arab Information Center break-ins have never received the type of
scrutiny afforded to the Weather Underground black bag jobs, primarily because the
Justice Department never indicted Gray, Felt, or Miller for authorizing them.76 The few
popular accounts of the FBI’s post-Munich operations against Arab targets came from
Gray and Felt, who both publicly claimed that the Dallas break-in and subsequent
One reason the Justice Department did not charge the FBI officials in relation to these operations is
because officials considered the Arab Information Center break-in to be targeting a “foreign” source (as
opposed to the domestic Weather Underground), so the illegality of the operation seemed less egregious.
Moreover, the Weather Underground black-bag job indictments came partially in response to lawsuits
from individuals targeted by the break-ins; Arabs and Arab Americans targeted by the FBI launched no
such suits. The Justice Department officials also may have taken FBI’s account of the operation at face
value. If they did question the FBI, Attorney General Griffin Bell and his staff may have chose to focus on
the Weather Underground-related indictments because prosecuting on the Arab Information Center
break-in would have potentially required difficult discovery hearings involving classified intelligence
reports on “foreign terrorists,” and could have risked greater public backlash. Racist anti-Arab fears may
have also played into the Justice Department’s decision.
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operations were crucial to thwarting a bloody Palestinian nationalist terrorist attack in
the United States. Both men unapologetically argued that although the FBI’s tactics
were illegal, they were justified because they protected American citizens and national
security from foreign terrorist violence. In his 1976 “Face the Nation” interview, Felt
justified the Weather Underground break-ins by pointing to the supposed success of the
Dallas operation. “The Palestinian Liberation Organization,” Felt claimed, was “planning
on all sorts of terrorism in the United States, and I think we stopped them because we
took that action.”77 Felt made such claims again in his 1979 memoir, contending that the
FBI’s Dallas black-bag job and subsequent campaign of interviewing, fingerprinting, and
photographing the men on the list uncovered in the break-in convinced “foreign
terrorists” that “the FBI was all-knowing and ever-present,” and “ended the Palestinian
terrorist threat of hijacking, massacres, and bombings in the United States.”78 Similarly,
Gray claimed in his 2005 memoir that the FBI “harassed… dozens of Al Fatah
assassins… out of the country by knocking on their doors and saying we wanted to
fingerprint them.” “Though it was clearly illegal,” he wrote, “the niceties of due process
weren’t applied; nobody in the intelligence community, the Justice Department, or the
White House was willing to risk the time that might allow one of them to slip free and
commit the atrocity he was here for.”79
Many details surrounding the post-Munich FBI break-ins and Gray’s
reauthorization of the practice remain unknown. Did Gray verbally approved break-ins
solely for use against supposed Arab “terrorists,” or did he also approve the measures
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for use in the Weather Underground investigation? And what prompted the Dallas field
office to initiate the Arab Information Center break-in? Did FBI Headquarters send a
message to field offices after the Munich siege calling for measures to preempt the
possibility of a similar deadly attack in the U.S.? These questions remain unanswered
partly because FBI personnel deliberately kept written records of the break-ins
minimal, limiting most of their communication on the matter to verbal exchanges in
order to avoid self-incrimination. To make matters worse, FBI agents destroyed most of
the documentation that did exist in 1976 when the Justice Department began to
investigate the FBI’s involvement in the practice. Moreover, Gray, Felt, and Miller all left
differing, contradictory accounts of who authorized the break-ins, when, and under
what conditions, not surprising since all three men faced legal consequences for their
actions. In 1978, the Justice Department indicted the trio for authorizing the illegal
Weather Underground break-ins. A federal jury convicted Felt and Miller in 1980, but a
judge dropped the charges against Gray, who maintained that he had authorized the
black bag jobs targeting foreign “Arab terrorists,” but not the operations targeting the
domestic Weather Underground. Felt and Miller nonetheless insisted that Gray had
verbally authorized break-ins against both targets.80
Despite lingering questions, a careful side-by-side reading of Gray, Felt, and
Miller’s memoirs and interviews casts light on the role each man played in
reauthorizing the break-ins. These personal accounts are especially illuminating when
analyzed in conjunction with a series of thirteen short memos Miller wrote to Felt
authorizing break-ins in the months after the Munich attack, sources that are available
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in Gray’s FBI Director’s file amid other documents released to his attorneys through the
discovery process during his late 1970s legal battle.81 Miller wrote the memos as part of
a system he and Felt devised after the Munich Massacre, in which Miller kept a record of
break-ins that Felt verbally authorized. Pursuant to their secret agreement, Miller
referred to the break-ins in writing as “contact with an anonymous source” and marked
the memos with a “Do Not File” caption reminding Felt to store the documents in a
secret location outside the FBI’s official filing system.82 On September 7, 1972, Miller
captioned the first of these memos “Al Fatah; IS – Middle East,” indicating that the
operation was part of an FBI internal security investigation of Fatah, the largest faction
of the PLO, led by Yasir Arafat, from which the Black September Organization had
recently split.83 The September 7 memo demonstrates that Felt and Miller approved the
Dallas break-in two weeks before Gray met with Nixon’s CCCT and verbally
reauthorized the FBI’s use of black bag jobs. However, there is no evidence that the
FBI’s use of this illegal surveillance tactic thwarted a Palestinian nationalist attack in
the United States.
The FBI conducted the Dallas Arab Information Center break-in not because they
possessed evidence of an impending terrorist attack in the United States, but as an act
of preventative surveillance intended to preempt the possibility of such an event. As
Felt wrote in his 1979 memoir, he and Miller authorized the Dallas supervisor’s request
for “permission to make a surreptitious entry into the offices of a suspected Palestinian
All thirteen of the Miller to Felt break-in memos are available in the LPG FBI, File No. 1222537-0-62118045, Section 8, Serial 1.
82 Miller to Felt, “Al Fatah; Internal Security—Middle East,” September 7, 1972, Gray FBI File. Gray
explained Felt and Miller’s communication and filing arrangement in In Nixon’s Web, 121; Miller offered
additional explanation in his oral history, 161, 163.
83 Miller to Felt, “Al Fatah; Internal Security—Middle East,” September 7, 1972. On Black September’s
split from Fatah, see Chamberlin, The Global Offensive, 149.
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terrorist group to learn of any terrorist plans for the United States and to identify any
possible terrorists who were residing here.”84 Felt’s account is consistent with the
Miller’s September 7 memo, which stated,
On 9/7/72 Security Supervisor [name redacted] Dallas Office, telephonically
contacted Bureau Supervisor [name redacted] and requested authorization to
contact an anonymous source in connection with captioned matter [Al Fatah] at
the Arab Information Center, Suite 1302, Hartford Building, 400 North St. Paul,
Dallas, Texas. He assured that such contact could be accomplished with full
security. I was advised of the Dallas request during the course of this telephone
call by Supervisor McDonnell and authorized the contact of an anonymous
source provided full security was assured.85
Dallas FBI agents determined they could break-in to the Arab Information Center
without getting caught because the organization’s director, Dr. Seif El-Wadi Ramahi,
was out of the country on his honeymoon.86 Because local FBI offices rarely initiated
unusual actions independently, it is likely that the Dallas field office requested
permission to conduct the break-in in response to a request from FBI Headquarters,
whether a direct request for specific information on the Arab Information Center, or a
general request to multiple field offices for intelligence on possible terrorist attacks.
There is no documentary evidence to determine this, though a journalist with sources
on the Church Committee reported in 1975 that the FBI had acted at the request of the

Felt, The FBI Pyramid from Inside, 325. Felt’s account of the Arab Information Center operation, despite
explaining the motives behind the Dallas field office’s break-in request, contains an important inaccuracy.
Felt contended that a lower-level Domestic Security Division official at FBI Headquarters authorized the
Dallas supervisor’s request, and that he, Miller, and Gray only learned of the operation after it was a “fait
accompli.” Miller’s September 7, 1972 memo to Felt belies this claim, however, demonstrating that both
men authorized the Dallas field office request. Felt likely made this claim in his memoir as part of his
efforts to resist the Justice Department’s efforts to convict him for his role in authorizing the Weather
Underground break-ins.
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CIA, which was “following up on intelligence received from foreign governments,” likely
Israel.87
Regardless of who initiated the post-Munich pursuit of preventative intelligence
on Arabs in the United States, the Dallas field office issued their request in the context of
the FBI’s ongoing war with domestic leftist guerrillas. FBI Headquarters had been
pressuring field offices to preempt guerrilla attacks for over two years. By prompting a
global panic about the threat of Palestinian terrorism, and creating an international
embarrassment for West German security forces, the Munich Massacre put even more
pressure on FBI field offices. In this climate, the Dallas field office’s domestic security
supervisor must have felt morally and professionally compelled to seek a preemptive
break-in into the Arab Information Center office, even if he had no solid evidence
linking the office to Al-Fatah. The Dallas Special Agent in Charge made his decision
knowing that if a group like Black September carried out a deadly attack in the U.S. and
it was later determined that the FBI had foregone an opportunity to prevent it, he
would be held personally responsible by FBI Headquarters, the White House, and the
American people. By officially authorizing the break-in, however, Felt and Miller

Ibid. Gray alleged in his memoir that Felt called him in Seattle “within days of the [Munich] massacre,”
informing him that the CIA had passed along information from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv indicating
that Fatah planned to carry out an attack on an airport in the Eastern United States, and that a Black
Panther informant in Los Angeles had corroborated the story. Supposedly, the informant indicated that
L.A. Panthers had discussed the idea of receiving training from Al Fatah guerrillas in Algeria who were in
contact with exiled Panther Eldridge Cleaver in order to carry out political kidnappings in the United
States. Numerous sources contradict Gray’s claim, however. FBI documents in Gray’s Director’s File,
though heavily redacted, reveal that the unnamed LA. Panther informant’s warnings of a possible
kidnapping attack in the U.S. “were totally unrelated” to the Munich siege. Moreover, documents from the
FBI’s Black September File indicate that agents investigated a Black September plot to bomb an airliner,
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departed from FBI Headquarters’ practice of informally encouraging black bag jobs, and
provided the Dallas supervisor and his agents assurance that Bureau officials supported
the action, and would take responsibility for its criminal nature if necessary.
President Nixon also worried about a Palestinian nationalist attack occurring in
the United States. Shortly after the Munich siege, Jean Dixon, an alleged psychic with a
popular syndicated column, predicted that Black September would carry out a terrorist
attack in the United States targeting Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli’s ambassador to the United
States. On September 21, after his secretary Rose Mary Woods told him about Dixon’s
prediction, Nixon spoke with Kissinger about his concerns. “Suppose [Black September]
kidnap[s] Rabin, Henry, and demand[s] that we release all blacks who are prisoners
around the United States, and we didn’t and they shoot him? … We have got to have a
plan,” he insisted. “We have got to have contingency plans for hijacking, for kidnapping,
for all sorts of things that [could] happen around here.”88 Nixon made his comment a
few days after Palestinian militants based in Amsterdam sent letter bombs to Israeli
targets in multiple countries, stoking further post-Munich hysteria over the threat of
international terrorism. One of the explosives killed an Israeli diplomat in London,
though officials intercepted the remaining bombs in Brussels, Geneva, Paris, Jerusalem,
Montreal, Ottawa, and New York.89
In order to address the problem of “terrorism,” Nixon formed the CCCT on
September 25, three days after sharing his fears with Kissinger. Gray attended the
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Committee’s first meeting the same day.90 In the aftermath of the Huston Plan that
Nixon aborted two years earlier, the CCCT, formed at Kissinger’s suggestion, was “the
first official U.S. government body charged with focusing on the terrorism problem.”91
The CCCT’s authority was extremely limited, however. While the Huston Plan attempted
to consolidate and expand the surveillance powers of all U.S. intelligence agencies
under the direct command of the White House, the main purpose of the CCCT was to
provide policy analysis, most of which would be undertaken by the committee’s
separate Working Group.92 In the midst of the escalating Watergate Scandal, Nixon did
not risk another Huston Plan-like attempt to seize control of the nation’s intelligence
agencies. Instead, the President charged the FBI, rather than the CIA or State
Department, with “full responsibility for combatting foreign terrorists inside the United
States.”93 Nixon’s Assistant John Ehrlichman conveyed this news during the CCCT’s
inaugural meeting. Gray recalled that the other intelligence officials in the room were
relieved by Ehrlichman’s pronouncement. They “washed their hands like Pontius
Pilate,” he wrote. According to Gray, “nobody there, the secretary of defense or the rest
of them, wanted to take responsibility for these Al Fatah guerrillas and other types that
were coming in.”94 Gray did not provide a direct explanation for this, but it is likely that
other intelligence officials knew that preventing attacks by clandestine guerrilla
organizations was inherently difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine

White House memorandum, Nixon to Kissinger, “Action to Combat Terrorism,” September 25, 1972.
Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 27. Stampnitzky analyzes how CCCT-funded research led to the rise of
terrorism experts and the “invention of terrorism,” but does not mention the Huston Plan.
92 The committee itself convened only a few times, though its working group met regularly from 1972 to
1977, providing the White House with anti-terrorism policy advice, sponsoring a number of conferences
on terrorism, and funding several research projects.
93 Gray, In Nixon’s Web, 117.
94 Ibid.
90
91

276

that any intelligence official in his right mind would envy the FBI’s burdensome duty to
prevent guerrilla attacks inside the United States amid Congress’ increased scrutiny of
intelligence agencies on one hand and the American public’s rising fears of terrorism on
the other.
Because the minutes to the first CCCT meeting are classified, it is unknown
whether or not Ehrlichman ordered Gray to reinstitute break-ins. However, the White
House had been pressuring the FBI reinstitute the practice since shortly after Nixon
came into office. Moreover, the CCCT meeting took place in Washington on the very
same day that Felt convened a conference of Special Agents in Charge from around the
country.95 In his 2008 oral history, Miller stated that Gray verbally informed him in
person in September 1972 that he had decided to reauthorize surreptitious entries for
both the Al-Fatah and Weather Underground investigations, and instructed Felt to
organize the conference in order to inform them of the FBI’s new policy of permitting
break-ins for terrorism investigations. Miller recalled that Gray made an appearance
during Felt’s meeting, where he emphasized to the Special Agents in Charge, “I want you
to make damn sure that you don’t do any of these [break-ins] without the Bureau’s
authority!”96 Felt also recollected Gray’s statement, adding in his 1979 memoir that the
Acting Director “ordered an all-out effort to prevent terrorism in the United States.”97 In
all likelihood, Gray addressed the FBI field supervisors’ conference after having just left
the CCCT meeting. Whether or not Ehrlichman explicitly directed Gray to reinstitute
No author indicated, “Conference, Special Agents in Charge, Washington D.C., September 25-26, 1972,”
LPG FBI, 1222537-0-62-118045 EBF 212x1, Section 1, Serial 1.
96 Miller oral history, 162.
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black bag jobs, the Acting Director made his orders under intense pressure from Nixon
and the American public to prevent a bloody Munich-like guerrilla attack inside the
United States.

The FBI and Anti-Terrorism after Munich
After the Munich attack and the FBI’s reauthorization of black bag jobs, the Bureau’s
war with leftist guerrillas unfolded in ways that no one could have anticipated. There is
no evidence to support Gray and Felt’s claims that the FBI’s post-Munich operations
thwarted a Black September terrorism conspiracy in the United States. The FBI never
arrested anyone on charges related to this supposed plot, which they could have done
had they possessed sound evidence. Nor has the FBI has ever declassified documents
corroborating these assertions.98 Instead, available evidence demonstrates that the FBI
responded to the Munich attack by illegally harassing innocent people and chasing false
leads. At the same time, the CCCT’s mandate, coupled with increasing public scrutiny of
FBI operations, prompted Gray to significantly reorganize the Bureau’s domestic
surveillance practices. While FBI agents carried out break-ins targeting the Weather
Underground, the Arab Information Center, and other targets, Gray curbed spying on
the U.S. left in order to more carefully focus preventative intelligence efforts on groups
and individuals the FBI deemed prone to revolutionary violence. Gray also redirected
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the FBI was concerned in mid-October 1972 over intelligence
from an unknown source indicating that “Al-Fatah” planned to assassinate Rabin or Sargent Shriver,
George McGovern’s vice presidential candidate, prior to the November election. John Ehrlichman
discussed this supposed plot with Nixon on October 18, 1972, indicating that he had received the
information from David R. Young, the Watergate conspirator who worked with Ehrlichman’s deputy Egil
Krough and served as a Cabinet representative on the CCCT working group. Ehrlichman mentioned the
supposed intelligence while conveying Gray’s desire for an official White House policy outlining the FBI’s
responsibilities in the case of a terrorist attack in the United States. Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 804,
October 18, 1972. Also see Naftali, Blind Spot, 60-61.
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Bureau resources towards apprehending guerrilla fugitives and developing contingency
plans for responding to domestic and international “terrorist” attacks inside the United
States.
None of these efforts prevented guerrilla violence, however. The Weather
Underground remained at large. And despite the State Department’s “Operation
Boulder,” a post-Munich effort to closely scrutinize all Arab and Middle Eastern
applicants for U.S. visas, PLO-affiliated Iraqi militant Khalid Duhhan Al-Jawary and two
other guerrillas entered the U.S. in early 1973.99 The cell planned to detonate three car
bombs outside Israeli banks and the El Al terminal at Kennedy Airport in New York
during Prime Minister Golda Meir’s visit to the United Nations. The plot failed, however,
only because of the attackers’ mistakes—faulty design prevented the hand-made bombs
from detonating.100 Meanwhile, controversy over Watergate and FBI surveillance
practices continued to wear away at the Bureau’s popular legitimacy.
The FBI did in fact harass Arabs and Arab-Americans after the Munich attack and
the Dallas break-in. However, accounts from individuals targeted by the FBI challenge
Gray and Felt’s assertions that these people were foreign “assassins” and “terrorists,”
and that the Bureau successfully “harassed” them “out of the country.”101 The Dallas
Arab Information Center’s director Dr. Ramahi, a Palestinian with a degree from
On December 7, 1972, CCCT Working Group member Armin H. Meyer of the State Department wrote,
“as a result of FBI deft action, the ringleader of Fatah in the United States, who cleverly by-passed
Operation Boulder, was apprehended and persuaded to leave the United States voluntarily on December
6.” It is unclear if this claim is true, however, and if so, whether the FBI located this individual as a result
of the Dallas break-in. See Department of State memo, Armin H. Meyer to Members of the Working Group
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, “Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Working Group,”
December 6, 1972, 3, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files, Staff Member and
Office Files, Richard C. Tufaro, Subject Files, Box 1, CCCT Working Group [1], Richard Nixon Library. On
Al-Jawary, see Weiner, Enemies, 320.
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Southern Illinois University, did not flee the United States. On the contrary, U.S.
authorities denied him a return visa when he sought to come back to Texas after his
honeymoon.102 Ramahi’s successor at the Arab Information Center was Dr. Munir
Bayoud, an American of Palestinian heritage. Bayoud insisted that Ramahi had no
connections to terrorism, and that the document FBI agents stole from the former
director’s briefcase was not a list of terrorists, but a mailing list containing names of
students and other people of Arab descent living in the United States.103 Bayoud also
revealed that FBI agents interrogated him after the Munich massacre, and made him
feel so threatened that he sought out an attorney.104 Although the identities and stories
of the other ninety-two individuals the FBI harassed as part of its post-Munich
Palestinian “terrorism” investigation remain unknown outside of the Bureau, it is clear
that Bayoud, in contrast to Felt and Gray’s claims, was neither a terrorist nor a
foreigner. And although FBI agents frightened Bayoud, they did not drive him out of his
home country.
Fears of a Munich-style terrorist attack in the United States sowed confusion
within the FBI. Declassified FBI documents indicate that on September 12, 1972, a week
after the Munich attack, special agents mobilized throughout the eastern United States
in response to information from an undetermined source warning that Black September
militants sought to blow up airliners at an East Coast airport prior to the close of the
Munich Olympics, which Olympic officials had resumed after a brief suspension to
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mourn the murdered Israeli athletes.105 FBI agents from Boston to San Juan spent
approximately forty-eight hours warning local airport security agencies of possible
violence and searching for the origins of the intelligence before the New York FBI office
determined that the investigation was “the outgrowth of a rumor running rampant the
last several days and has no validity whatsoever.”106 The FBI dropped the investigation
and the attack never materialized. Similarly, on November 24, 1972, one hundred and
sixty armed FBI agents converged on Chicago’s O’Hare international airport in response
to information that terrorists were planning a “Lod-style” massacre.107 Though the
threat proved to be a false alarm, Gray considered the FBI’s response to be “an excellent
field test for evaluating our emergency procedures for dealing with threatened terrorist
attacks.”108
The FBI carried out its operations under the belief that the Munich attacks had
signaled an escalation in its war with domestic leftist guerrillas that necessitated the
Bureau’s further adaptation to the threat of “terrorism.” After the Chicago scare, Gray
conveyed his thoughts on the matter to Edward Miller:
We are in an age of terrorism. A potential attack of the sort which occurred at
Lod Airport or which occurred at the time of the Munich massacre could happen
in the U.S. The tactic of the urban guerrilla, often used in Latin American, Algeria,
the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, was introduced into the U.S. about
FBI teletype, SAC Baltimore to Acting Director and SAC Newark, “Threat by Alleged Black September
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five years ago and we have seen ample evidence of it in the form of ambushed
police officers and terrorist bombings which have included the U.S. Capitol and
the Pentagon. We now accept the existence of urban guerrilla terrorism and the
fact that the urban guerrilla’s philosophy of terrorism has made it necessary for
law enforcement to adopt new standards and adapt to the constant threat of
terrorist attack. We recognize that FBI personnel have been targeted for assault
or assassination.109
Gray further argued that the terrorist threat required major FBI field offices to acquire
caches of body armor, shotguns, gas masks, bullhorns, and other equipment left over
from the Army’s use in Vietnam.
There is also no evidence to support Felt and Gray’s claims that black bag jobs
were an effective tactic for preventing guerrilla attacks. In the case of the Weather
Underground investigation, black bag jobs were not only ineffective, but also
counterproductive. Felt and Miller authorized the first post-Munich Weather
Underground break-in on October 24, 1972, targeting a leftist print shop in Eugene,
Oregon run by supporters of the guerrilla organization. Felt and Miller authorized six
more Weather Underground break-ins over the next six months, most of them in the
New York metro area.110 None of these operations, however, uncovered information
leading to the capture of the organization’s members. In October 1973, with the FBI’s
investigation still unsuccessful, the Justice Department dropped their charges against
Weather Underground fugitives. According to an FBI memo, the Justice Department had
prepared its indictments using illegal surveillance by “another government agency”—
probably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or National Security Agency (NSA).111
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Given that the Weather Underground had only carried out one bombing during the past
year, Justice Department officials calculated that bringing attention to illegal FBI
surveillance activities in the midst of the Watergate Scandal was not worth the
additional damage this might cause to the reputation of America’s political institutions.
In addition to reauthorizing break-ins after Munich, Gray also reduced the scale
of the FBI’s domestic surveillance operations. During the 1973 fiscal year, which
roughly covered the period of Gray’s tenure, the FBI reduced its use of informants in
“extremist” investigations by approximately twenty percent.112 Much of this reduction
was due to Gray’s elimination of the FBI’s “ghetto informant” program, which Hoover
established in 1967 in an attempt to gain advance warning of popular rebellions in
African American inner-city communities. Among FBI personnel, the ghetto informant
program was widely regarded as a farce, in which field agents regularly contrived
fictitious “paper informants” and false intelligence in order to meet FBI headquarters’
monthly report deadline.113 Gray also “drastically reduced” the number of Americans on
the FBI’s Administrative Index (ADEX), which listed individuals, deemed a threat to
national security. Though the precise number of individuals on the ADEX under Gray’s
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tenure is unavailable, his efforts contributed to a reduction of names on the list from
over 12,000 in November 1971 to 1,250 in November 1975.114
Gray reduced domestic surveillance partially for strategic reasons, in an effort to
refocus Bureau resources on combating revolutionary violence. However, the Acting
Director was also responding to economic, legal, and political restraints on the Bureau’s
surveillance powers. Public scrutiny over FBI surveillance practices unleashed by the
April 1971 Media, Pennsylvania burglary only intensified as the Watergate Scandal
unfolded in late 1972 and early 1973. On January 31, 1973, for example, NBC television
journalist Carl Stern sued the Justice Department and FBI under the Freedom of
Information Act for access to files related to the COINTELPRO-New Left program
referenced in a document uncovered through the Media burglary. Over the next three
years, Stern’s lawsuit led to the declassification of the FBI’s COINTELPRO documents
and massive investigations of the FBI and other federal intelligence agencies by the
Senate’s “Church Committee” and the House’s “Pike Committee,” which, for the first
time, provided the American public with a full picture of the Hoover FBI’s covert
operations and surveillance of American dissidents.115 Moreover, the FBI’s massive
Watergate, Weather Underground, Black Liberation Army, and MEDBURG
investigations, each of which involved investigators in the majority of the FBI’s 59 field
offices, utilized a massive amount of FBI resources. Nixon’s mandate through the CCCT
that the FBI take responsibility for all terrorist attacks in the United States required still
more Bureau resources, as officials rapidly worked to develop training and operational
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protocols for hostage negotiation and armed standoff situations, both of which required
coordination with additional police and military agencies.116
According to Gray, Nixon’s CCCT directive resulted in the FBI leading the
government’s response to the American Indian Movement’s February 27, 1973 armed
seizure of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, site of the U.S. Army’s massacre of more than
two hundred Lakota Sioux eighty-three years earlier.117 Lasting 71 days and garnering
international media coverage, the Wounded Knee siege pit a few hundred American
Indian militants fortified behind sandbags and trenches against FBI agents, U.S.
Marshals, and Indian vigilantes allied with Dick Wilson, President of the Pine Ridge
Lakota reservation. Thousands of bullets were fired in the stand-off, which resulted in
the death of an FBI agent, a U.S. Marshall, and two Indian activists. The Wounded Knee
siege further damaged the FBI’s public reputation, as public opinion largely favored
AIM and Oglala Sioux elders, who demanded the U.S. uphold its broken treaties with the
Lakota.118 In one of the most public displays of support for the Native American
activists, actor Marlon Brando boycotted the March 27, 1973 Oscar Awards. On live
television, Apache actor and activist Sacheen Littlefeather accepted Brando’s award for
Best Actor in the film The Godfather, and afterwards read to the press a fifteen-page
speech Brando had written in support of the Indians at Wounded Knee.119
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Meanwhile, as Gray juggled guerrilla investigations and growing public scrutiny
of FBI operations, the Watergate Scandal continued to undermine his career prospects.
On January 8, 1973, Nixon again told his staff that he did not want Gray to stay on as the
FBI’s permanent Director. “Gray can’t cut it,” he told Haldeman. Within the next three
weeks, however, Hunt, the five Watergate burglars, and Liddy and McCord all took
guilty pleas. They concealed information about Nixon Cabinet officials’ connections to
the burglary in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars taken from CREEP’s
coffers, but on February 2 Judge John Sirica announced his belief that the full Watergate
story had yet to be revealed, and five days later the Senate voted unanimously to
establish a bipartisan committee to investigate the scandal. Realizing that Gray would
likely get called to testify before the new Senate committee, Nixon calculated that it
would be best to maintain Gray as FBI Director. The president sought to avoid the
appearance of attempting to cover-up the Watergate investigation, and calculated that if
Gray was going to testify about Watergate, it would be better for him to do so during his
confirmation hearings, as a loyal ally to the White House, than as an adversary in the
Senate Watergate investigation. It was too late, however, for Nixon to undo the chain of
events that Felt’s disclosures had triggered.

Conclusion
In early 1973, the FBI’s war on domestic leftist guerrillas yielded the most unintended
of consequences. As the Watergate cover-up unraveled, the leadership of both the
Bureau and the Nixon administration began to crumble beneath the weight of the
institutional conflict spawned four years earlier by revolutionary insurgency against
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war and racism. Nixon hoped that he could defend the federal government’s
prerogative to engage in illegal surveillance by citing the threat of guerrilla “terrorism.”
The president conveyed his feelings on February 16, 1973, when he informed Gray that
he planned to nominate him for the permanent position of FBI Director.
In what was only their second Oval Office meeting since the Acting Director
assumed office nine months earlier, Nixon ordered Gray to cite the threat of “terrorism”
as justification for Bureau surveillance measures during his upcoming confirmation
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Nixon specifically ordered Gray to
assert the FBI’s need to engage in warrantless wiretapping. “There’s this violent Jewish
committee that wants to kill the Arabs, and the Arabs want to kill the Jews … Hijacking
is another thing,” the president exclaimed. “Some of that requires wiretapping. It’s your
responsibility to do this, and your authority. I just don’t think that we should be
defensive … We must not be denied the use of the weapon. The idea that we’re
wiretapping a lot of political groups is bullshit.”120
Nixon also demanded that Gray eliminate the information leaks he believed were
coming from within the FBI, specifically from Mark Felt. “You haven’t been able to do
anything—or have you?—about the leaking coming out of the Bureau,” the President
stated. “The lines lead very directly to [Felt],” he added.121 Gray insisted that he had the
FBI under control, and that the leaks were coming from outside the Bureau. The Acting
Director still believed Felt’s repeated personal avowals that he was not involved in the
leaks. Gray could hardly get a word in, however, as Nixon vented his frustrations over
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the unfolding Watergate Scandal. Ironically, amid deepening crisis, the president longed
for the leadership of his erstwhile friend, J. Edgar Hoover. Privately, the deceased
former FBI Director had been a major source of frustration for Nixon, but Hoover
always maintained discipline within the FBI, and in public he never hesitated to support
the president’s calls for law-and-order policing in response to civil disorder,
revolutionary violence, and leaks of classified information. “This stuff didn’t leak when
Hoover was there,” Nixon declared. FBI personnel, the president insisted, need “to fear
the man at the top, and you’ve got to get that again.” “You remember in World War II,”
he continued, “the Germans, if they went through a town and one of their soldiers was
hit by a sniper, they’d line up the whole goddamned town and say, ‘Until you talk every
one of you is going to be shot.’ I really think that’s what has to be done. I mean, I don’t
think you can be Mr. Nice Guy over there.”122
A few weeks later, however, when it came time for his confirmation hearings,
Gray did not tow the Nixon line. During the hearings, which lasted from February 28 to
March 22, 1973, members of the Judiciary Committee and a string of expert witnesses
hammered Gray on his role in the ITT-Dita Beard controversy as Assistant Attorney
General, on Hoover’s secret files on American politicians, on warrantless wiretaps, on
the FBI’s sharing of VVAW surveillance with the Nixon administration, on his long
periods of time spent away from Bureau Headquarters, and on his sharing of Watergate
investigation files with John Dean.123 In the face of such scrutiny, the Acting Director
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attempted to demonstrate his independence from the Nixon administration by sharing
with the Senate Judiciary Committee the FBI’s classified files on the Watergate
investigation. At this point Gray knew that the FBI’s investigation was moving in on
Nixon’s Cabinet, but he did not realize that the president and his top advisors, including
Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell, had all conspired to obstruct the FBI.
Inadvertently, Gray had provided the Committee with evidence that would lead to both
Nixon’s downfall and his own.
After sifting through the FBI’s Watergate investigation documents, members of
the Judiciary Committee concluded that John Dean had lied to the Bureau by concealing
the contents of Howard Hunt’s safe. On March 22, when Senator Robert Byrd asked
Gray if Dean had lied to the FBI, the Acting Director replied in the affirmative. “I would
have to conclude that that probably is correct,” Gray stated.124 Gray did not mention the
fact that he had destroyed classified documents from Hunt’s safe at Dean’s request, but
he would be compelled to do so soon. Meanwhile, as Gray turned against the White
House, and the Judiciary Committee turned against the Acting Director, Nixon decided
to seek a new FBI chief, and withdrew Gray’s nomination.125
It was too late, however, for either Nixon or Gray to prevent the demise of their
careers. In early April, facing a federal indictment, John Dean began confessing his
Watergate crimes to a grand jury, including his handing of the secret Hunt documents to
Gray. On April 27, 1973, Gray resigned from his position as Acting Director, cryptically
citing “serious allegations concerning certain acts of my own during the ongoing
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Watergate investigation.”126 Three days later, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kleindienst
resigned from their Cabinet posts, and Nixon fired Dean. Felt continued to jockey for a
position as Hoover’s successor, threatening Nixon’s new appointee for Acting Director,
former Environment Protection Agency Director William D. Ruckelshaus, with a mutiny
of more than 70 FBI officials.127 On May 14, however, at Nixon’s urging, Ruckelshaus
accused Felt of leaking classified information to the press, and forced Felt to resign.128
It would still be another year before Nixon’s August 4, 1974 resignation, but by
the summer of 1973, conflict between the Hoover FBI and Nixon White House had
already brought about the downfall of both institutions. Meanwhile, the prime
organization responsible for prompting the FBI-Nixon feud—the Weather
Underground—continued to elude law enforcement. By this point, the Weather
Underground was falling apart as well. It had become clear, with the waning of mass
street protest since the spring of 1970, that their bombings had failed to ignite their
longed-for mass revolutionary uprising. Facing a political and existential crisis,
members of the group spent more time arguing, reading Marx, and reassessing their
strategy than carrying out bombings. Despite their internal feud, the organization
would manage to plant a few more bombs, and publish their 1975 book-length
manifesto Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism, before disbanding
in 1976.129
What the Weather Underground’s guerrillas did not realize, however, was that
they had helped ignite the greatest political scandal in United States history. Without
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the Weather Underground and other domestic leftist guerrillas, it is unlikely that
institutional conflict between Hoover’s FBI and the Nixon administration would have
culminated in the Watergate Scandal. There would have been no Huston Plan; no mass
expansion of domestic surveillance in 1970; no Media, Pennsylvania burglary, no
COINTELPRO controversy; no revival of black bag jobs. Perhaps Hoover would have still
refused to go after Daniel Ellsberg, and Nixon’s Cabinet would have still formed the
Plumbers. But without the bitterness engendered by institutional conflict over
“revolutionary terrorism,” it is unlikely that Mark Felt would have taken on his Deep
Throat operations and exposed Nixon’s Watergate cover-up to the world. The Weather
Underground’s bombings had failed to spark a socialist revolution or overthrow the
state. But inadvertently and indirectly, they had taken down an American president and
irreparably tarnished the legacy of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI.
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EPILOGUE
THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM

U.S. officials did not always refer to insurgent violence as “terrorism.” FBI documents
from the late 1960s and early 1970s also described leftist violence as the work of
“militants,” “extremists,” “radicals,” “revolutionaries,” “guerrillas,” or “anarchists.” Over
the course of the FBI’s war with domestic leftist guerrillas, however, authorities framed
guerrilla violence as “terrorism” with growing frequency. Reflecting on his experiences
investigating the Weather Underground and other leftist guerrilla groups from 1969
through the 1980s, FBI Special Agent William E. Dyson, Jr. recalled this change. The
“people who [were] doing these bombings on campuses, these anti-Vietnam War
people, people that [were] trying to overthrow our Government and get rid of the
Capitalist system,” Dyson recollected, were “called, well, militants… revolutionaries,
radicals, Commies, Pinkos, weirdos, beatniks… I mean there’s all sorts of terms.”1 It was
not until “the early 1970s,” he explained, that “the word terrorism creeps into our
vocabulary.” Indeed, Dyson reflected that he was “working terrorism before terrorism
[was] accepted as a term for this form of violence.”2
Declassified state documents trace authorities’ increasing use of the term
“terrorism” during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In September 1968 Director J. Edgar
Hoover sent a secret memo to police agencies around the country warning that New
Left “militant extremists” planned to “launch a widespread attack on educational
institutions” during the coming autumn. “It would be foolhardy,” he cautioned, “for
1
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educators, public officials, and law enforcement officers to ignore or dismiss lightly the
revolutionary terrorism invading college campuses.”3 Hoover used similar language in
October 1969, when he informed his agents that SDS’s Weatherman faction “was going
underground and forming commando-type units which will engage in terroristic acts,
including bombings, arsons and assassinations.”4 FBI and White House officials utilized
the term to describe leftist violence with increasing frequency after the Weather
Underground’s deadly March 6, 1970 Greenwich Village townhouse explosion, which
precipitated the Huston Plan, the United States first proposed federal institution
explicitly dedicated to combating “terrorism.”
What were the reasons for this shift in terminology? Did Israeli and European
officials’ increasing use of the term “terrorism” to describe Palestinian nationalist
militants’ hijacking of international passenger jets influence FBI and White House
officials?5 What about South African, South American, and South Vietnamese
authorities’ use of the term to characterize domestic left-wing guerrilla insurgencies?
More research is needed to determine the answers, but it is clear that Black
September’s bloody attack at the September 1972 Munich Games was a critical turning
point, after which President Richard Nixon formed the Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism (CCCT), the United Nations held a series of hearings on “terrorism,” and state
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officials in the U.S. and throughout the globe formed the world’s first international
treaties, laws, and protocols dedicated to combating this newly constituted problem.6
Four months after the Munich attacks and Nixon’s founding of the CCCT, FBI
Acting Director L. Patrick Gray publicly conveyed his impressions on the Bureau’s
responsibilities in the fight against terrorism. Gray addressed an audience of police and
intelligence agents on January 16, 1973, at a National Symposium on Terrorism held at
the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. “The terrorist,” the Acting Director proclaimed,
“is an outlaw, a wild animal, a jungle killer!” “How the terrorist got that way is not
important,” he continued, “We’re not interested in the psychological, philosophical,
sociological factors on the terrorist scene.” The priority of law enforcement, Gray
asserted, was not to understand “terrorists” and their motives, but to forcibly prevent
them from killing “innocents.”7
FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley made similar public comments about terrorists
three months after taking his position as J. Edgar Hoover’s first permanent successor.
Sworn in on July 9, 1973, Kelley took the reigns of the Bureau amid swirling
controversies over Watergate, FBI civil liberties violations, and a new wave of leftist
guerrilla violence led by California’s eccentric Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a
mix-gendered clandestine guerrilla organization comprised of white Vietnam veterans
and former student activists and led by escaped radical black convict Donald “Cinque”
DeFreeze. The SLA burst into American consciousness in early 1974 after assassinating

Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 21-48; Naftali, Blind Spot, 54-77; Bernhard Blumenau, The United
Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s (Basingtoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
7 L. Patrick Gray, Address before the National Symposium on Terrorism, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia,
January 16, 1976, 4, LPG FBI, 1222537-0-62-118045 EBF 212x1.
6

294

African American Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster and kidnapping the
young white newspaper heiress Patty Hearst, who in a bizarre turn of events,
denounced her wealthy parents as “pigs” in a tape-recorded communiqué and joined
the group in a series of high-profile armed bank robberies. During the last four months
of Nixon’s presidency, news of the SLA and the FBI’s nationwide search for Patty Hearst
competed with Watergate for national headlines.8 Speaking before a group of military
veterans on November 11, 1974, Director Kelley asserted that leftist guerrilla
“terrorists” acted not in response to understandable political grievances, but because of
their irrational “hatred.” “Urban terrorists,” he declared, “share a common
denominator—that is, hatred of America, free government and other constitutional
liberties.”9 In another speech, Kelley upheld the FBI’s prerogative to engage in
“anticipatory” intelligence operations in order defend society from a “malignant cancer”
of “terrorism and extremism” practiced in the U.S. by “guerrilla-type groups.”10 “The
FBI,” Kelley insisted, “simply cannot wait until the terrorist or extremist—the individual
whose allegiance is to violence—strikes before we act.”11
Gray and Kelley’s comments speak to the greatest legacy of the FBI’s war with
domestic leftist guerrillas: intelligence officials’ framing of “terrorism” as a problem that
was not to be understood but fought, specifically, through “preventative” surveillance,
covert operations, police raids, and high-security incarceration. Lisa Stampnitzky has
described the type of framework Gray and Kelley used to discuss terrorism as a “politics
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of anti-knowledge.”12 Portending how President George W. Bush and other U.S. political
leaders would discuss terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Gray and
Kelley engaged in “active refusal of explanation itself,” removing consideration of
attackers’ motives “from the realm of political debate.”13 Gray and Kelley’s “politics of
anti-knowledge” drew upon Hoover’s similar, earlier characterization of Communists as
“deranged” and urban rioters as senseless “criminals”; from Nixon’s attempts to stamp
out social conflict through “law and order” policing rather than through state initiatives
to eliminate racism, militarism, and economic exploitation; and from early FBI officials’
efforts during the early 1970s to counter leftist guerrillas through “preventative”
surveillance operations.
Despite the ongoing problem of guerrilla violence, public concerns over
government abuse of authority and violation of Americans’ civil liberties prevailed in
the 1970s over fears of terrorism. To a majority of Americans, the crimes of Watergate
overshadowed the emergence of new domestic leftist guerrilla groups such as the New
York-based Puerto Rican nationalist Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN),
the Bay Area’s New World Liberation Front (NWLF), Seattle’s George Jackson Brigade,
and New England’s Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit, as well as Palestinian militants’
continued international bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings. Some U.S. political
leaders sought to emphasize the threat “terrorism” posed to U.S. national security.
Former segregationist and logtime anticommunist Senator Strom Thurmond (R, SC), for
example, presided over more than a dozen hearings on “terroristic activity” and
political violence from 1974 to 1976 as chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
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Internal Security Subcommittee. Gathering testimonies from police, intelligence
officials, and academic experts, Thurmond revived the Internal Security Subcommittee,
an institution liberals typically dismissed as a relic of the McCarthy-era, to investigate
groups such as the Weather Underground, the SLA, and the FALN.14 While Thurmond’s
efforts had little influence on federal policy, investigations of federal intelligence
agencies conducted by the Church Committee and other government bodies led to
substantial new limits on the state’s surveillance powers. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, for example, established a special court to oversee new limits
on CIA and NSA international surveillance, and in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi
issued new guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations that required the Bureau
to base investigations of American citizens on “specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be engaged in activities which
involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the
violation of federal law.”15
America’s prevailing views on terrorism changed dramatically, however,
following the 1980 election of President Ronald Reagan. During the 1980s, notions of
state overreach and repression did not anger Americans nearly as much as concerns
that the federal government was failing to protect them from terrorism. Reagan came to
power after Carter’s presidency became bogged down in the 444-day-long Iranian
hostage crisis, in which a group of Iranian student revolutionaries stormed the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and held 90 people captive; the nightly ABC television news

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Hearings on Terroristic Activity, Parts 1-9, September 1974September 1976, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.-95th Cong. 2nd Sess.
15 Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy, 146, 158.
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program “America Held Hostage” served as a nightly reminder of the Carter
administration’s inability to resolve the conflict. In what some have suspected was the
result of a secret deal between the incoming Reagan administration and the Iranian
revolutionaries, the American hostages in Tehran gained their freedom on January 20,
1981, the day of the new President’s inauguration.16 A week later Reagan proclaimed:
Let the terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are
violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear it said
that we live in an era of limits to our powers. Well, let it also be understood,
there are limits to our patience.17
The conservative “Reagan revolution” was advantageous for Strom Thurmond
and others who sought to revive U.S. intelligence agencies’ “preventative” intelligence
capacities in the name of fighting terrorism. Reagan appointed Thurmond to take fellow
ex-segregationist Senator James O. Eastland’s long-held position as chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. In this capacity, Thurmond established the new Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Security. Freshman Southern conservatives dominated the new
Subcommittee, including chairman Senator Jeremiah Denton (R, AL), and John P. East
(R, NC). An influential member of East’s staff named Samuel T. Francis had published a
report on U.S. intelligence agencies in Mandate for Leadership, the 1,093-page
publication of the conservative Heritage Foundation think-tank that became the Reagan
administration’s policy Bible.18

David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
17 Reagan quoted in David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the
Reagan Era (Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 1.
18 Samuel T. Francis, “The Intelligence Community,” in Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a
Conservative Administration, edited by Charles L. Heatherly (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1981),
903-953.
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Seeking federal surveillance capabilities similar to those outlined in the Huston
Plan, Francis called in his report for an overhaul of Attorney General Levi’s Domestic
Security Guidelines; greater cooperation between intelligence agencies and local police
departments; reinstitution of the McCarthy-era Attorney General’s List of Subversive
Organizations; FBI exemption from the Freedom of Information Act; and a revival of
break-ins, mail-covers, and warrantless wiretapping. Arguing that intelligence agencies
needed to detect terrorist plots in advance, Francis asserted, “authorities must keep
extremist movement under at least moderate surveillance, become familiar with the
public positions and members as well as their unstated goals, adherents, and fringe
elements, and be prepared to escalate surveillance of whatever groups seem likely to
engage in more extreme activities.”19 From February 1982 to March 1983, Francis
played a key role in filing reports and drafting policy recommendations for the Internal
Security Subcommittee’s hearings on the Attorney General Domestic Security
Guidelines and in shaping Attorney General William French Smith’s new Guidelines for
Domestic Security/Terrorism.20 The new Smith Guidelines limited Justice Department
oversight over FBI operations and removed the requirement that Bureau obtain
evidence of illegal activity before opening an investigation, empowering agents to
“anticipate or prevent crime” by initiating surveillance whenever “facts of
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in nan

Ibid, 940.
Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Hearing on Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic
Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines), 98th Cong. 1st sess., March 25, 1983.
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enterprise [to further] political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that
involve force or violence.”21
A deadly leftist guerrilla attack carried out by remnants of the Weather
Underground and Black Liberation Army help create the political climate necessary for
the Smith Guidelines’ expansion of FBI surveillance powers. The Revolutionary Armed
Task Force’s botched October 20, 1981 robbery of an armored Brinks truck in Nyack,
New York left two security guards dead, and led to the arrests of several guerrillas,
including former Weather Underground members Kathy Boudin and David Gilbert and
BLA members Sekou Odinga, Kuwasi Balagoon, and Mutulu Shakur.22 The Nyack
robbery and a series of other attacks by leftist guerrillas also prompted the formation of
the United States first FBI-led interagency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), formed
in New York, Chicago, and Boston from 1980 to 1983.23
Despite defeating the Levi Guidelines, many conservatives continued to bemoan
post-Church Committee intelligence reforms, especially after the FBI failed to prevent
the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), when members of the Islamic fundamentalist
al-Qaida organization flew hijacked airliners into the Pentagon and New York City’s
World Trade Center skyscrapers, killing 2,973 people. The day after 9/11, former
Secretary of State James Baker (who served in the Cabinets of Presidents Reagan and
George H. W. Bush) claimed in a television news interview that the Church Committee
hearings had caused the United States to “unilaterally disarm in terms of our
Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy, 163.
Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Hearing on Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic
Security Investigations, 4; Gilda Zwerman, “Domestic Counterterrorism: US Government Responses to
Political Violence on the Left in the Reagan Era,” Social Justice Vol. 16, No. 2 (1989), 44-45.
23 Dyson oral history interview, 66; Richard Connolly, “Task Force had Role in Halting Holdup,” Boston
Globe, May 20, 1984.
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intelligence capabilities.”24 Speaking on Fox News’ rightwing talk show O’Reilly Factor,
spy novelist Tom Clancy charged, “The CIA was gutted by people on the political left
who don’t like intelligence operations… And as a result of that, as an indirect result of
that, we’ve lost 5,000 citizens this week.”25 FBI Director Mueller affirmed, “We need a
different approach that puts prevention above all else.” FBI Headquarters, he asserted,
needed the “capability to anticipate attacks.”26
Within seven weeks of 9/11, President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT
Act, the greatest expansion of “preventative” surveillance powers since the Huston Plan.
Under the PATRIOT Act, U.S. intelligence agencies seeking to prevent “terrorism” could
engage in warrantless wiretaps and computer searches; enter homes without warrants;
seize library, internet, and business records; and detain resident aliens without charges
for seven days to six weeks. The new rules also empowered FBI agents to recruit
informants and conduct other surveillance without approval from Bureau
headquarters.27 Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the FBI expanded its number of
JTTFs—institutions initially formed to combat domestic clandestine leftist guerrillas—
from thirty-five to over one hundred, including one in every one of its fifty-six field
offices.28
Federal agents began to carry out preemptive arrests even before the Bush’s
signing of the USA PATRIOT Act, however. In the weeks following 9/11, authorities

Baker quoted in Russell A. Miller, ed., U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the
Church Committee to the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2008), 2.
25 Clancy quoted in ibid. At the time Clancy made this quote, police had overestimated the number of
casualties at 5,000.
26 Mueller quoted in Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy, 159.
27 Ibid, 158-159.
28 FBI website, Joint Terrorism Task Forces page, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
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rounded up and detained over 1,000 immigrants, mostly of Middle Eastern descent, and
transferred an unknown number of Arab, Arab-American, and Muslim federal prisoners
to segregation units, where they were held in solitary confinement. Immediately
following the 9/11 attacks, federal prison authorities also transferred several
incarcerated former leftist guerrillas into solitary confinement, including Richard
Williams, Tom Manning, and Raymond Luc Levasseur of the United Freedom Front;
Antonio Camancho Negrón and Carlos Torres of the FALN; Sundiata Acoli of the Black
Liberation Army; and white BLA supporter Marilyn Buck.29 The documents that
ordered this round-up of incarcerated dissidents remain classified, but they appear to
have come from the office of Attorney General John Ashcroft, who on October 26, 2001
signed new federal rules authorizing “special administrative measures with respect to
specified inmates.” Outlined in a document published in the Federal Register entitled,
“National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism,” the rules enable the
Department of Justice to hold prisoners deemed a “threat to national security”
incommunicado for up to a year and deny them the right to attorney-client privilege.30

29 Peace

activist Phil Berrigan also endured such treatment, as did Yu Kikumura, a prisoner accused of
membership in the Japanese Red Army. Anne-Marie Cusac, “You’re in the Hole: A Crackdown on Dissident
Prisoners,” The Progressive, December 2001, and Nora K. Wallace, “Inmate Questions Post-Sept. 11
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News-Press, July 1, 2002, reprinted in Interfaith Prisoners of Conscience Project (IPCP), They Never
Crushed his Spirit: A Tribute to Richard Williams (Montreal: Kersplebedeb, 2006), 48-56, 57-59; J. Soffiyah
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In their efforts to prevent “terrorism” through surveillance and policing, the FBI
and Nixon administration established a legacy as equally profound as Watergate, the
Church Committee reports, and the subsequent popular disillusionment that President
Jimmy Carter famously identified as a national “crisis of confidence” in American
political institutions.31 By waging America’s first war on “terrorism,” Nixon and the FBI
put the United States on a path towards permanent war. Despite short-lived
surveillance reforms instituted after the Church Committee hearings, U.S. officials
employed mass surveillance, covert operations, police raids, incarceration, and military
intervention in the name of fighting “terrorism” at home and throughout the globe
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Such activity increased exponentially after 9/11,
which led to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; covert operations and drone wars in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Syria; the U.S. prison for “terrorists” at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; CIA water-boarding; the NSA’s expansive bulk electronic data
collection programs; and numerous FBI arrests of alleged Muslim and anarchist
“terrorists” that seem to be examples of entrapment rather than preemption of
authentic terrorists plots.32
In keeping with a precedent established during the Nixon administration,
American wars on terrorism—fought to preempt insurgent violence carried out in
response to U.S. state violence—have proved largely ineffective, if not
counterproductive. Sure, police raids, military operations, and drone strikes have
Carter quoted in William Graebner, “America’s Poseidon Adventure: A Nation in Existential Despair,” in
America in the 1970s, edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2004), 157.
32 Human Rights Watch, “U.S.: Terrorism Prosecutions Often an Illusion: Investigations, Trials of
American Muslims Rife with Abuse,” Human Rights Watch website, July 21, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/21/us-terrorism-prosecutions-often-illusion (accessed June 1,
2016).
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occasionally resulted in the capture or extrajudicial execution of key terrorists. But U.S.
military, police, and intelligence agencies’ involvement in countless civilian deaths,
arrests, detainments, and torture sessions, along with the destabilization of Iraq and the
greater Middle East, have also inspired new “terrorist” organizations. Witness the rise
of the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Are America’s latest “terrorist” enemies, to
borrow L. Patrick Gray’s terminology, “wild animals” and “jungle killers” whose motives
are beyond comprehension? Or are the Islamic State’s terrifying insurgents, with all of
their horrible murder and destruction, products of understandable historical
circumstances? Until enough of us gain the courage to answer the latter question in the
affirmative, and find creative ways to overcome the conditions of state violence and
global inequality that foster violent insurgency, self-perpetuating wars on terrorism
will remain a permanent fixture in U.S. and international politics.
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